



TRAINING AND DOCTRINE COMMAND

# MILITARY REVIEW

Security and Defence Review  
Training and Doctrine Command

*Third Edition, June 2012*

Tirana, June 2012

Board of Military Review Publication  
Approved by the Order of the Minister of Defense No. 1538, dated 18/08/2010

**Board Chair**

B.G. Prof. Asc. Dr. Agim Lala

**Members**

Col.(R) Thimi Hudhra

Col. Perikli Koliçi

M.G. (R) Prof. Dr. Ruzhdi Gjatoja

M.G. (R) Prof. Dr. Kostaq Karoli

**Editor in chief**

Pano Hallko

**Editor**

Silvana Markgjonaj

**Operator**

Lindita Kuçana

**Art design**

Teuta Mullisi

ISSN 2227-8133 (Print), ISSN 2227-8141 (Online)

Copyright © 2012 All rights reserved. The Center for Defence Analyses (CDA) of the Albanian Training and Doctrine Command.

The views and opinions expressed in this Military Review are of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policies or positions of the Ministry of Defence, General Staff and Training and Doctrine Command.

The authors of Military Review articles will not be subject to punishment for free expression of individual views and positions even if they are not in line with the official positions of the defence institution.

The authors are also responsible for any slander actions, distortions of facts, offense and plagiarism aspects to the creativity and thoughts of other authors.

This edition of Military Review is found on the website <http://www.tradoc.mil.al/> In case you can not get the information you need on the Internet, please apply for a copy at the electronic address: e-mail: [revistaushtarake@aaf.mil.al](mailto:revistaushtarake@aaf.mil.al) or [qam@aaf.mil.al](mailto:qam@aaf.mil.al)

Training and Doctrine Command  
Center for Defence Analyses  
Research Publications Branch

**Printed: June 2012**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b><i>INTRODUCTION</i></b>	<b>5</b>
<b><i>On the Process Strategy of “Smart Defence”</i></b>	<b>6</b>
Address by Albanian Minister of Defence Mr. Arben Imami on the occasion of the International Conference on Smart Defence, 27 April 2012	
<b><i>Albanian Armed Forces and Smart Defence</i></b>	<b>8</b>
Address by Albanian ChoD, MG Xhemal Gjunksi at the International Conference "Smart Defence-Innovative Approach in facing Security Challenges"	
<b><i>NATO'S Victory in Libya</i></b>	
<b><i>The right way to run an intervention</i></b>	<b>11</b>
Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis, Foreign Affairs, March, April 2012	
<b><i>“Smart defence-innovative approach in facing the present security challenges”</i></b>	<b>16</b>
Dr. Holger Bahle Nato Defence Planning and Smart Defence Team	
<b><i>We will compete with our values</i></b>	<b>23</b>
Brigadier General Agim Lala, TRADOC Commander	
<b><i>“Smart Defence” A Smart Approach for the Balkan Region</i></b>	<b>29</b>
Address to the International “Smart Defence” Conference, 27 April 2012 Col ® Thimi Hudhra, Chief of the Center for Defence Analyses, TRADOC, Tirana	
<b><i>Two approaches towards “operational capability”-Bring them as closer as possible</i></b>	<b>33</b>
Colonel Foto Duro, Director of Defence Policies, MoD	
<b><i>A concept on research and development in AAF</i></b>	<b>41</b>
Colonel Perikli Koliçi, Commander of Defence Academy “Spiro Moisiu”	
<b><i>Defence Attaché</i></b>	
<b><i>Essential element of Defence Diplomacy</i></b>	<b>46</b>
Colonel ® Zaim Kuçi, Former Defence Attaché in the Republic of France/Portugal	
<b><i>Shaping the future Albanian National Maritime Security Strategy</i></b>	<b>56</b>
Captain Ist Rank Artur Meçollari, Chief of CET, TRADOC MSc. Suard Alizoti, Lecturer at “Ismail Qemali” University	
<b><i>STANAG 6001 in the AAF: achievements and problems</i></b>	<b>64</b>
Docent Jaup Zenuni, Ph.D. Applied Linguistics, Faculty of Foreign Languages, Tirana	

<b><i>A historical overview of Military Education Until 1944</i></b> _____	<b>70</b>
Colonel, PhD. Edmond Braneshi, Head of the Military Leadership Section, Defence Academy “Spiro Moisiu”	
<b><i>83 Years Military Hospital in Albania</i></b> _____	<b>83</b>
Colonel Phd Luan Nikollari, LTC Dr. Edlira Kukeli, Military Institute at Central University Military Hospital (CUMH)	
<b>Short Guidance for “Military Review” Research Papers</b> _____	<b>88</b>

## **INTRODUCTION**

This June edition of Military Review in English is dedicated to key issues in the agenda of reforms of NATO and Albania, as an allied country.

‘Smart Defence’ initiative, after the Chicago summit is at the centre of this English edition. Several articles are selected from the ‘smart defence’ conference held in Tirana in 27 April 2012. Authors believe that the ‘Smart Defence’ will be the driver of defence reforms in the years to come. Minister Imami and General Gjunksi are among the dignitaries addressing their speeches to the conference.

Other articles of this edition are written by various well known analysts on different issues, such as the Strategic Defence Review, which is being recently conducted in Albania; some others are addressing historic topics of interests, etc.

Of great interest is the article of US Ambassador Daalder and Admiral Stravridis worth reading for the fresh information and in-depth analyses of the Libya campaign and lessons learned.

Next edition of the Military Review in December will particularly handle issues regarding the Chicago summit and their impact on defence reforms in Albania.

## ***On the Process Strategy of “Smart Defence”***

Address by Albanian Minister of Defence Mr. Arben Imami on the occasion of the International Conference on Smart Defence, 27 April 2012

In a world which is changing fast with all the dynamics of its development, conferences of this nature, forums to exchange ideas and experiences are necessary. In this framework I would like to congratulate the Parliament of the Republic of Albania and NATO Parliamentary Assembly for organizing this event, in the eve of Chicago Summit where that Alliance members are expected to make important decision-making process.

The reason that has driven all the countries of the Alliance to start a process of major reform in the defence sector, beyond the context of financial crisis, undoubtedly related to the Cold War and the nature of relations between state actors or blocs of states of that time. Constant tension between the Soviet Union and Western liberal democracies forced states to establish and maintain large military capacity, often exaggerated and oriented towards conventional defence concept, because the very main risks of the time, were conventional. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, countries were relieved from the nightmare of the great clashes and certainly they started great reforms to eliminate excess capacities and their orientation in the areas most needed. But the truth is that administrative bureaucratic inertia,, especially in security and defence sector has left its trances and has slowed down the reform process.

In more than 20 years after the end of the Cold War, many trends and tendencies have been shaped in the system of international relations, outlining an international political and economic system different from that after the 90's. Many countries that before the 90-es were not integrated into the global economy, are already important players . The extent of their economic interest, certainly, brings even greater interest from these countries to increase military capabilities thus ensuring their economic interests. In addition, the nature of the threats and risks is now diverse therefore making security more complex. Many threats which up to the were barely known have already become a priority and here we can mention: terrorism, organized crime, energy security and cyber security etc.

Under this global circumstances, financial crisis hits, which eventually raises the urgency of reforms in the defence sector. During the Cold War the guiding principle was everything for security thus neglecting the financial effects and that inertia, in many cases, has continued until today, whereas today the guiding principle is balancing defence needs to the resources by considering the principle of cost-efficiency. Here I would like to clarify very important element which is often misunderstood. In principle, this reform is not aiming at reducing capacities, but eliminating excess costs, guiding capacities based on the needs and new capacity building in the framework of a new security context and economic and financial environment.

Most NATO member countries are having deep reforms based on these principles and here we can mention Britain, France, Germany, Italy, as well as the United States of America. In this context, Albania also has entered the phase of implementing a structural reform. General Staff of the Armed Forces has developed a new structure of the Armed Forces, which will be the future structure of these forces.

During the development of this structure we are not guided by the principle of budget cuts, but from that of cost-efficiency. In this sense, there will be no defence budget cuts, but a re-orientation to the needs of the Armed Forces considering maximizing the efficiency of these forces.

In essence, this is the concept of Smart Defence based on the level of cooperation among the Alliance Countries. The principles of Smart Defence are prioritizing-specialization-cooperation. Setting national priorities and their interrelation with the Alliance priorities within the Smart Defence context would be opportunity not to be missed. This is a chance for an open, transparent cooperation oriented towards cost-efficiency in order to meet the fundamental requirements of the Alliance for capacities.

One of the most important elements of Smart Defence is specialization in the sense of planned and consulted reductions of expenses and capacities. This would bring a continuous coordination among the alliance member countries in order to focus the national capacities in the right direction, so that they are complementary to each-other. It is essential for NATO member countries to have a common plan, so that while properly finalizing it there would not be a decrease in capacities. In that way, NATO will maintain and develop the necessary capacity for deterrence and defence.

In this context, the cooperation among our countries will enable us to access each other's capabilities, which are unaffordable and have a high cost for individual countries. This could be done through cooperation among smaller groups of member states or through strategic cooperation between countries that are close in all dimensions. Agreement between Great Britain and France ,on sharing the strategic assets is quite encouraging and may be followed by other Alliance members.

Albania has expressed its full support for Smart Defence encouraging cooperation with the countries of the region under various regional initiatives, such as charter A5 or SEEDM. It is imperative that we move towards increasing interoperability of our Armed Forces and establishing specific frameworks for a concrete cooperation especially in maritime security, natural disasters and civil emergency areas. In this regard, we could form the foundations of a long term and consolidated cooperation among our Armed Forces aiming at contributing directly in NATO-led or EU-led operations, where deemed necessary. Cooperation of the country's military capacity in the region would increase the quality and quantity of operations where we take part and will also reduce the financial cost. Such a successful co-operation is the joint operation in Afghanistan of the military police of several countries of the region under the leadership of Croatia. This operation has produced very positive outcomes.

We are willing to expand and extend this cooperation into other areas.

## *Albanian Armed Forces and Smart Defence*

Address by Albanian ChoD, MG Xhemal Gjunkshi at the International Conference  
"Smart Defence-Innovative Approach in facing Security Challenges"

Let me start with thanking you for this invitation and for the opportunity to share with this very distinguished audience some thoughts and ideas related to the "Smart Defence" initiative and its projection in the Armed Forces.

Just three days ago, the Albanian Parliament, through Parliamentary Security Committee, in cooperation with NATO Parliamentary Assembly, organized here in Tirana, a conference that addressed the issues related to Smart Defence Initiative and their implications for the South Eastern Europe.

Yesterday I came back from Brussels, where I participated in the meeting of NATO Military Committee. One of the main topics discussed in that meeting had to do exactly with issues related to the Smart Defence initiative.

So, taking into account your conference today, within a week, as Albanian Chief of General Staff, I attended and contributed in three very important events, all related directly to this initiative. This fact alone is enough to understand the importance that is barring for the Alliance and for Albania at the same time, perception and understanding of the concept, at first, and its implementation later on.

It is not by coincidence that this very issue is anticipated to be one of the most important topics that will be discussed and elaborated in the Summit of Chicago next month.

Articulated by the NATO Secretary General Mr Rasmussen only one year ago, this initiative became well-known in a very short period of time within all structures of the Albanian Armed Forces. Mr Rasmussen presented this initiative as an alternative to the problems related to the dualism between the necessity to cope with all kind of risks and threats, and further cuts of already limited defence budgets. In other words, this was presented and understood as a good way to accomplish the mission without increasing the national defence spending.

In fact we live today in a reality which is dominated by the phenomenon of globalization. Interdependence of all factors, whether political, economic, financial, military, cultural, technological, etc. is a dominant feature of this global phenomenon.

But this variety of interdependence inevitably makes the nature of risks to be more complex by the fact that in turn requires the same reaction.

Often the inability to cover certain defence programs in terms of the complexity and high degree of interdependence lead to the question: How will the programs be covered by the defence budget in the frame of the present financial crisis? If we have cuts in defence budgets, is it possible that we are most vulnerable in the face of reality so diversified and therefore the threats of different nature?

In these conditions, the optimal option is what Secretary General of NATO summarized in the concept of "Smart Defence".

Let me quote a paragraph that summarized his whole philosophy and content of the concept of "smart defence"



*"I know that in the period of financial constraints everybody can not spend more, but can not spend even less. The answer is to spend better and spend money to achieve our best. We need to help countries to maintain their capabilities, and provide new capacity. This means that we need to better define priorities, specialization for certain capacities and seek multinational solutions. These, together, I call 'smart defence'"*

In this context, I would say that the essence of this process has to do with the need to find appropriate solutions in the focus of the changes that have occurred and continue to be present at all levels of interaction, regional, but also global.

Above all, understanding and implementation of strategy of "Smart Defence" is associated with the appropriate response given to the challenge posed by the relationship between capabilities and commitments. So in a situation with limited budgetary resources it is very important to find an intelligent way to compile the dynamic programs that ensure the mission and commitment of the Armed Forces.

Focusing on the logic of the definition of Mr. Rasmussen the first step in our strategy to build the process of "Smart Defence" is to define the priorities.

Certainly not an easy step to take, because as a member of NATO is very important in identifying these priorities in accordance with two main principles:

First, by defining the areas of these priorities, we must ensure that we provide the necessary level to guarantee national security and secondly, these priorities must be met and be interoperable with the needs and NATO standards.

By knowing the basic priorities of the Alliance as :10 points of "Critical Capacities", adopted in Lisbon, hereinafter "the menu" of 50 "Critical Capacities" which are essential for the alliance to develop and run the mission in Afghanistan, but also the bilateral and multilateral joint capabilities, or knowing the regional or national priorities remain important guidance in designing the strategy of "Smart Defence".

Further on are the developments of individual capacities, which are considered as "the niche capabilities", where many large countries can provide such capabilities to their needs, but also for other allied countries, if it would be necessary.

In this context we are committed to develop capabilities in the context of "niche capabilities" such as national capabilities, looking at these as well as contributions within the Alliance. e.g. the exchange of security and defence senior course, and also through the participation of our troops on missions of POMLT OMLT, etc.

The "Smart Defence" strategy considers the aspect of cooperation very important not only for countries with limited resources, as is our country. Not only our own experience has shown that even in this case can be effective if countries operate together with the Alliance, NATO-led missions, as well as other international organizations.

Experience of joint medical team under the Adriatic Charter (A5), Military Advisory and Training Teams (OMLT), Training and Advisory Teams Police (POMLT) within ISAF, are realities that demonstrate our possibilities to be successfully engaged together to operations into NATO, EU, UN, or other operations.

As a member of NATO, the Albanian Armed Forces are committed to achieve the standards of "Force Goals". We are aware that many of these objectives are difficult to implement, especially because of their cost.

"Smart Defence" gives us an opportunity by recommending their fulfilment in the frame of the regional efforts, in cooperation with our allies and partners.

In 2011, immediately after recognition of the initiative "Smart Defence" we have organized consultations and meetings with relevant institutions to develop our national vision and opportunities in order to determine our capacities and contributions.

Currently the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania are involved in the initiative of NATO, by selecting 22 major projects that have already declared our interest to explore eight of them.

We have declared our readiness to cooperate with joint procurement with some countries in the region, under the A5, (buying a radar) and also the development of a regional joint exercises.

At the same time, we are ready to continue to provide for allies and partners Senior Course on Defence and Security Issues as well as offering our facilities in the Foreign Language Centre

We are aware of the usefulness of these projects not only nationally but also regionally. We are convinced that they will prove our seriousness in the context of the vision of the Alliance.

We think that is very important for all countries in the region to determine their military capabilities, which are necessary to deal with common challenges, and on this basis to consider a strategy of "Smart Defence" in a frame that exceeds the national level.

Wrapping up, I am confident that on our way to implement the "Smart Defence" we can find smart solutions through engagement across the spectrum of Albanian Armed Forces structures and institutions, but also beyond.

Even today this forum is a valuable contribution to our efforts to find the best routes and less cost to implement the initiative.

On the other hand is very important to understand that intelligent elections and solutions will require smart people and effective institutions.

We will be very committed to develop all the intellectual capacity in the interest of national security agenda and our participation in NATO.

*NATO'S Victory in Libya*  
*The right way to run an intervention*

Ivo H. Daalder and James G. Stavridis<sup>1</sup>  
Foreign Affairs, March, April 2012

NATO's operation in Libya has rightly been hailed as a model intervention. The alliance responded rapidly to a deteriorating situation that threatened hundreds of thousands of civilians rebelling against an oppressive regime. It succeeded in protecting those civilians and, ultimately, in providing the time and space necessary for local forces to overthrow Muammar al Qaddafi. And it did so by involving partners in the region and sharing the burden among the alliance's members.

NATO's involvement in Libya demonstrated that the alliance remains an essential source of stability. But to preserve that role, NATO must solidify the political cohesion and shared capabilities that made the operation in Libya possible-particularly as its leaders prepare for the upcoming NATO summit in Chicago this May.

### **Rapid Response**

When the people of Libya rose up against Qaddafi in February 2011, many hoped that the nonviolent protests would follow the successful path of similar uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. But rather than capitulate, as had Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and Hosni Mubarak, Qaddafi launched a brutal crackdown.

The international community responded swiftly. In late February, the UN Security Council placed sanctions, an arms embargo, and an asset freeze on Libya and referred Qaddafi's crimes against humanity to the International Criminal Court in The Hague. Shortly thereafter, the Arab League suspended Libya from its sessions and then called on the international community to impose a no-fly zone. On March 17, the Security Council granted that request, mandating "all necessary measures" to protect civilians.

The United States facilitated this rapid international reaction. In late February, Washington was the first country to cut off Qaddafi's funding, freezing \$ 2 billion in Libyan assets and prompting other countries to follow suit. Washington also led the charge for the UN resolution that authorized the intervention, justifying the action as consistent with "the responsibility to protect," the norm that calls on the international community to intervene when governments fail to safeguard their own civilians. And on March 1, following the UN authorization, the United States led a coalition in launching air and missile strikes against Libyan forces-including against a large concentration of armored vehicles approaching Benghazi, the headquarters of the revolution and home to 750,000 people whom Qaddafi had labeled as "rats" when he threatened to "cleanse Libya house by house." The initial intervention rescued the people of Benghazi, obliterated Libya's air defense system within 72 hours, and deployed aircraft and naval vessels to enforce the UN resolution.

---

<sup>1</sup> Ivo H. Daalder is U.S. Permanent Representative to NATO. James C. Stavridis is Supreme Allied Commander Europe and Commander of the U.S. European Command.

Following this early success, U.S. President Barack Obama sought NATO's agreement to take over command and control of the operation in order to ensure the effective integration of allied and partnered militaries. Washington would continue to participate in military operations but would do so mainly by gathering and analyzing intelligence, refueling NATO and partner aircraft, and contributing other high-end military capabilities, such as electronic jamming.

With many NATO countries, including Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, already contributing to the intervention, NATO was the logical choice to assume command, and it agreed to do so on March 27. Dubbed Operation Unified Protector, the alliance's mission in Libya consisted of three separate tasks: policing the arms embargo, patrolling the no-fly zone, and protecting civilians. Although it immediately solidified the maritime blockade and the no-fly zone, it encountered difficulties in protecting the Libyan people. The proximity of the regime's forces, facilities, and equipment to civilian infrastructure; the initially limited ability of the Libyan opposition to defend itself and the population centers under its control; and the need for NATO to minimize harm to civilians all slowed the operation and at times led to a perception of deadlock and stalemate.

By the middle of August, however, the opposition had gained enough strength to attack Qaddafi's strongholds, first in Tripoli and then in Sirte. Within two months, the Libyan National Transitional Council had secured control over the entire country and rebels had captured and killed Qaddafi. Operation Unified Protector ended on October 1, 222 days after it had begun.

### **A teachable moment**

By any measure, NATO succeeded in Libya. It saved tens of thousands of lives from almost certain destruction. It conducted an air campaign of unparalleled precision, which, although not perfect, greatly minimized collateral damage. It enabled the Libyan opposition to overthrow one of the world's longest ruling dictators. And it accomplished all of this without a single allied casualty and at a cost \$1.1 billion for the United States and several billion dollars overall that was a fraction of that spent on previous interventions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq.

But the Libya operation had its challenges as well, both in conception and in execution. If NATO is to replicate its success in the future, it must examine and learn from these challenges.

The first lesson is that NATO is uniquely positioned to respond quickly and effectively to international crises. Some countries have significant military reach. But when a group of countries wants to launch a joint intervention as a coalition which confers political legitimacy only NATO can provide the common command structure and capabilities necessary to plan and execute complex operations. Multilateral coalitions built on an as-needed basis, by contrast, have no common doctrine for conducting military operations, no common capabilities or command structure for quickly integrating national forces into a cohesive campaign, and no standing mechanisms for debating and then deciding on an agreed course of action. Such ad hoc coalitions therefore almost always rely disproportionately on a single nation to bear the brunt of security burdens that ideally should be more equally shared.

In Libya, NATO coordinated the actions of 18 countries member states and four partners under a unified command. The United States certainly played a critical role, providing intelligence, fueling, and targeting capabilities. But other states made similarly indispensable contributions.

France and the United Kingdom flew over 0 percent of the sorties, together destroying more than a third of the overall targets. Italy provided aircraft for reconnaissance missions and, along with Greece, access to a large number of air bases. Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Norway, and the United Arab Emirates deployed fighters for combat operations, and Jordan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and Qatar helped enforce the no-fly zone. Many of these states, as well as Bulgaria and Romania, also deployed naval assets to enforce the arms embargo.

The second lesson of Libya is that although NATO's political unity is improving, more work must be done. NATO allies overcame their early differences on Libya and forged a course of action acceptable to all. Every ally contributed to the operation through NATO's command structure, and no allies restricted the use of their personnel assigned to NATO command centers in places such as Mons, Belgium; Naples, Italy; or Ramstein, Germany. But although 14 member states contributed directly to Operation Unified Protector, an equal number did not. Many of the countries that did not participate lacked the resources to do so but still lent their political support. Some countries, such as Germany, however, decided not to participate even though they could have. Berlin did not block NATO's decision to act in Libya and even assisted alliance operations as a whole by increasing its involvement in aerial surveillance in Afghanistan. But it abstained from the UN Security Council vote authorizing the intervention and stayed out of the military operation. And even though Poland assisted by selling precision munitions to other NATO countries, it, too, refrained from participating directly.

Some commentators, such as Anne Applebaum, have expressed fears that the absence of a substantial number of NATO members from the mission in Libya signaled a lack of solidarity or, worse, the emergence of a two-tiered alliance, in which some members focus on humanitarian and peacekeeping missions and others bear the burden of combat.

Such a concern is misplaced at least for now. When NATO's work is viewed through the context of the entire span of its missions, from that in Afghanistan to antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, it becomes clear that every member state participates to the best of its abilities including Germany and Poland, both of which are playing significant roles in Afghanistan and Kosovo. Yet although the Libya operation showed that the allies' political commitment to NATO is improving, the allies must work to translate this political will into reality by sharing more equitably in the alliance's overall defensive burden.

The intervention in Libya also demonstrated that a politically cohesive NATO can tackle increasingly complex, and increasingly global, security challenges. For its first 40 years, NATO concentrated on defending the borders of its member states. But after the Cold War, the alliance expanded its focus beyond deterrence, making it the partner of choice for international security operations. This trend began with the Partnership for Peace in the mid-, a program of practical cooperation and political dialogue with nonmember states across Europe and Central Asia. And it has continued into the current century, with 50 nations placing their forces under NATO's command as part of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan.

NATO again took the lead in Libya. Some countries hesitated to place NATO in charge of a military action, fearing that the alliance would not garner enough support in the region, but it turned out that Arab states preferred to work through NATO; several of them, such as Jordan, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates, had already participated in NATO-led operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, and others had fostered closer relations with NATO through the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. These programs, launched in

1994 and 2004, respectively, expanded NATO's ability to partner with countries in North Africa and the Middle East.

These partnerships with non-NATO members signify the increasing role of the alliance beyond its borders. Such cooperation may not have a decisive military impact; as in the Balkans and Afghanistan, alliance members supplied the bulk of the military capability in Libya. (Nearly 90 percent of the non-U.S. forces in Afghanistan, for example, come from countries in Europe.) But this kind of burden sharing is politically essential to the overall effectiveness of NATO's operations. The participation of Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates and their support for Libyan opposition forces proved critical to the liberation of Tripoli, both by demonstrating Arab political support and by providing additional military capabilities. Regional participation also helped allay potential friction within the alliance, reassuring many otherwise reluctant NATO members of the mission's legitimacy.

### **It gets better**

However successful, NATO's intervention in Libya suggested that the organization must strengthen its basic infrastructure if it hopes to increase its role in global security. NATO's integrated command structure and shared funding bind the alliance together, but serious gaps remain in its overall capabilities. Within the command structure, for example, the alliance has failed to devote the necessary resources to developing key skills, including the capacity to find and engage the types of mobile targets common in contemporary operations, plan joint operations in parallel with fast-paced political decision-making, support the targeting process with legal advice, and provide timely and reliable information on operational developments to the public. NATO has also neglected to cultivate essential tools for military campaigns, such as intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, precision targeting, and aerial refueling despite nearly two decades of experience that have demonstrated their value.

Instead of investing in NATO, many member states have depended on the United States to compensate for these deficiencies. In Libya, Washington provided 75 percent of the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data employed to protect Libyan civilians and enforce the arms embargo. It also contributed 75 percent of the refueling planes used throughout the mission without which strike aircraft could not have lingered near potential targets in order to respond quickly to hostile forces threatening to attack civilians. And U.S. commanders in Europe had to quickly dispatch over 100 military personnel to the NATO targeting center at the outset of the intervention when it became clear that other member states lacked the knowledge and expertise to provide their aircraft with the correct targeting information.

The heavy reliance of alliance members on the United States during the conflict highlighted the cost of a decade of European underinvestment in defense. On average, U.S. allies in Europe now spend just 1.6 percent of their GDPs on their militaries, and many spend less than one percent; the United States, in contrast, spends over four percent of its GDP. The fact that Washington spends nearly three times as much on defense as the other 27 NATO allies combined has opened a growing divide in the capabilities of the member states. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned in his valedictory policy address last June, this imbalance threatens to create a two-tiered alliance that will ultimately prove unsustainable.

NATO began to address these short falls before the war in Libya began. At the Lisbon summit in November 2010, for example, the alliance adopted a new “strategic concept” to guide it for the next decade. In it, the allies committed to deploying the “full range of capabilities necessary to deter and defend against any threat to the safety and security of [its] populations.” It also identified and prioritized the ten capabilities that member states agreed were essential to the organization’s strength not only in today’s operations (such as enhanced methods to counter improvised explosive devices and improvements in information sharing) but also in the future (such as missile defense and joint intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance a key deficiency in Libya).

The alliance will now have to summon the political will to implement these standards in a period of fiscal austerity. NATO countries can continue to invest in their military capabilities on their own which means investing inefficiently and often insufficiently, while leaning on an increasingly impatient United States to make up the difference. Or member states can invest through NATO and other multinational programs, saving money, promoting cooperation, sharing capabilities, and demonstrating solidarity. NATO will continue to succeed only if every member state chooses the latter course.

Should NATO members rise to the challenge, their investments will fund vital programs that can address some of the shortfalls of the Libya operation. One such program is the Alliance Ground Surveillance system, which is designed to help locate mobile and concealed ground forces and will thereby strengthen NATO’s intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. Members should also consider pooling their investments in aerial refueling and precision-guided weapons and sharing data on their own national munitions stockpiles in order to improve planning.

The allies must also remember that the operation in Libya was relatively small about one-fifth the size of that in Kosovo in terms of the number of military assets involved. If defense spending continues to decline, NATO may not be able to replicate its success in Libya in another decade. NATO members must therefore use the Chicago summit to strengthen the alliance by ensuring that the burden sharing that worked so well in Libya-and continues in Afghanistan today becomes the rule, not the exception.

## *“Smart Defence - An innovative approach to security challenges”*

Dr. Holger Bahle  
NATO Defence Planning and Smart Defence Team  
Tirana, 27 April 2012

Thank you for your kind introduction. I am honoured and very delighted to address this International Conference hosted by the Atlantic Council of Albania. Last Monday I addressed the Albanian Parliament on behalf of the Deputy Secretary of NATO, Alexander Vershbow. That speech is available to all of you. It might be of interest that I also met with the Albanian Minister of Defence, with the Albanian Defence Academy, with students of the State University of Tirana.

Today I would like to further develop some key messages with additional conceptual thoughts on regional cooperation in this multinational format of key stakeholders. I introduced the same thrust during a High Level International Conference in Bulgaria/Sofia on 2<sup>nd</sup> of April 2012. And the same applied yesterday during my attendance of an international conference in Rome, hosted by the Instituto Affari Internazionali; a key note speech was given by the Italian Defence Minister.

The centre of gravity to all my thoughts is at the core of the Alliance: Cohesion and solidarity of sovereign nations.

The strength of the Alliance will continue to come from the ability of its member nations to work together-to deal with crises that threaten Alliance security, wherever in the world they may arise; to put together complex joint operations, at short notice, with high impact and high precision; and to have the right mix of capabilities on hand to respond to different scenarios.

“Smart Defence” is a new way of thinking about generating the defence capabilities we need for the year 2020 and beyond. It is about deciding how to manage what we have to cut, but also staying focused on what we need to keep, so that we can meet the Alliance's strategic goals now and in the future. It is about Allies working together to deliver capabilities multinationally that would be too expensive for many of them to deliver alone, ensuring that we all get the maximum return on available defence budgets. And it is also about Allies coordinating their plans more closely than they do now so that they can specialise in what they do best, and focus their resources in those areas.

“Smart Defence” will be high on our Chicago Summit agenda, and it is a project that will take years to fully implement.

But acquiring the right capabilities is not enough. We must also make sure that these capabilities, and our forces, can work with each other effectively. This is especially important as we prepare to draw down our combat operation in Afghanistan by the end of 2014. After that, Allied and Partner forces will no longer be operating shoulder-to-shoulder on such a large scale as they have for the past decade. We must not lose the vital skills they have gained, but build on them to strengthen our interoperability, our effectiveness and our credibility.

We can strengthen our ability to work together and, when necessary, to fight together, through expanded education and training; more exercises-especially with the NATO Response Force; and the better use of existing equipment and technology. That is the thrust of the Connected Forces



Initiative which the Secretary General launched earlier this year, and that should receive formal approval at Chicago as well.

With that overall introduction let me offer some thoughts on practical issues of implementing the initiative. Recent discussions among Allies revealed that with all good intent for promoting valuable initiatives there remain several important concerns which need to be reflected honestly. Those must not be underestimated in their relevance:

- NATO is concerned that the initiatives follow political intent as a NATO Summit deliverable and cannot be sustained as a long term effort. NATO is seeking for supporting mechanisms to maintain momentum. NATO staffs and Agencies should be pro actively engaged in roles of facilitating capability delivery of Allies and partner nations, providing consultancy and honest brokering in practical terms.
- NATO has not exploited all opportunities and mechanisms to reach out to partner nations. Their potential to contribute to and benefit from smart defence could be pursued much more ambitiously while there are diverting views among Allies about the scope of partner involvement. The only convincing argument for being restrictive is that partner nations must not help compensating capability gaps which to overcome has to remain the privilege and sole responsibility of NATO Allies.

One underlying assumption of Smart Defence is that the best chance of success can be envisaged through a regional approach involving groups or a group of nations bound together by strategic proximity. Determining elements could include geography, cultural affinity, common equipment, language, national levels of ambition, history, economy interests beyond defence cooperation. In theory that should build trust and ease the entering into binding commitments related to improved and innovative delivery of defence capabilities.

We could look at the issue from a capability delivery perspective and focus on some basic parameters which should be shared amongst interested nations from the outset. Agreements should be documented and communicated in a transparent way to avoid misunderstandings. Flexible cooperation requires certainty at a minimum about:

- “Length of time: is a particular initiative designed to set up a temporary or permanent small group cooperation?”
- Location: is small group cooperation designed to take place within NATO structures or outside of them?
- Scope: does mini-lateralism cover a specific capability area or does it have a wide scope?
- Membership: is small group cooperation inclusive, in that sense that Allies, (and let me add partner nations) who wish to participate are allowed to do so, or is it restrictive?”<sup>2</sup>

There are signs in that neither “region” nor “strategic proximity” tend to be the only drivers for Smart Defence; it is obvious when looking at nations’ choices of projects of interest for them. How can we deal with the overwhelming number of projects on the market? Well, I suggest that we change the perspective as we judge the added value of single Smart Defence projects. Instead of an isolated, scattered pick and choose way of showing interest, bailing out or participating we

---

<sup>2</sup> IISS, Dr Bastian Giegerich, NATO’s Smart Defence Initiative, February 2012 ([www.iiss.org](http://www.iiss.org)).

could do something else. Can't we develop a South Eastern European commonly agreed concept about finding innovative options of cooperation available to transform existing capabilities?

It should be no surprise that I propose the regional capability "SEEBRIG" to serve as a potential common denominator and an agent for change in and for SEE. Without reinventing the wheel, but with a good and established framework there is a chance for further developing and improving existing capabilities. Those are visible, well experienced and bear the potential be enriched and transformed for both: for the benefit of the Alliance and also the EU. The targets for change and transformation could be the SEEBRIG HQ and all designated or affiliated units and formations from Allies and partner nations. Observers might alter their status and others could be invited to join.

Bulgaria recently agreed on enhancing strategic cooperation with US European Command. Deputy Defence Minister Tzvetkova is quoted to have highlighted on 14 March 2012 "that the joint experience gained so far in the course of the activities carried out at the Novo Selo Field Training Area forms a good basis for the enlargement of the scope of future trainings and participants therein. Involving countries from the region in the trainings and exercises may turn out to be a significant contribution on the part of the U.S. and Bulgaria to NATO's Smart Defence initiative. She added that the facilities can be used for pre-deployment training of contingents which would participate in international operations, for training of military formations from countries in the region, as well as for training of personnel participating in the MPFSEE."<sup>3</sup>

I started to look at all Smart Defence Tier 1 projects and selected most of them as being relevant.

The slide shows on the top row all SEEBRIG participating and observer nations. On the left column you see Tier 1 projects. The text in some boxes indicates the lead and participating nations in a Smart Defence project. In some cases I selected SEEBRIG nations randomly for explanatory text, when no SEEBRIG nation assumes a lead role. The crosses in the boxes show that SEEBRIG members and observers until today declared to participate in a project.

What does that indicate?

- Interest for a project is not driven by regional considerations only;
- some SEEBRIG nations will gain insight, expertise, gather lessons learned and best practice from isolated projects which others will not have unless there is a shared ground of interest.
- What could we do?
- With a "SEEBRIG perspective" cross fertilisation, sharing and contributing to capability improvement could be offered or requested and achieved even, if other SEEBRIG nations do not enter into a specific project;
- other SEEBRIG members may support project participants and share the burden of involvement;
- some SEEBRIG members may grab the opportunity and reconsider their project interests and participation;

---

<sup>3</sup> See more information on: <http://www.defpro.com/news/details/33586/?SID=620b3dfdeda6faa5436c25ee13c3489d>

- a partner nation, not member of SEEBRIG, could offer cross pollination from an attractive project which may for example link to the C2 structure of operational HQs. Bulgaria, and Austria as potential invitee to SEEBRIG, should share recent best practice from the fully deployable Joint Force HQ in ULM. The HQs in ULM could also be designated to command the SEEBRIG.

Along those lines I suggest that this becomes part of a wider scope to launch a project. SEEBRIG members, observers and invitees might agree upon launching a new Tier 2 or even Tier 1 project for that purpose.

I could envisage that the South Eastern European Region (plus or enhanced) could turn challenges into real opportunities. Here is my proposal: A project should be launched which looks at supporting structures for cooperation and options for improving capability delivery. We could name it “Multinational Project ‘Support Defence Cooperation in SEE”:

What might be some essentials of the project?

- Objectives of the project need to be SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, timely)
- the project should be temporary and forecast the time horizon (0/1/3/5 years) with clearly defined phases, workpackages, and milestones;
- the project could be designed with phases as follows:
  - 1) Before entering into any solutions, SEE should take the time and engage with many stakeholders to develop a concept (capture/evaluate the ‘as is’-develop the ‘to be’). This would have to include Business Cases/recommendations/consultation process/decision making in the appropriate fora. Worthy of note: The concept requires recognition of stakeholder views, interaction, dialogue and deals with acceptance of an integrated approach; in my view the prerequisite of fertile cooperation.

*Guiding motto: Do not fix, if not broken!! It is important to stress that there is no intent to add any costly and bureaucratic structures or plan investment without return or benefits.*

The concept phase should cover two areas:

- a) SEE multinational cooperation support structures and mechanisms (review initial project management team / office; it may be decided to turn the project office into a program (SEEBRIG transformation) office and have projects (capability areas) managed from within existing structures.
- b) SEEBRIG is the regional agent for change and transformation. It drives the evaluation of selected Smart Defence, Connected Forces, Pooling and Sharing, and other existing projects in order to promote synergies potentially for areas like
  - C2/C4ISR
  - Sustainment and Deployability
  - Education/Training/Exercises/Evaluation
  - Certification

- Research and Development / Technology

- 2) Planning and implementation of support structures and mechanisms
- 3) Planning and implementation of SEEBRIG (Smart Defence / Connected Forces) pilot cases (test runs) in line with the concept.
- 4) Evaluation and improvement of measures
- 5) Full validation (enhanced Final Operating Capability)
- 6) Termination and handover of project

What might initially be required to run the project?

- Initially a small, professional project management team (impartial, unbiased) in one collaborative office should be established with authorised access to all stakeholders. Those are connected in a virtual team: only one responsible project manager; he/she leads 5-10 core project team members from interested nations, staffs/university, NGO. The team would reach out to a wide network of Allies, partner nations, stakeholders, communities of interest, administrations, academia, industry, NATO HQs and staffs, NATO Agencies. This would not require presence of those actors in the office location! In time contributions to project phases and work packages are key; let me underline that NATO Delegations and Missions need to be fully aligned to this effort. This team has to be reviewed as part of the conceptual phase. If better mechanisms are available or can be arranged, get rid of the team.
- the project management will follow recognised and internationally certified standards;
- therefore and if there is a need, the team should enjoy education and training in project management with the aim to establish self sustaining skill sets within the governments; selected staff of stakeholders should be aligned to the same management approach;
- the project requires a responsive governance structure.
  - o It would need one government sponsor (preferred a [host] lead nation) which by authority ensures consistent strategic government oversight and directing authority and is acting on behalf of a steering mechanism;
  - o the appropriate body to assume the steering role should be identified. We may think about the SEDM or an expanded format. It is important to have all participating nations on board and represented with a voice.
- all activities need to be visible, transparent and shared with all stakeholders, hence up to date communication is key;
- as industry/enterprises are involved, from the outset (even in pre competitive phase) Transparency International will be invited to track all steps and interactions, in order to avoid corruption and that any benefit from interaction with industry will fall to governmental officials or any other stakeholder. Should there be any event indicating that illegal activities happen, this will be announced immediately with the expectation that the project is not jeopardised;

The project team should be allowed to build its own temporary and visible identity. It should express the special nature of this challenging and future oriented task, dedicated to the

transformation of the Multinational Peace Force South Eastern Europe. “The soldier who brings peace” is quite nicely symbolised by this hand painting by the Bulgarian artist Todor Popov from January 2012. The original is registered in the Bulgarian Ministry of Culture.

My presentation links up to the 2<sup>nd</sup> April 2012 High Level International Conference in Sofia where the Bulgarian President, Rosen Plevneliev, announced that Bulgaria intends to host a meeting of Heads of States and Governments in South Eastern Europe. In addition during the conference two more conceptual ideas were introduced: firstly to establish a “Multinational Centre for Intelligent Defence of NATO” at the University of World Economy in Sofia, open for Allies’ and partner nations’ participation and contribution; this could be used to work on concepts as a project. The second idea relates to the politically most visible demonstration in military and comprehensive approach capability terms: to further transform the South Eastern European Brigade while exploiting the potential of Smart Defence. This force could become a fully deployable and sustainable force in a joint operational environment which would strengthen the HQs and all the units provided by Allies and partner nations in the region.

**Summary:** Smart Defence is innovative in many ways and there are challenges which have to be put on the table; this initiative on regional level can be turned into real opportunities. I am convinced that there is potential for change and meaningful transformation in substantial areas. This requires time, stamina, patience and most of all high-level support, by many stakeholders, not just their good will or intent.

## **Further Considerations**

### **Potential practical areas for multinational cooperation (sustainment)**

A further range of very practical sustainment (meaning logistics, maintenance, infrastructure) topics can illustrate the benefits and added value in fostering regional cooperation. Those are proposed by the NATO staffs and could promote an initial discussion between stakeholders. The topics are an offer, food for thought, and neither intended to be authoritative nor complete in its coverage.

Those could become part of the conceptual analysis of the project

### **“Multinational Project 'Support Defence Cooperation in SEE”**

- a) Pooling and Sharing. Have you considered joining:
  - all multinational strategic lift organisations?
  - the Multinational Logistics Coordination Centre (MLCC)?
  - the NAMSA (future Support Agency) Operational Logistics Support Partnership (OLSP)?
  - A multinational integrated logistics unit?
- b) Stockpiles, including munitions. Would you consider:
  - for nations with similar weapons systems, consolidated munitions procurement?
  - one shared regional civil-emergency and crisis management stockpile ?
  - better sharing of spares, tools and test equipment at home and while deployed?
  - regional stockpiles held by contractors?
- c) Equipment Procurement. Would you consider;

- multinational procurement and life-cycle management of the same or similar equipment?
  - agreeing role specialist areas among the group of nations?
- d) Regional Contracting (Static and Deployed). Would you consider:
- implementing a short-notice regional contracting capability for deployed operations?
  - reviewing all equipment refit and maintenance work to assess what can be contracted?
  - reviewing all static base support (shared services) to assess what can be contracted?
- e) Partial Capabilities. Are there any partial capabilities in your nation that could be developed with the assistance of other nations? For example, one nation has provided Role 2 hospital equipment and another has provided the medical staff. In addition, smaller nations have also provided a complete rotation of staff for a mentor nation.
- f) Military infrastructure. That topic is closely linked to capability development. Have you considered improved sharing of:
- military schools?
  - warehouses, in particular expensive special warehousing? (e.g. refrigerated, anti-static benches, munitions storage)
  - headquarters and offices?
  - information networks?
  - military ranges and training areas?

## *We will compete with our values*

Brigadier General Agim Lala,  
TRADOC Commander

**Abstract.** *Nowadays, the TRADOC is required to turn the attention to the standardization of training and education programs. That should lead the opinion and needs of other forces serving tomorrow's developments. This requires vision, far-sightedness, wisdom in leading and planning; it requires of military planners to try not to make mistakes or make the smallest justifiable mistake. Today, there is no excuse for us not having the same programs, or those ones adapted for a small army, with limited resources but many missions, with the aim of preparing on the same courses military with a great vision, to engage jointly and successfully in battlefields, with all the countries of the Alliance. This would, in my opinion, be the "Smart" solution in the area covered by this command.*

The Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania have entered into a radical process of changes, reforms, and modernization. This transformation of the Armed Forces is a requirement of expected changes of the National Security document of the Republic of Albania, following the membership in NATO, and positive developments of regional security and further. This change of the Armed Forces does not have to do with, as minister Imami said at the conference on "Smart Defence", lowering the number at the expense of operation, but with developing effective structures and enhancing operations. Today, when the entire Alliance is discussing the development of "Smart" structures, without affecting operations, smart people and smart ideas are to be introduced in the process.

On the final report of the Prague Summit in 2002, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, after valuing the advances of Albania in the AF reforms, stressed: "Change mentality. Membership in NATO will be enabled through changed human capital, not through cannons and airplanes."

Our army is small, and as a result must compete with values. From that moment on, we have prioritized preparation and change of mentality of our people. Ever since, Albania has reflected on security sector reforms. This has brought about the change of mentality of all the people working in this sector.

Nowadays, this Command is required to turn the attention to the standardization of programs. That should lead the opinion and needs of other forces serving tomorrow's developments. This requires vision, far-sightedness, wisdom in leading and planning; it requires of military planners to try not to make mistakes or make the smallest justifiable mistake. Today, there is no excuse for us not having the same programs, or those ones adapted for a small army, with limited resources but many missions, with the aim of preparing on the same courses military with a great vision, to engage jointly and successfully in battlefields, with all the countries of the Alliance. This would, in my opinion, be the "Smart" solution in the area covered by this command.

The reforms in the Armed Forces aim to create a force, though small, with a more interactive, efficient, and operational structure. This force must be prepared to face up to the new nature of conflicts, and simultaneously be interoperable for joint operations and actions with our allies, as well as other national security agencies. But who will plan and integrate it? This is certainly the primary task of this command, through scientific opinion and integrated learning programs.

The present war and the Armed Forces' engagement in Peace Operations require that the Armed Forces have a high degree of interoperability to participate in these operations not only with sufficient capabilities but also be well-trained for many roles and well-equipped for support operations. Likewise, the Armed Forces must be prepared for a greater participation in support operations. In order for this to be realized, we must think both as military but and as civilians, build operational capabilities for action, and know how to carefully manage what we have.

At this phase of enlargement of the Armed Forces' mission spectre, it is essential that the Military Education system produce a group of suitable leaders who think critically, with the same education and training logic, with the same programs, by eliminating repetitions in them, from the simple soldier to the senior general. They must have the required moral and intellectual values, flexibility and high quality in decision-making, planning and leadership abilities to train troops under today's nature of war and mission, in order for them to properly perform their duties to the nation and Alliance.

These leaders must be loyal, with integrity, critical thinkers and responsible, when they act in a much more complex, different security environment, just as the waves of marine landing, which is familiar to the military. Simultaneously, leaders must form efficient teams, fully able to support multinational operations under rapid and continuous technological and organizational changes. An efficient and complete program of Military Education prepares the leaders for the responsibilities put forward and enables them to achieve results in the chain of command. The educational and training programs in TRADOC must reflect the current requirements for the role of the Armed Forces in the new environment of security.

### **The Improvement of the Armed Forces' Educational System**

Even though this conference focuses on education and training programs, I cannot bypass the issue of Armed Forces' educational system. It is three years since Albania became a NATO member, which increases the demands on education, and requires it to be its integral part. Our educational system must be fully integrated into the National Higher Education system, part of which we are.

One of the weaknesses it has had, in the past years, is its inability to turn educated citizens into devoted and disciplined officers.

The complete recruitment of officers from the national civil university system requires a new philosophy, a new expansion of programs and contemporary thought, by studying first the program done at Tirana University. The military training must fulfil the needs of tomorrow's officer who will prepare soldiers and NCOs being able to take decisions at a strategic level. Somebody from the audience would rightly object to me, but today's fighting is no longer classic. It is too complex, and action or inaction of a single soldier, consequences on both directions of the axis, are decisive.

One of the directions of our work on drafting the programs this academic year has to do with meeting all these requirements stipulated by Law No. 9741, dated 21.05.2007 "On Higher Education in the Republic of Albania", amended. This is completely achievable for the next academic year.

Today in the Defence Academy, we have two part-time Master's programs accredited, which under the Law "On higher education in the Republic of Albania" must go toward 90 and 120



credits. With this logic and the master's we grant for two institutional courses (Chief of Staff Command Course and High Officer Course) are combined, partly 60 credits on full-time basis, partly on part-time basis and transfer of credits.

Along with drafting official programs, the Defence Academy will also continue drafting accredited programs, since the law allows such a thing, and the tendency is to compare them with our institutional courses, by making this process bilateral and leading the programs toward a standard approved by the Ministry of Education and Science. The exploitation of possibilities to transfer credits must be another direction of improvement of programs, as this would considerably impact the transfer of credits that hundreds of military and civilians have taken in NATO countries' academies or universities, and further. The improvement of education programs, including in them even elements of fight against terrorism, fighting in urban centres, against rebels and challenges that NATO faces in missions etc, has already become part of the Defence Academy's activity.

### **Standardization as spirit**

The main objective of standardization in the Armed Forces is to enable, through acceptance and implementation of policies, doctrines, training and education, equipment and systems, the achievement and maintenance at the required level of interaction among the forces within the Armed Forces, as well as interaction with the other countries' forces of the Alliance. Standardization must be built and enhanced based on "NATO policy on standardization", "Law on military standardization", "Standardization directive", as well as numerous Handbooks and documents regulating the functioning of the system. For more than a year, the Armed Forces have started the process of ratification of these documents of the Alliance. It is important that they be the basis of the entire educational and training system of TRADOC.

The inclusion of the Alliance doctrines in the process of education and training has brought out another spirit in auditoriums; it has enabled the improvement of interaction among forces and services, as well as enhanced interoperability among them while accomplishing international missions. This action is not new for the Defence Academy, nor for the other TRADOC institutions.

The technological developments and the new nature of risks, have changed the nature of war and the ways of its management. Our Armed Forces have been involved for years in support and peace building operations against an opponent who does not fight with traditional methods. This requires that programs of education and training in TRADOC include subjects of the nature of these kinds of operations, anticipating what can happen and what can be expected, by thinking and by "entering" in the mind of the opponent.

Natural hazards and human risks constitute real threats towards national and global security. The Armed forces are increasingly involved in civil emergency operations in support of civil authorities. The nature of civil emergency operations, their complexity and comprehensive nature, make them more sensitive for the population. However, these operations can become more complicated in the future, such as industrial disasters, attacks with chemical ingredients, and in order to deal with them, our forces must be well-trained as early as possible in our schools and academies. It is mandatory to include changes and to treat such topics in the educational and training programs, therefore this requires the review and the improvement of the programs.

The Analysis Centre of Defence plays an important role in improving the programs, in accordance with the spectrum of the use of the AF today and in the future. The Analysis and the Lessons Learned, from the participation of the Armed Forces in operations at home and abroad, but also from the experiences of the allied and partner AF. The Lessons Learned from the Forces Commands have undoubtedly an important role, a process that needs to be consolidated.

### **The modernization of the Armed Forces and the role of the NCO**

For years, the AAF have been involved in the modernization programs. The adaptation of the curricula with technological developments, requires comprehensive engagement of all the structures of the Armed Forces in particular, of the TRADOC. The production of the new vessels for the Marine Force, the equipment of the Air Force with helicopters, the establishment of the Observation System for the Marine Space, the completion with modern equipment and weaponry of the Army, the significant improvements in the system of command and control, the building of simulation centres, etc., are some developments that require a well-trained force for their use and maintenance.

The programs of education and training in TRADOC should include the necessary professional knowledge not only of the technology being used. They need to anticipate future technological developments. Improving special education programs with an educational body with contemporary knowledge, will enable educational institutions and training in TRADOC to always precede the expected technological developments. The task of this command is to study the developments of the techniques and tactics of the application of our potential adversaries, across the spectrum of the mission of our forces.

The education and training of the NCOs aims to achieve their further qualification and their professional growth by creating the pyramid of hierarchy as an important contingent that significantly affects the growth of the operational and the training level of the AF. Despite efforts made so far, we are away of the target to build an NCO corps as the backbone of the Armed Forces. Excluding some special units, generally it is still felt a lack of the role of the NCOs in the work of the staff. The NCO education system still does not prepare NCOs who are able to take responsibility through the headquarters. Their level of knowledge of the English language, is very poor.

I think that changes are needed in the NCO education program, focusing on two aspects: Giving priority to the inclusion of the English language courses as well as to the Improvement of the education programs of high-ranking NCOs, equivalent to the education programs of low-ranking officers, enabling the connection of the programs. Another way would be to refresh the staff of instructors and their transfer so that they are not disconnected from the development and the updates of the Lessons Learned from the missions.

### **Method of Training and Special Education**

The Armed Forces are ready, and organized to operate in difficult operational situations. This requires that this force be educated but also be trained in similar circumstances. The participation of the Armed Forces in Peace Support Operations such as in Bosnia, Iraq, Chad, Georgia, and recently in Afghanistan is a valuable experience which should be utilized. The participation of the Armed Forces in civil emergency or search and rescue operations, should be also better

reflected in the programs of the TRADOC. This requires that we maintain contact between operational forces, support and training.

The education and subsequently the continuation of training should be an unbreakable chain, being considered as one and indivisible. This requires that programs be an integral part of it. This consistency must combine general and special education, but especially needs to be integrated with the training system. Maybe a full review of the programs in order to avoid overlap and ensure consistency, would allow a better identification of the gaps in the current programs and their improvement. Overlaps increase fictitiousness, reduce interest, and mislead the work of commands in the training process.

One of the weaknesses of the educational system in TRADOC remains the education of narrow specialties. This challenge is associated with any army which is limited in number. The effectiveness of this system is directly linked to the AAF operability and use of technology. In recent years, the Armed Forces have been equipped with modern technology that poses the highest demands for special education. The mobile teams organized by the TRADOC have yielded results. A reassessment of the capacities of TRADOC for the special education of the AAF is required. This maybe because we need practical solutions associated with this type of specific education. Relying on our partners, on the civil national university system but also on some private entities, may be some alternative solutions for education in specific areas with limited numbers. However, the education of the officers of the three Forces should be considered in the framework of the solution for the system of higher education in the Armed Forces.

### **For a new role in the region**

In the recent years TRADOC has extended its cooperation with counterpart institutions in the region and beyond. The personnel of the neighbouring AF is increasingly being educated and trained here, such as Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia, Italy, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Turkey etc. The TRADOC capabilities allow for a more active role in regional cooperation and for the enhancement of the role of our education system in this cooperation. Perhaps a more thorough assessment of the areas of cooperation is necessary, where of course i think that the Defence Academy should continue to have a more active role. The increase of this role needs to be assessed in accordance with the National Security and Albanian Armed Forces role in creating a favourable regional environment.

It is time that the regional context, we have a project of ours, a project that should lead us, Albanians. In various meetings this idea was cast and of course, intelligent decisions are expected to be taken. Besides the Security and Defence High Course, we should think what else we should do in the regional context. Even this Conference can offer thoughts on this issue.

Enhancing the role of our educational and training system in the regional one requires that this system be on continuous improvement and competitive. TRADOC must provide contemporary programs, competitive and that can be accredited. Future challenges of the full integration of our Armed Forces in the NATO require an educational and training system with improved and integrated programs to precede the spectrum of the use of the Armed Forces in future operations. This system should also aim at preparing officers at all levels in the fulfilment of their mission.

These were some ideas to provoke your thoughts, to stimulate discussion about what worries us. This requires that all of you give your views today, think tomorrow across commands and always keep us informed of the need for change, the need for reflection.

I would be delighted if you gave your thoughts today, in a critical sense for our work, we know that tomorrow we will do what we need more, and not to prepare contingents who think to leave the Armed Forces at any moment.

The technological developments and the new nature of risks, have changed the nature of war and the ways of its management. Our Armed Forces have been involved for years in support and peace building operations against an opponent who does not fight with traditional methods. This requires that programs of education and training in TRADOC include subjects of the nature of these kinds of operations, anticipating what can happen and what can be expected, by thinking and by "entering" in the mind of the opponent.

Natural hazards and human risks constitute real threats towards national and global security. The Armed forces, are increasingly involved in civil emergency operations in support of civil authorities. The nature of civil emergency operations, their complexity and comprehensive nature, make them more sensitive for the population. However, these operations can become more complicated in the future, such as industrial disasters, attacks with chemical ingredients, and in order to deal with them, our forces must be well-trained as early as possible in our schools and academies. It is mandatory to include changes and to treat such topics in the educational and training programs, therefore this requires the review and the improvement of the programs.

The Centre for Defence Analysis plays an important role in improving the programs, in accordance with the spectrum of the use of the AF today and in the future. The Analysis and the Lessons Learned, from the participation of the Armed Forces in operations at home and abroad, but also from the experiences of the allied and partner AF. The Lessons Learned from the Forces Commands have undoubtedly an important role, a process that needs to be consolidated.

### **Conclusions:**

- The programs of education and training in TRADOC should anticipate the future technological developments;
- It is necessary to refresh the body of instructors and their movement so that they are not disconnected from the development and the updates of the Lessons Learned from the missions.
- The education of the officers of the three Forces should be considered in the framework of the solution for the system of higher education in the Armed Forces.

***“Smart Defence”***  
***A Smart Approach for the Balkan Region***

Address to the International “*Smart Defence*” Conference, 27 April 2012

Col ® Thimi Hudhra  
Chief of the Center for Defence Analyses, TRADOC, Tirana

As Chief of the Center for Defence Analyses in TRADOC, and representing a ‘think tank’ institution, I am privileged to be free to provide my personal opinion, which does not necessarily reflect the position of the defence institution.

The Center has recently elaborated the “smart defence” concept in a full edition of its Military Review. With this in mind, I see that there are different perceptions about “Smart Defence”. Some are very ambitious, some others are sceptical. Many say that our region is still immature for such smart projects, and that it is practical for more developed regions with a happy history.

Also, some other researcher say that Smart Defence might be important for NATO as a whole, some say it is relevant only to big NATO countries, and some others say it might be effective for all allied countries, either they are big or small.

In my opinion, smart defence is an option for all countries, and for all regions which have some common goals and objectives. Especially now, when the conventional state-to-state confrontations are no longer in the list of immediate threats, we have to think about common threats to national and regional security.

There is no country or region to be excluded of this smart initiative. OK, some countries have started earlier, and some other will start later. But, all countries can find many ways to apply smart defence. “*Where there is a will there is a way*”, once the iron lady, Margaret Thatcher said.

Frankly speaking “smart defence” in our region is at the very initial phase, we have very small ‘smart’ examples at regional level. Other countries of various regions have already developed several tools of smart cooperation, such as the France-UK Cooperation, the Baltic Experience, the Vishegrad country cooperation, the Battlegroups, the Center of Excellences, and other best practices to follow.

In this evolutionary effort, we need to overcome some historic barriers linked with the traditional development of security services and the armed forces, and adopt new approaches based on the messages of NATO Strategic Concept of Lisbon Summit. Now, our region is in a more favourable position than several years ago for smart choices and solutions. In order to start with ‘smart solutions’, we need *first*, smart ideas to convince our political masters, and *second*, we need political will. In my opinion, the glass is going half full.

Secretary Rasmussen, together with authorities of all Allied countries, have constantly supported the idea for a substantial change in the Alliance business. The essence of “smart defence” is not about how to spend more or how to spend less; it is how to spend better. In Chicago, I think our regional countries will support the “smart package” agenda. *Prioritize, specialize, and provide*

*multinational solutions are the three key points for discussions prior to, during and after the Chicago Summit.*

It is clear that now and ahead, all our regional countries have and will have pressures to national budgets, and defence budget cannot be excluded. There is an urgent need for innovative ways and new solutions. Reform and transformation of the military organizations is in the agenda. This conference initiated an open *'food for thought'* debate: how to develop more capabilities with less resources? How to further prioritize the priorities? How to specialize in niche capabilities we can afford? How to promote multinational approaches and develop regional capabilities, and how to share and pool many of our capabilities at regional level? So, the main question is how to apply a *'smart defence'* at national, multinational and regional level.

That is not easy, but it is not impossible either. There are subjective and objective obstacles to overcome. There are also best practices to follow and good ideas in our *'markets'*. A number of 169 smart solutions are already identified by ACT, working together with all allied countries. Albania has contributed in this effort, other regional countries as well.

These are smart questions that require smart answers. Smart answers need smart people and smart organization. One thing is sure: the idea of going smart in this time of financial austerity is being discussed by all defence organizations of all allied countries, and nobody can avoid that easily. This is only the beginning of a *'for and against'* positioning of independent experts and other researchers.

*In my opinion, 'smart defence' may have a specific approach for our region.* The Balkans is a region of small countries with a total of about 550,000 km<sup>2</sup> and a population of over 50 million people. We initiated with the Vilnius group after the Washington summit, later we continued with the A3 Initiative with the US in May 2003 with 3 countries (Albania, Croatia and Macedonia). From October 2008, we are 5, together with Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and later we expect to be more.

In this new regional framework, we should encourage *'smart ideas'* in the interest of our peoples. Based on our previous experience and others', we are in the right time to identify specific options for our countries, bilaterally, multilaterally, and regionally as a whole.

### **Smart Defence-A National and Regional Approach**

In order to be more practical, I have explored below some of the priority areas we can apply a *'smart defence'* in Albania and the Balkan region or A5 community.

***First***, we have to follow a *'smart defence'* approach at national level. When building national capabilities, we should avoid parallel capabilities in the armed forces, police, information services, border control units, customs services, etc. We cannot develop a bit of everything and everywhere. We need to prioritize, and now under the *'smart defence'*, we need to further prioritize the priorities. Studies have shown that there are still duplications of national capabilities of the security institutions covering tasks in land, air and maritime areas. Small countries of the region cannot afford maintaining or building national capabilities with the same mission in different national security institutions. Use of some Reserve personnel could also be very useful and effective in the Armed Forces. There are also many areas we can use dual use technology, such as civil and military.

In order to promote the right capabilities for security and defence as a NATO country, Albania is currently conducting an SSDR (Strategic Security and Defence Review). We are working also to develop a new Security and Military Strategy, which will also consider elements of the ‘*smart security and defence*’ concept.

**Second**, ‘*smart defence*’ is about development of most critical capabilities through elimination of surpluses, obsolete capabilities, or units of low frequency use. The concept of usability is a primary test for future forces. Again, we cannot afford to develop and maintain military units which belong to the past and do not resist to the existing or expected security situations. SSDR is the right tool to identify the surpluses and the shortages of a smart defence.

As Secretary Rasmussen rightly argues “*Our guiding principle should be to cut fat, and build up muscle. Rather than spending on fixed infrastructure and soldiers, who are essentially stuck in their barracks, we should re-direct our investments towards more flexible, mobile and modern armed forces – armed forces that we can actually use, against the challenges we actually face*”<sup>4</sup>.

**Third**, we need the development of a ‘*smart defence*’ concept at regional level. We together should build a new mentality for a better cooperation in the area of joint and common capabilities needed to face common threats and risks to the region. In the emerging security situation, no country in the region can develop all required capabilities to deal with the full spectrum of threats we are facing today and tomorrow. Where necessary, ‘*regionalization*’ of some defence capabilities, based on NATO standards, is a smarter choice to be considered by all our countries. “*The best security is shared security*”, sais Secretary Rasmussen<sup>5</sup>.

**Fourth**, we need a ‘*smart defence*’ for the development of collective defence capabilities of NDPP (NATO Defence Planning Process). This ‘*smart defence*’ has to do with the implementation of the Partnership Goals, Force Goals, or Capability Targets of our countries. These are a very important area of cooperation. NATO is in the transition phase of the New Defence Planning Process and we should take advantage of this period to develop the capabilities we need for Article 5 or Non-Article 5 contributions. To build more and spend less, we can develop a regional framework for the development of specific Partnership Goals, Force Goals or Capability Targets.

Development of the concept of a “*Single Set of Forces*” for NATO Force Structure, such as SEEBRIG type or EU Battle groups (*especially the Balkan Battlegroup*), and UN Pool of Forces is a rational way of ‘*smart defence*’ for all our regional countries. We cannot afford the development of specific forces/ capabilities for each of international organizations. Furthermore, all forces assigned for international operations should be available any time to support national operations as well.

**Fifth**, we need a ‘*smart defence*’ with regard to joint participation in NATO/EU/UN or Coalition led missions. Joint participation in NATO led operations, based on the experience of A3 countries medical team and the current POMLT case in ISAF. Going together in operations is much better and cheaper than going alone. This is an area of great interest for all of our regional countries.

**Sixth**, we need a ‘*smart defence*’ with special focus on the development of specialized niche capabilities. All our countries have traditional units and specialties, for which NATO is in real

---

<sup>4</sup> Secretary Rasmussen, Munich Security Conference, February 2011.

<sup>5</sup> Secretary Rasmussen, speech at the European Policy Centre in Brussels, 30 September 2011.

need. What NATO and EU need from our countries today are not mechanized or motorized battalions, but both organizations are in need for EOD, C-IED, MP, OMLT, POMLT, CIMIC, PRT teams, and other small specialized capabilities, which can be better provided by smaller nations.

***Seventh***, we need a ‘smarter defence’ with regard to Civil Emergencies. Civil Emergency should be the primary area for cooperation and development of joint capabilities. Albania had a flood crisis situation last December and most regional countries helped our country. We are committed to do the same, and we should continue this approach of helping each other in these cases.

***Eighth***, we need a ‘Smart Defence’ through applying a ‘sharing and pooling’ approach at bilateral, multinational and regional level, where possible. Sharing and pooling could be a better way to develop capabilities which overcome the possibilities of our individual nations, such as a Regional Airspace Management System, a Regional Air Policing System. Also, none of our countries is able to develop Strategic Airlift, Intelligence capabilities, or other highly expensive capabilities, but we can work on alternative approaches based on national, regional, or collective level.

***Ninth***, we need a ‘Smart Defence’ in support of the Education and Training, Infrastructure and Maintenance. This is a large area of research on how to effectively use our precious available resources at local or regional level. Pooling and sharing some of the national training and education institutions, where necessary, is a very efficient tool to get closer our armed forces, and save considerable spending. The efforts made so far in this area are to be appreciated, but a ‘smart defence’ concept is to be supported by all regional countries. Among others, Albania has made available a Senior Regional Course on Security and Defence, successful so far.

Pooling and sharing can be further extended when building and using the capabilities of existing and future Regional Centres of Excellence, or Facilities for Training and Exercises of regional countries. We are ready to provide a menu of national capacities for regional use and appreciate the capabilities provided by all other regional countries in this direction. *This is a very important area to be further explored by the experts of our countries.*

Using infrastructure, maintenance and logistics capabilities of countries at bilateral, multilateral and regional level is an area of smart cooperation to be further explored. For example, for a small region such as the Balkans, instead of having separate capabilities in all regional countries, we can use at a regional level destruction sites of excess ammunitions, or repair and maintenance factories, ship-building and shipyard facilities, and many other services. Communication is another area of interest to promote interoperability of our forces. Of course, they need legal appropriate arrangements.

***Tenth***, but not the least, ‘Smart Defence’ is not completed without the Research and Development element. We cannot find smart solutions without research and development in our defence institutions. Smart solutions require smart peoples and smart defence institutions based on knowledge and innovation practices. Albanian MoD is using all intellectual potentials of the Defence Academy and the Center for Defence Analyses to bring about ‘smart defence’ solutions regarding issues in national and international security agenda. In our opinion, Research and Development in the security and defence area should become a new element in the agenda of cooperation among our regional countries.



## **Some Conclusions**

I identified only ten areas of a smart defence approach in our region. Of course, there may be tens of others to be explored. Beyond the identification, they should be discussed in round tables based on a top-down or bottom-up approach, depending on the situation.

Small countries, like our regional countries, cannot develop all required capabilities on their own. Being flexible and pragmatic, away from being conformist and traditional, are two key elements of a smart defence. A new vision should be developed, a new mentality should be articulated, a new area of cooperation should be opened. Capabilities, we cannot afford at national level, could be developed together. A good example to be followed is the successful approach of the Baltic countries.

“Smart Defence” may require short, mid and long term solutions. Application of this concept requires first of all a strong political will at national and regional level. It will require new legal arrangements from all regional countries, either members or aspiring NATO and EU membership.

“Smart Defence” should be reflected in the National Security and Military Strategies of our countries. Security and defence of each of our countries is not any longer a question of the countries in isolation. We have common challenges, regional and transnational risks and threats which have to be managed by use of regional approaches, capabilities and solutions.

“Smart Defence” should be further extended to a broader ‘*Smart Security*’ agenda at national and regional level. I believe Security and Defence are interrelated topics which cannot be separated.

## ***Two approaches towards “operational capability” – Bring them as closer as possible***

Col. Foto Duro,  
Director of Defence Policies, MoD

**Abstract.** *Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in Albania has already reached the stage, when lining-up and linking operational capabilities (as final products of this process) with the corresponding resources is becoming a necessity. At this stage, some of the initial signs of challenges in making this linkage possible have come up. One of them is related to different approaches to the operational capability, the building of which is one of the main goals of SDR. Being part of this process, based on his own experience in the area of defence resources management, the author tries to put these challenges in the focus of this article, as well as offering some ways to overcome them. The article is viewed from an academic perspective, particularly addressing concepts, due to a relative absence of them in our defence planning process.*

Since February 2011, the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) in cooperation with six other state institutions and agencies which have constitutional responsibilities in the security area, have initiated a Strategic Defence Review (SDR) process. It is being viewed as an attempt, to jointly plan adequate capabilities, to deal with a carefully crafted list of security scenarios. The different level working groups involved in the process of scenario development, and in the identification of proper operational capabilities to be built, have been cautious enough not to lose sight of the objective realities of Albania and the region, in terms of threats and risks to our security, but also the resources to be devoted to cope them.

Unique by the dimensions and the scale of inclusiveness as it is, in general the whole process, supported by the Office of the US Secretary of Defence, seems to be running relatively well. By now, this process has reached the phase of linking proposed operational capabilities with financial resources projected in the defence budget figures for the next 20 years. That constitutes a very important moment with some of the most expected challenges not only because of the already known gap between ambitions and resources, but also (and probably much more) because of the differences in culture and the way of “doing business” between programmers and budgeters. It is something already recognized and accepted by all schools of defence resources management, an acceptance which however doesn’t automatically bring solution. We are currently experiencing the same approaches gap in AAF, which calls for more debates and analyses, to find the common ground.

First of all, we should understand where these differences consist. By their area of interest, the programmers are more focused and interested on the operational capabilities (outputs) which could be considered as “end products” of the process, whereas budgeters are more preoccupied about funds (inputs), which are to be allocated in different areas of activities, during the implementation of the defence programs, in to build these capabilities.

As such, as two different approaches, it’s natural that in any resource management system (not only in defence) they expose differences in interests, concepts, mindset in general for the people involved. Because of that fact, and the consequences associated with them, any management system is interested to narrow that gap if not possible to avoid it.

The Albanian Mid-term Budgeting System (PBA) tries to narrow this gap by mandatorily asking for some concrete and tangible indicators to be clearly stated, put forward as objectives to be achieved by budgetary programs. For that purpose, PBA Operational Manual (2009) provides the definition of budget program productions: “...as a precise definition of a product or service, which is to be achieved...All the products (of this process) are similar to each other in that of being: concrete, measureable, realistic, achievable, and definite by the time perspective”<sup>6</sup>. Despite the definition and the strict requirement to state them clearly in the budgeting programs, in reality, the list of outputs generally has resulted generic and apart from listing some of the major equipment, systems, and some infrastructure objects, it has failed to offer a clear picture of what is expected to be achieved through this budgeting. They have remained far from becoming a vivid picture of the aimed results (i.e. operational capabilities) which major unit commanders are really interested for.

In an “ideal world”, it wouldn’t be very problematic that connection (achieved by budgeting) between funds and requests for operational capabilities, stated in plans and elaborated more in defense programs, in other words, that very linkage of the part of inputs related to money with corresponding outputs (capabilities) required and attempted by programmers and unit commanders to be achieved. In this case (ideal world) “defence programs” would provide the only foundation for developing “budgeting programs.” In a simplistic way of speaking, it would be enough just to cut from the consolidated block of defence programs extended in time (usually 6 years time frame) that part, corresponding to the budgeting year. After that, every category and subcategory of activities programmed in the defence programs would have to be converted into the budgeting categories and subcategories.

In the “real world”, the situation poses difficulties and challenges. Decisions and orders for changes to money allocations may come for many reasons, which usually are imposed by unexpected changes in domestic or regional security landscape. These changes could also be imposed by other factors, out of the security context. They may be changes in prices, failure in achieving the pre-planned state budget incomes, emerging national obligations and participations in other regional initiatives, and beyond. All these reasons cause discrepancies in defence programs (prepared years in advance) compared to current developments, therefore posing the need for revisions and reflections over the activities planned sometime in the past for this specific budgeting year.

On the other hand, as part of the State Budget, the Defence Budget is organized differently from the Defence Programs, which logically (should) pave the way for the budget. Defence Budget cannot be organized structurally in a different way from the State Budget, as such, it follows the latter and is organized through the same “categories” and “subcategories”, as the State Budgeting is. This is natural, because the State Budget aggregates in one structure all other institutions designated to be supported by the State Budget. To keep control over all of them, some broad areas and indicators are necessary to be applied in relation to personnel, operational expenditures, investments etc. For each of them, to be easily identifiable, some “code numbers” (or “budget categories”) have been established and agreed, each of them further elaborated in “sub codes” (or “sub budget categories”). In different countries there are different techniques. In Albania, all funds allocated for state employees’ salaries are represented by the “category 600”, funds for insurance (life, medical) are allocated under the “category 601”, operational

---

<sup>6</sup> - PBA Manual, Tirana, 2009, pg.A.1-4

expenditures for normal functioning of any institution are allocated under the “category 602”, whereas expenditures for investment (major equipment and infrastructure) are under the “category 231”, etc. It’s understandable that each of the abovementioned categories can be broken further down in sub-articles, which in total go to tens of thousands.

In this way, every budgeting institution establishes and keeps a particular relation with the Government, in order to achieve financial support for its own objectives. For that purpose, one of the priority concerns of the budgeting institutions in defence sector, (primarily Ministry of Defence but also Major Commands) should be serving as a facilitator in connecting MoD and Major Commands with the Ministry of Finance. To achieve that, they should do the best to convert what is so far expressed in “defence programs language” into “budgeting language”.

In conditions of a mature “programming” process, it might be relatively easy, because (hypothetically) the only thing to be done should be just viewing the defence programs structure by another point of view (Fig.1). In this case, the programmers view the program build up (as described by left to right arrows) developed in time, through the known components: “Personnel” “Operation and Maintenance” (O&M), “Equipment”, “Infrastructure” (principally also Research and Development, R&D, which practically is missing in our defence programs). We should bear in mind what was mentioned above, that operational capabilities, or “outputs”, dominate in the defence programmers’ concept. Operational capabilities themselves should be visualized as a composition of the components of “personnel”, “equipment”, “infrastructure”, packed together in concrete military units which cannot stay “static”, but conduct either training/exercises or operations, or all them together.




Fig 1: Programmer approach vs Budgeter

Quite different than this approach, in “budgeters’ view”, (figuratively expressed through the top-down arrows) the same programs’ build up, is being viewed and conceived as “inputs”, expressed into money terms, more specifically, into budgeting categories (“600”, “602”...etc). Refereeing to Pict.1, it is obvious, that for a programmer, “personnel” category (money) is represented by one single component. On the other hand, for a budgeter, it is distributed and represented by five different components (budget articles), such as salary (“category 600”) life insurance (“category 601”) some compensations (uniforms, food, etc, included into O&M, or “category 602”) social support (“category 604”, pre-pensioning and pensions) some other bonuses (“category 606”, housing, spouses’ support etc).

Being two different approaches, two different perspectives, in viewing the same thing, conducted for two different functions in managing the defence resources, i.e. programming of expected outputs from one hand and budgeting of the activities to achieve them on the other hand, they ask for and are practically handled by people with different education and mindset. That is the reason why in practice, running process encounters difficulties, sometimes friction, even cracking or stopping. What is concerning in this process, is the fact that in any case when the smooth conversion capability requirement → money results impossible, it is “budgeting” that takes the

lead, with its own solutions which appear to be imposed to defense plans and programs. That could probably avoid a challenge in short run, but in a long term perspective cannot be without serious consequences. Usually they appear to be either insufficient, or inadequate or premature capabilities, which, on the other hand, result to insufficient capacity of the armed force to conduct operations.

Problems encountered in almost every country in struggling to achieve a harmonious and smooth transition request for capability → budget, have their own root causes deriving from tradition, experience, different methodologies, the level of professionalism, institution culture and institutions' team work attitude. Almost all of them are subjective by their very nature and might be overcome through maturing the system and the structures involved. In addition, there are some other challenges and obstacles which are objective in their nature and difficult to overcome. First of all, they stem from the intrinsic characteristics which differentiate “operational capabilities” from “financial resources”; the earlier, the operational capabilities, are always “discrete”, which means they are formed as packages, or as portions of composing elements. They neither can be perceived, nor can be built differently. The latter, the “financial resources”, in their very essence, are quite the opposite of the discrete state. They remain or flow in a continuum, and might take the nature of portion packages, only when linked closely with concrete activities or products.

This point is worth elaborating further. For that, it's necessary to go deeper into the essence of the operational capability. Practically, an operation capability could be designed for a variety of purposes. It can be a combat capability/unit (regardless of the level, platoon, company or higher). It can be a combat support (CS) capability/unit (reconnaissance, fire support, communication) or a combat service support (CSS) capability/unit (logistic, medical support etc). In any case, this operational capability should be visualized as unitary, measurable, with clear contours (in numerical aspect, in terms of some certain tactical-technical attributes, volumes etc). It's already mentioned that these measurable components are: “personnel”, “O&M”, “equipment”, “infrastructure” and (in some instances) R&D. If all components are measurable (let's say – “with clear contours”) it's understandable that the same attributes, “clear contours” (being them seen quantitatively or qualitatively) will characterize their grouping to broader operational capability. Furthermore, amongst these components, which together make this capability, there are some logical ratios which should be respected, otherwise we couldn't have the desired capability. So, for example, it doesn't make sense for a platoon of 30 people to have more than 30 individual weapons, and so on.

For a better understanding of this, in Fig.2, six different kinds of operational capabilities are symbolically displayed, differing qualitatively or quantitatively from each other. Let's suppose (figuratively) that in any case their components (personnel, O&M, equipment and infrastructure) are rightly proportionate to each other, the operational capability itself takes the shape of a regular parallelepiped, with rectangular faces which sit in a right angle to each other. After accepting this geometrical symbolism, we can assert that because of this regularity, these operational capabilities can be combined, divided in pieces,




Fig.2: Operational capabilities, from Nr.1 to Nr.6 (proportionate components)

recombined again to serve a given mission, possessing again some rightly proportionate capabilities, able to fulfil the mission (Fig.3). So, due to their proportionality (symbolically let's say geometrical regularity) they offer the possibility to fit to each other with "no gaps".

Everyday practices have shown that when it comes to calculate the total cost of an operational capability, usually at the end, we realize that the ambition to build that capability exceeds available financial resources. As a consequence, there appears a need for reductions, to draw inside "the green" all activities necessary to build that capability, which is to match them with the budgetary ceilings put forward by the pertinent authorities (usually defined in the Minister's guidance for the budgeting year). This is the moment when the budgeters start to "utter" more with some characteristic problems to follow.




Fig.3: Well proportionate op.capabilities can fit to each other

As a consequence, there appears a need for reductions, to draw inside "the green" all activities necessary to build that capability, which is to match them with the budgetary ceilings put forward by the pertinent authorities (usually defined in the Minister's guidance for the budgeting year). This is the moment when the budgeters start to "utter" more with some characteristic problems to follow.

To make an operational capability financially affordable, one has two options, either to reduce it or to stretch it out in time (sometimes, a combination of both, could be reasonable and applicable). In any course of action, it is crucial to keep proportions balance of its components. For

a budget officer this is a painful nuisance. Often, reduction by portions results challenging. One more portion, even a very small one, and the cost pops over "the green", which means inability to support with money. A portion less and the cost drops under "the green", which means unused money. Unfortunately, in many cases, budgeters pursue an easier way, which is faster for sure, but less productive from the operational capability perspective. They make reductions by operating in the "realm" of "budgeting categories", ignoring some "devil operational considerations". In this regard, it is mostly the "category 602" (O&M, training in particular) which suffer most of reduction, but sometimes investments ("category 231") are suffering from these reductions as well. These cuts, with no proportions in sight (which is so crucial for an operational capability) cause these capabilities to become distorted, atrophied. As such, it results ineffective (at least to a certain extent). It is obvious, in the case when cuts are made respectively

in "category 602" (O&M - usually in training and exercises part of that) or "category 231" (mostly equipment investments), the consequence related to the operational capability will be - people staying inactive (respectively because of the lack of training or equipment). In cases when cuts are made in "category 600" (salary) the consequence will be - equipment in storage because of the lack of personnel to operate them, and so on. In cases like these, the shape of the operational capability (keeping the same geometrical symbolism) will no longer be a perfect parallelepiped, but an "irregular" shape as it is depicted in Fig.4. These irregular shapes should be considered (as they really are) as capabilities running short of expectations, unable to be combined with other capabilities in an attempt to contribute to larger and more complex operational capabilities.




Fig.4: Operational capabilities, from Nr.1 to Nr.6 (disproportionate components)

In addition to its prerequisite of being composed by harmonious and proportionate components, operational capability is problematic also in another aspect. Its value, its capacity to successfully conduct operations is never calculated as an average of its own components, but takes the value of the lowest component. In this aspect, an operational capability looks much as a chain, the strength of which can never be higher than the weakest link of it. It is logical, if we suppose a unit manned 70%, whereas equipped 100%, in other words, if one company based on its TOE (Table of Organization and Equipment) should have 100 personnel, but in fact has 70, regardless of the fact that it might have all the equipment required in TOE, the real effectiveness cannot be higher than 70%, because armament with no humans to operate it, does not produce operational effects. It is the same reasoning in cases when manning level is higher than the equipment attached to the unit, and so on.

It's known that for a unit commander, same as for a programmer, the "money factor" is simply a means towards the end, which is always a desired capability appropriate for the mission. Sometimes they consider money and people dealing with them, as strangers. Financial personnel are seen very often as "different than us" or just "they" (in a better case), but there are (worse) cases when the attitude towards them becomes rigid and not trustworthy. On the contrary, for a budgetary/financial person, the "money factor" means very much if not everything. For him/her, it is important that funds be allocated in compliance with the "ceilings" established in an official document (coming from above) and afterwards, be spent rhythmically, in accordance with the detailed plan. Unfortunately, very often, for them, the term "operational capability" is something abstract, which brings concerns, leaving somebody else to deal with it. For sure, the whole system of defence resource management could work better when these two approaches are not positioned extremely against each other. In other words, the more and the better a unit/institution leader thinks as a manager, on the other hand the clearer a budgeter understands that money is just a means towards an end (operational capability) the more efficient this system will be.

In any case, to some extent, the fate of the organization and its capacity to achieve the planned objectives relies on the quality and the level of planning and executing its own budget. Their leaders and staffs, regardless of the level should realize the essence of the budget, the process it goes through, and in particular, all the techniques applied to monitor and react during the course of its execution. Subordinate units, as well as other parallel units/institutions should prepare, should know and possess their own budget, as part of the whole, which, is to be fused and consolidated afterwards into the Defence Budget. It calls for all the units and institutions of the defence sector to broaden their "range of sight", in particular to better understand how their own problems in achieving their own objectives, such as reforming, program development, budgeting, etc, are interrelated and interdependent to those of the other units/institutions of the same level or higher in the chain of command. In addition they should keep in mind strategies and plans of the armed forces, being in the same time aware of cost implications of any decision made, closely linked to a striking balance between efficiency and effectiveness.

### **Conclusions and recommendations:**

1. Budgeting process should take more in consideration what has been made during the other phases of defence resource management, namely: Planning and Programming, in order to better put itself under their "service". It should possess and go into the essence of the "defence programs", as well as finding and adopting the adequate ways to achieve that

smooth conversion from the defence programs to budgeting programs. In so doing, the defence resource management process can gain continuity which guarantees a successful management of the available (and scarce) defence resources, that optimum “money-result”, which is the main gauge of the efficacy of any management system.

2. It is very crucial to bear in mind that support with funds of any activity of the armed forces should be done in capability portions. For that, the budget categories and subcategories, as well as proportions among them, for every activity, cannot be decided arbitrarily. They should derive from the cost of corresponding component of every operational capability, organized and disciplined into defence programs or subprograms. Any reduction or cut, any change in the fund allocation, which might come out as must during the budget execution, should be done through the same concept, based on proportions, in order to avoid “capability distortion”, which would make it ineffective.
3. In Albania, budgeting programs (to some extent) keep track of some indicators or “end products” assigned to support financially, but even though sometimes in very lengthy lists, they haven’t provided enough information to understand and identify operational capabilities to which they are dedicated. Defence resource management methodologies should do more to find efficient ways in order that any indicator in the list is (as much as possible) clearly and organically linked to the operational capabilities designed in the defence programs.
4. It is impossible that the abovementioned recommendations be achieved without a new mentality in shaping of the personnel charged to manage the defence resources. They should master (at least) satisfactorily both the programmer’s approach and the budgeter’s one. On one hand, this calls for commanding structures, all institutions charged to develop visions and to program operational capabilities to “think financially”, to become aware that programs, regardless of how good they are, could bog down if not linked to the corresponding funds. On the other hand, budgeting personnel and institutions should know better and consider more the long-term visions and approaches (formulated into defence plans and programs). In the end, there are exactly these visions which should be materialized in the concrete terrain, whereas budgeting is but an available mechanism for them.



## **“A smart Defence”**

### **A concept on Research and Development in AAF**

Colonel Perikli Koliçi  
Commander of Defence Academy “Spiro Moisiu”

**Abstract.** *Research and Development (R&D) is a term on the daily agenda for the Alliance and for each ally country. This process is inspired by the idea of the secretary general of the Alliance Rasmussen on “smart defence”. The new Strategic concept of Lisbon promotes the values of research in the security and defence sector.*

*This article presents a general idea on the development of an organized system of research-development in the defence institutions. It is a fact that the research we make in the AAF today has not served enough to the fundamental issues of the defence reform. A considerable part of the research in the AAF has reflected few applied values, to anticipate with advanced military reasoning the future challenges and important decision making of high civil military authorities.*

*To overcome this situation as a new ally member of the new era and professional force, in the same line with establishing new systems of management, this article sheds light on new ideas on creating systems of management of research and development in AF.*

#### **Introduction**

*The main aim of research-development is the advancement of knowledge and their implementation for the creation of products, processes and new improved services fulfilling the increasing demands of the consumers..”<sup>7</sup>*

Today it is more and more evident that the security of global environment is becoming unpredictable. “Many of the yesterday’s capacities are being less used today and many of the capacities we have today will be less used tomorrow”<sup>8</sup>. In the dynamic conditions of the security environment, the research on the strategic, operational and tactic level is of special importance. NATO experience shows that research activity (Research&Development – R&D) is more and more ranking among the priorities. They have established specialized institutions in the research field with the right capacities and relevant sources. Our country, having little authentic research experience , which will have served to the development of defence reforms in the last 20 years, in most cases ,delegated the reform expertise of the AF, to the counsellors, companies or expert groups of allies or foreign partners. This has been an acceptable policy so far, but one that requires the articulation of an alternative comparison in compliance with the new reality.

Now, we are in a more advanced new area. We should leave behind the phase of consulting and get into the phase of alley partnership. Albania is a NATO country member moving forward to EU session. This new phase, seeks for more efficient efforts and high responsibility. It is the time for us to shape our positions and attitude, becoming actively part of the process that we are involved in, and we also should become a moderated factor in building the consent of decision-making of the international organizations.

---

<sup>7</sup> Webster’s Dictionary, [www.http.definitions/R&D](http://www.http.definitions/R&D).

<sup>8</sup> Paul Davis, Capability based Planning, Study for RAND Cooperation, 2007, page 12.

## **An overview of the research of the AAF**

Currently in the Albanian Armed Forces there are several institutions of research. Some of them such as Military Academy, function based on the Law for the High education. Some others are supported by special decision of Ministers Council, whereas some others conduct research in the tactical and operational level.

In my opinion, not every institution or any person is able to do conduct research. The research work is characteristic of the institutions and developed countries which have advanced intellectual experience Also, it is an attribute of institutions recognized by law Higher Education Law and the involvement of the Defence Academy in high cycle postgraduate studies, the opening of master and doctorate programs are achievements that should be explored further in establishing an organized system of research at the Armed Forces.

I think the time is right to establish this system of research needed to serve as "eyes and ears" of decision-making authority for the development of a modern armed force.

## **Research priorities in AAF**

It is obvious that before establishing a system of research (R&D), we should articulate a clear view why the research is needed in the AF and what its subject should be.

The midterm ahead will be a period of reforms and transformations for the institutions of security and defence, *"to create more capacities with fewer resources"*<sup>9</sup>. In terms of budget constraints, we will need to find solutions and less costly alternatives. I think one of the main sources of finding more effective alternatives and less costly action should be based on "Smart Defence". I also think that research should look for recommendations and solutions for a period of at least 5 years ahead. It should be at the forefront of AAF strategic planning.

Defence Academy in cooperation with the Defence Analysis Centre has defined 10 key areas of research during the next 5 years. They include, among other issues, fundamental issues of policy development and the National Security and Defence Strategy of the country, the level of ambition and the challenges of integration into NATO and the EU, the future security environment and international relations, regional and bilateral, the transformation and reform in the Armed Forces in the longer term, the development and consolidation Professional Force 2010; training, exercises and operations today and the future of the Armed Forces units, the development of Millennium Force Package - 2008 (FG -2008), the development of tactics, technology and military technology, and legal developments, psychological, social and pedagogical of professional AF, etc.<sup>10</sup>

## **Research &Development planning in AAF**

Research and development, more than any other field, needs a careful planning. Incorrect planning can lead to deviation of resources in the wrong directions and unpredictable losses. Research should focus on the main current priorities and medium term perspective. On the other hand, it is almost impossible to search and development to respond to all research needs that Armed Forces may have.

---

<sup>9</sup> Anders Fog Rasmussen, speech at the European Policy Center, May 2011.

<sup>10</sup> Research Policy in AAF, work document, pg 4.

Why I do recommend a careful planning for search and development in AF? There have been several cases in the 20-year defence reform when the major decision-making events are not based upon a well-studied framework. In many cases funds were invested for facilities, infrastructure and equipment that have not resisted in time. As a result, the expenses have not actually gone to the right direction.

In order to avoid such phenomena, very positive and promising steps were made during the recent years. The Armed Forces have become for the first time in 20 years part of the preparation of annual and mid-term research plans.<sup>11</sup> These plans were initiated by the Minister of Defence Directive 2010, and culminated with the support of research and development plans and the support of the research and development separately in the defence budget, which is still in the process of institutionalization.

### **Supporting research and development**

Despite the achievements we have had so far, a still weak point of research in AF is lack of a sufficient level of financial funds for its support. Creating a new mindset for financial support for research and development projects in the AF is the “Achilles heel” for a functional R&D system. It is encouraging the fact that the predisposition of the senior civil-military authorities at MoD is positive and gives a qualitative boost of this process.

Based on the experience of Allied Armed Forces, Research & Development is planned separately in the defence budget. The current trend in these countries is to allocate from 1% to 6% of the defence budget for research-development. It is time that we do so, but always by being proportional to the priorities, opportunities, and our absorption capacities available. In the future perspective, an acceptable version of the search and development funds can be a gradual increase from year to year, to reach up to 1 to 1.5% of the defence budget in 2020, in accordance with the needs for Research & Development, priority problems of perspective, available resources, absorption capacities, etc.

The question arises, how prepared are we to properly and effectively absorb this considerable fund? This is a challenge, but not insurmountable. The best solution is to approve within 2012 a directive for search and rescue, to set up the respective infrastructure (ad-hoc boards), to develop and approve the respective R&D plan for 2012, to allocate the relevant budget for its implementation, and to assign the institutions responsible for research projects.

The Armed Forces have a complete structure for proper research work. We have a Training and Doctrine Command with some subordinate institutions of education, training, and scientific research. With all this potential, TRADOC must become the place where there should also be concentrated AAF research work now and in the future, given that today’s trends link research work to higher education.

### **AAF Research and Development**

Scientific work has no value if the final products of search and development do not bring forth development or a new quality of issue for solution ahead. The major objective in setting up the system of search and development within AF is to set standards for research products and research discipline, in order to prevent subjectivity and pseudo research and development.

---

<sup>11</sup> Research and Development Plan in AAF, 2008, 2009, and 2010, approved upon the Order of Minister of Defense.

Scientific projects will be conducted by the research community within and outside of AF. They will be won by the best applicants, passed through the quality, background, and research guarantee filter, with clearly-defined rules. The application for research projects will be open for individuals and expert groups.

It is very important that the Annual Plan and Mid-term Research Work Plan serve as a main source to formulate research and scientific papers for the candidates of Professional Master, Scientific Master and Doctorate, in the respective Defence Academy syllabuses.

Likewise, the research products should use various methods such as: formal and informal interviews, direct observation, monitoring, surveys, displays, direct participation in activities subject to study work, group or panel discussions under “brainstorming”, statistical methods, written document analyses, workshops, seminars, conferences, symposiums, reviews, opposition etc.

In the research and development system we should give primary importance to evidencing and promoting a qualified research community in AF, as well as young military and civilian talents. The development of this elite community of research work should aim to include talented people, committed and passionate about research work.

A key issue in research work is also that of checking its quality, thus how useful it is to current developments and AF reform-making perspective. To aim for the highest quality possible, AF research products will be evaluated and checked based on modern parameters accepted by research institutions of advanced NATO countries.

Each product of AF Research Project Plan should be assessed not just about the amount of information it treats but rather about application values, analyses and synthesis, as well as creative capacity to make recommendations and be action-oriented, mainly concrete solutions to decision-taking authorities, based on sound arguments and reliable statistics.

In this context, the research and evaluation of its quality control will be performed on the basis of “*improved Bloom system*”<sup>12</sup> with 6 assessment levels, which in its center has to encourage independent research and study work based on analytical treatment, rational reflection, logical reasoning, critical and creative thinking. This system is compatible with both the Higher Education Law, as well as the requirements of the Bologna process and that of Consortium of Defence Academies.

This methodological system of quality control of the research will bring not only the avoidance of mediocrity, but also the research discipline of the authors and academic staff, as well as the quality control organisms for application of the same philosophy of the research and evaluation only on the basis of its real performance.

Of particular importance is the selection of research personnel in the AAF. Research institutions as the Academy of Defence or Defence Analysis Centre should be composed of *scientific personnel, technical personnel and administrative personnel*. Scientific and technical personnel should be selected among active / reserve militaries or civilians with the background in the field of security and defence, with experience and gifted outstanding achievements in the research field of the mission, with the quality of group work, operational experience and language skills

---

<sup>12</sup> Bloom system on Taxonomy of Learning and Research, Barcon edition, page 34-67.

by STANAG 6001<sup>13</sup>. In my opinion, it should be used more experience and knowledge of the reserve military personnel, especially in the teaching and research functions.

***Scientific Personnel must necessarily have a scientific degree.*** I think that the appointment of scientific and technical personnel should be made after an evaluation by the department/centre based on open application where you can run any member of the Armed Forces or outside them, which meets the specific research criteria of the job description.

There can be no real research where there is no quality increase in research issues – this is the fundamental precondition of AAF research and development.

### **The role of research cooperation**

The research work in the AAF seeks cooperation and free opinion exchanges of civil and military academic elite within and outside the Armed Forces, sharing experiences and lessons learned, and collaboration with counterpart institutions of NATO / EU (such as ACT), but with the partner and allied countries also. For this purpose, I think we should aim to raise the level of cooperation:

- a. Between research institutions within the AAF;
- b. Between AAF research institutions and other national research institutions;
- c. Among AAF institutions and international research institutions analogues, especially those of NATO / EU, allied and partner countries.

### **Conclusion**

Development and consolidation of a research and development system will require several years, but it is necessary and worthwhile in the interest of the AF transformation process in the coming decades. The author of this article assesses that with the status of membership of the Alliance, we are at the right time to make this step.

### **Bibliography:**

- Law on Higher Education in the RA, 2010.
- Guidelines of RA Minister Education, March 2011.
- Minister of Defence Directive, 2010, 2011.
- National Security Strategy of RA, 2004.
- The Alliance's Strategic Concept, Lisbon 2010.
- NATO Directive for Research Development.
- ACT Experimentation Campaign, 2010.
- Benjamin Bloom, Taxonomy of Learning and Research.

---

<sup>13</sup> English Proficiency Levels, STANAG 6001, October 2006.

## ***Defence Attaché*** ***A key element of Defence Diplomacy***

Colonel ® Zaim Kuçi,  
Former Defence Attaché in the Republic of France/Portugal

**Abstract.** *Diplomacy is the weapon of the word, which becomes more powerful than aircraft, missiles, warships and tanks, when it is owned by the wise and the prudent. Military diplomacy if guided by an intellectual and moral driving force, the military who own more than the art of war speech is a guarantee, security and financial resource value, it gives the proper form in diplomacy, as a national force.*

*In general terms, diplomacy is classified in line with the assessment and development of the art of war making, so is art that puts into action a host of peaceful means to achieve the goal: of the party negotiator, to create necessary conditions for consensus to win lost situation, in the interest of security.*

*Historically diplomacy has produced various forms of action to stabilize the society which unfortunately produced more war than peace, for example, England for two centuries dominated European diplomacy with the concept for establishing a "balance of forces" and later the history brought the implementation of policy of force by Germany, under the concept that "the goal justifies the means"<sup>14</sup>.*

*Even after the second world war it was diplomacy that kept a balance of forces to ensure peace, although it was the period where military forces and assets in Europe and around the world, involved in conventional and nuclear arms race, reached the peak of their development , threatening each other for a new world war. There was this element of state power that has avoided military conflicts and civil wars.*

*As mentioned above, diplomacy as a national power means the strength of a country on the attitudes and actions of other countries in the expected security environment on which we must stick. What force and role defence diplomacy has and will have in the new strategic environment? It remains to be seen.*

*In the complexity of the elements of diplomacy as national power, in the past and present, military diplomacy has played and plays a primary role as an important element of state diplomacy. This article focuses on the role of the Defence Attaché in diplomacy as a leading factor and actor in defence diplomacy.*

### **Development of the concept of "military diplomacy"**

Notion of military diplomacy comes from the period of Antiquity, represented by an officer accompanying the ambassador, has continued to increase military representation in the middle Ages, and has evolved into the modern era, in the new form and content, as a high diplomatic representative in the service of national power improvement.

---

<sup>14</sup> Henry Kissinger, "Diplomacy", Albanian publication, 1999.

Valued from this story of development, comprehensiveness of its elements in state formation, the role of military diplomacy constitutes a basic platform for the development of national power, the primary element of the development of state diplomacy.

Nineteenth century brought permanent acceleration and accommodation of the diplomatic relations of national defence (said: permanent observer), a necessity of the European wars consequences.

Initially, military representativeness is established permanently alongside embassies in the capitals of major European powers. The need for this service took space from the period of Franco-German War (1870) until the beginning of the First World War, a period where warring blocs increased interstate antagonism, and, on the other hand military diplomatic service was decupled, from 30 to 300 in personnel, the personnel attached legally, with legal status and practice within the embassies.

At that time, the function of their role, was established by a royal order of February 1839 for France, which regulated the contents of this mission: military attaches at the time had a mission to study and inform on the military force, not only military forces and equipment, but also planning of the military actions of states at which they were accredited.

During the first and second world war in the context of diplomatic missions, military attaché mission provided information of special importance of a military and political character, whose service was crucial to the state diplomacy in the decision making process for conflict resolution .

After World War II, the term "military diplomacy" received a wide development as in concept, doctrine, strategy and hierarchal scale. Military representation kept growing with the emergence of newly independent states by changing the mission, structure and naming.

### **What does "defence diplomacy" represent?**

Theoretically, the term is presented as a pun, on the one hand the forces and equipment to wage war and diplomacy on the other side to stop the war; on the one side solders produce diplomacy to not use military forces and equipment against humanity, and on the other hand they design and direct military operations.

In this conflicting dualism of the term of our society in history (filled with chronic war) and in problematic actuality (new hotbeds of war) finds a determinant room the development of diplomacy notion also led by the solders, with the purpose of making war and getting away from it.

### **Is the defence diplomacy a contribution of only attachés or military representatives?**

Military diplomacy embraces a wide spectrum of actors, from the President of the Republic to the military attachés. Diplomacy is not property of diplomats with/without uniform, but is a comprehensive contribution. It is the property of those who know how to turn evil to good and conflict into cooperation.

Civil diplomatic missions should be included and become part of military diplomacy, directly and indirectly, thus providing a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution to

increase stability and security through contacts and lobbying to allow changing attitudes and perceptions for a given situation.

Military, certainly do not lead politics of a country, but are speeding up or slowing down actors, "pro" and "against" war development. Military are those who know better than anyone else scenarios of war making, they predict better than politicians war damages and are those who know how to prevent war and to rebuild peace. In the history of wars examples are numerous.

They are actors and factors of military actions development across land, sea and air; assess the level of military preparedness, morale and their arming. Evaluate other assets relating to the country's military power such as: the budget, natural resources, and technological capabilities of weaponry development, the geographic distribution of population and its morale.

As mentioned above soldiers are the best players in the field of security and defence; they find out, present and play with facts and figures about the forces and equipment on a given situation of a country. They analyze the ratio of forces and conclude the prospects and fortunes of war.

In the complexity of the problems that arise in the field of security and defence, states have been careful in preparing the military leadership to take the position of military diplomat. They are selected not only professionally, but rather; they should have a comprehensive education and culture of the current and perspective stage of development of society.

The development of today's officer, his scholastic background, not only meets the criteria of being a ground, air or sea specialist, he/she have above all a civic and patriotic education. Both of these make him/her a good diplomat and politician of his/her country, where economic profit and security is gained.

### **Defence Diplomacy**

After the 50s, with the establishment of security organizations such as NATO and the EU, member states created among them new doctrine in military diplomatic relations. In this new security environment, creating new state alliances significantly devalued the mission of attachés; there could not be an active diplomacy up to date with tasks that hinder the mission of the interaction in the field of security and defence.

In order to meet the challenges of security Armed Forces passed to a new strategic concept of defence "collective defence", as a result AF mission, according to this concept, changed the width and depth of its tasks. The area of responsibility expended, by assuming new missions in the regional or global areas where the security of member countries of NATO is threatened.

### **Transformation of the Defence Attaché Mission**

In this new strategic environment, military diplomatic mission was revised almost entirely in the interest of the strategic concept and the new missions that Armed Forces took over.

In this period of change, now, the traditional concept of "power", that meant force and threat, in this new environment was devalued and replaced by modern integrative concept that national power is accomplished by increasing the comprehensive level of political and military actors for an active "defence diplomacy".



First, the designation "military attaché" was replaced with "Defence Attaché", which gives him a wider sphere of action than that of classic "military informant" of cold war.

Second, there is radical transformation of the military mission, intelligence (observation, reporting), which usually was done by intelligence officers, in a diplomatic function that means, carrying out open bilateral relations between two countries.

Thirdly, cooperation in the field of security/defence has been growing by creating other security structures such as those of regional and sub regional. For Balkan countries, the Adriatic Charter A5, South Eastern European Defence Ministerial SEDM, RACVIAC and other structures, have brought improvements and changes in bilateral relations not only in defence but also in the political climate of the region. All these make up the entirety of the Defence Diplomacy.

Fourthly, it was defined the new mission of military attaché, which is consistent with the aforementioned missions undertaken by the Armed Forces according to the strategic concept of NATO, where "cooperative security" is one of the three main missions.

Defence Attaché represents the armed forces of his country within the diplomatic mission (army, air force, navy) and advises the Ambassador on security and defence field, represents the Minister of Defence and Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces in the country where it is accredited, initiations and develops bilateral relations between the two armed forces.

### **Development of the Defence Diplomacy in Republic of Albania**

Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Albania has already fulfilled the self isolated gap of totalitarian system in the spectrum of military diplomacy. I consider a success in the field of Albanian diplomacy, as a political attention of a new democratic state, of the Ministry of Defence opening of new missions and the growth of broad cooperation with allied and partner countries.

The establishment of military diplomatic relations with major countries of NATO is a fully integrated evaluation of whole Albanian politics in the region and beyond.

Albanian military diplomacy is new. Even though in a very short time, it includes a wide and important range of activities and contributions in the field of defence relationships. The results of this active diplomacy are significant; the majority of Albanian soldiers are educated, qualified or trained in military classrooms abroad.

### **Tasks of the Defence Attaché of the Republic of Albania**

Defence Attaché's duty is consistent with state policy and the Minister of Defence/Chief of General Staff of Armed Forces to the country of his accreditation.

Based on acquired intellectual and military potential, the diplomatic attaches process and develop active visions and policies to meet the "defence diplomacy" spectrum.

The primary task of defence attaché is the fulfilment of a cooperative plan, recommendations for the opening of areas of cooperation, knowledge-study-reflection on the Armed Forces and on the basis of this recognition, the preparation of recommendation - information on the experience of the accredited country's Armed Forces for our forces.

Equally important for defence attaché is a step by step presentation of the progress made by our forces, by presenting arguments for the whole integration of NATO standards that are accomplished and will be accomplished by our armed forces in order to be recognized from partners and securing routes of collaboration and support for our forces.

Ministry of Defence has pursued the policy of the Accreditation of defence attaché in the countries with big military structures, which increases the responsibility of his job. To be familiar with the functioning of this force and mechanism of structures is need to go inside in order to select the best, to be appropriate to that which we are building, and to give the best valued, which applies to countries with large and modern forces.

To carry out qualitatively its task, defence attaché must be continuously informed by the relevant structures of Ministry of Defence on developments in Ministry of Defence and General Staff (policies), components of land, air, navy, logistics and equipment that are worth to be shown.

This kind of information, the standard for all, should be improved whenever necessary by competent persons of the respective field. Information is in the format of "pocket pad" in order to make simple presentation, in meetings, receptions at the embassy and family, coffee etc; as the most efficient way to present what we have achieved and will achieve in the field of defence.

### **Military Ceremonial**

Besides the presentation of content, military diplomacy is also a presentation in the appearance of military relations, bilateral and multilateral to fulfil the mission up to the national honour.

*What do we mean by presentation in the appearance?*

Solders in diplomacy, should represent the best national and military values, traditional and contemporary. Armed Forces, in the past and present, demonstrate their strength through the ceremonial, be it the military parade by showing the performance of troops (traditional), weapons, logistics but also the power of their discipline; and exercising as a group of countries as the most direct way to demonstrate the power of knowledge, being equal with partners.

Military Ceremonial of any country in peacetime is a kind of demonstration of force creates confidence in the nation and strengthens the civil-military cohesion. Ceremonial on the eve of war is a moral strength to win the battle.

In modern armies, uniforms, signs and symbols are considered as elements of "military" power, represent the vigour of discipline, hierarchical level of the state, behaviour, the admiration for national and military values, traditional and modern.

Diplomats in uniform are the best conductors of ceremonial behaviour of armed forces. They are in daily contact with people who make diplomacy and have the opportunity to do that in the best way.

I would say that the behaviour, ethics, communication, every action and commitment of the diplomat and his family are basic routine elements of relations in diplomacy. All these, labelled diplomatic culture, are powerful weapons to make friends, or enemies if they are absent or of no value to display.

Organization of national and military holidays, family and the embassy receptions, are necessary presentation and communication opportunities, that I will value important and valuable as well as

the legal duties of a military character. From these events and manifestations is obtained or created diplomatic lobbying.

*The importance of rank representation:* States do care and appreciate most the rank level. Rank represents the degree of diplomatic relations between two countries. Change of rank representation, always has a political and diplomatic "biography"; failure to respect it during diplomatic rotation takes political nuances.

### **Defence Attaché, lessons learned**

Defence Attaché organizes its work in accordance with political, economic and military trends and developments of the country in which he is accredited in the interest of the Albanian policy objectives.

That the task be performed at the required level, military diplomat should have a complete understanding of the situation and based on this knowledge he should advise the Chief of Diplomatic Mission (Ambassador) and prepare recommendatory information for the Ministry of Defence and the General Staff of Republic of Albania.

For example: defence attaché accredited to European countries should bear in mind common policies of development of European and Euro-Atlantic structures, and find the best opportunity for our country's cooperation with allies and partners.

Defence Attaché optimizes the range of cooperation focusing on what we really need more than what we would like to, by harmonizing our requirements with those that offer European initiatives. This is worth and a financial resource for the country.

### **Relations of Defence Attaché with the press**

Media is a very important and delicate field in the interest of national power. As such, the press must remain at the centre of attention of any diplomat in uniform or not, as a presenting and encouraging mechanism of what is and what is to be done. It is regarded as the most effective policy-making and advancing relation in the area of economic as well as that of defence.

“A small drop of ink, falling like dew, upon a thought, produces what thousands, perhaps millions, thinking ideas”<sup>15</sup>, said George Byron, an expression that has transcended centuries and has come to present day.

### **Defence Attaché Profile**

Military Representative of the Republic of Albania should have a broad professional and cultural education, these being basic criteria to be integrated as a dignifying citizen of Albania. They should be contemporary military capacities, careful diplomats to offer the best of what we symbolize and present in such a diversified, sympathetic or not sympathetic and very important environment.

---

<sup>15</sup> George Byron, Selected Works, 2003.

On the other hand, given the numerous activities organized by the AF and the diplomatic body accredited, I would say that the role of family of the military attaché in this civil-military environment is complementary and important for diplomacy; it is the value that I will rank as a member of the diplomatic service.

### **Selection of defence attaché and military representatives**

According to the practices of NATO countries, for the selection of defence attaché and military representatives in the headquarters, are set some basic criteria on which is made the selection of officers, foreseen long ago to avoid “emergency” appointment. Not every officer of the Armed Forces, despite having achieved high rank, enjoys the status to make a career in diplomacy positions.

On the bases of the mission of defence attaché and military representatives in the headquarters of international organizations are defined specifics depending on the missions. Defence attaches are selected primarily candidates with a disposition for a diplomatic career (diplomatic ceremonial) while the personnel working in headquarters are military-minded (military ceremonial); so these two functions cannot be paralleled and assessed equally.

After the mission Defence Attaches gain diplomatic experience, while the personnel in headquarters gain military experience. This experience must be differentiated to plan for their next appointment, whether in the AF structures and converting them to civilian life in the state structures.

The period of time for defence attaches is preferred four years, depending on the projects in process or policies that present the need for experience. Usually this practice applies to countries with a small military force, for reasons of personnel selection as senior grades are limited, while for countries with large military forces the duration of mission is up to three years.

Defence Attachés who have had results on the first mission remain a preference for other missions, so it is gained a military 'career diplomat' for other state structures.

### **The initiative of defence attaché**

The Defence Attaché should not be just a routine informer, but he must be a military with determination to propose activities in the interest of national power, based on a deep analysis of mutual interest.

Personally accredited in a country like France, which bases its military strategy on the concept that the defence of France starts from the defence of Europe, I valued as important the geopolitical situation of European countries, and proposed the participation of our forces in EU-led operations as complementary forces for global missions (operations in Chad and Atlanta).

### **The geography of military representatives**

The Ministry of Defence is represented by resident defence attaches in the USA, Turkey, Greece, France, Spain, Italy, England, Hungary, Austria, who are not resident in other countries of

NATO. This political representation has met political and military vacuum of Albanian diplomacy.

In recent years in general by countries of the world is seen, a growing tendency of declining representation of Defence Attachés and on the other hand an increase of military representation in the structures of security and defence staffs, depending on the situations.

This downward trend of representation is not the result of increased security in the world, otherwise military analysts estimate that more than ever the world is fraught with crisis, risks, conflicts, but the engagement of other political and economic factors of countries has brought changes in organizational structure and objectives of the defence attaché.

The new security environment following the events of 11 September 2001, membership of new countries into NATO; the expansion of the area of responsibility; increase of staff in headquarters; enlargement with new members of the European Union; increasing the active role of other security organizations such as: the UN, OSCE, the Adriatic Charter, the Southeaster European Ministerial, Mediterranean Dialogue, and many other initiatives, have brought the reduction of defence attaché mission by focusing on bilateral relations.

Based on the above, recently European countries have reduced defence attaché structures. These states, generally, are represented by resident defence attaches in Paris and not resident in other countries due to the fact that Paris has a considerable share in global policy making.

For our country I will bring as a model representation of Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia, which for example: resident defence attaché in Paris also covers other countries: 3-4 countries.

Reduction of defence attaché posts even for developed countries, including for example France, except as above have stated that reforms are made for reasons of high cost budgeting. In this context, in current and expected circumstances of regional developments, which affect the interests of Albania in the region and beyond, there is a need to reform the military diplomatic representation.

Given the inherent problems of the Balkan region, today and for a long period, already made present by international organizations, I will propose increasing of the defence attaché representation in the region. Our military diplomatic positioning in the Balkans can better serve our active positions for security and stability, and promoting regional cooperation bridges or under the A5.

In my opinion, the Albanian military diplomacy will best serve a resident defence attaché in Serbia and nonresident in Austria, Switzerland, as well as a resident in Croatia and a non-resident in Kosovo, Macedonia, (Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina) and review of resident positions in countries that are not applicable and countries with greater military force (Hungary, Spain).

### **Inter-ministerial relations on issues of diplomacy (MOD and MFA)**

Foreign ministries build their interstate diplomatic relations depending on mutual interests in various development fields such as: politics, economy, culture and defence. All of these areas serve to achieve the single goal: increasing the country's national power.

From this fact and course of action in order to achieve the goal, the defence diplomacy remains a defining element to build diplomatic relations between countries.

Seen in different time and space, the level of interstate diplomatic relations is conditioned by the assessment situation analyzed for the country as part of national security. Now and again defence relations have influenced subsequent the establishment of the state diplomatic relations.

Given the above, GDDP (General Directorate of Defence Policies) and DMHR (Directorate of Management of Human Resources) in the Defence Ministry and relevant departments of Foreign Affairs Ministry should coordinate their work in shaping foreign policy, diplomacy in general and defence diplomacy in particular. Experience gained from this diplomatic staff is diplomacy earned.

### **Some conclusions**

- Military diplomacy embraces a wide spectrum of actors. It includes a number of actors; from the head of state to the military attachés. Diplomacy is not owned by diplomats in or without uniform, but is comprehensive contribution.
- Defence diplomacy is not an act of all rotating colonels/lieutenant colonels; it requires a careful and well thought selection procedure, of one of their elite group with a broad culture, education and civic behaviour and dignified representation.
- It should be understood that the defence attaché task focuses not only on the quantity and the pursuit of activities that is a routine part of the mission, but on new developments in the strategic environment and the armed forces, moreover, it is a *selling* of the best we have selected and a selected *purchasing* of what we need in the interest of security, it is authority and prestige.
- Defence attaché's task is the completion of a cooperative plan, recommendations for opening areas of cooperation, knowledge – study - reflection on the Armed Forces and on the basis of this knowledge, the preparation of information-recommendation on the experience of the Armed Forces of the country accredited for our forces.
- Defence Attaché optimizes the space of cooperation focusing on what we really need more than what we would like to, and harmonizes our requirements with those that European initiatives offer. This is valuable and a financial resource for the country.
- The defence institution should plan and budget more for the making of military diplomacy, i.e. "soft power", rather than large structures and military equipment, hence the "hard power". Production of effective diplomacy in the interest of national power means, substantially increasing the military strength and prestige of the country. If diplomacy is successful then the Armed Forces are better presented. Republic of Albania needs fewer forces and more presence, an objective that fits the new concept of "Smart Defence" of NATO.
- Given the above, for the Albanian Armed Forces is space to chose: the type of operations and the number of participation (less troops/resources, but with *notable appearances*) light structures for operation and integration, appropriate logistics and armament; opportunities for reassessment of representations such as those in NATO headquarters and the Defence attaché corps.

**Bibliography:**

- Henry Kissinger, "Diplomacy", Albanian edition, 1999.
- Charles de Gaulle and the nation, facing the defence problems.
- Jon Lotz, in an analyst position wrote: In his book Memoirs, "A Time to Lead", titled "Diplomacy, diplomacy, diplomacy."
- Vienna Convention of 1963, Pages 12-17

## *Shaping the future Albanian Maritime Security Strategy*

Captain Ist Rank Artur Meçollari,  
Chief of CET, TRADOC

MSc. Suard Alizoti,  
Professor at “Ismail Qemali” University

**Abstract.** *Albania is a maritime nation with regional interests. Albania has a favourable maritime position linked with the Adriatic and Ionian Seas and the Central Mediterranean Sea<sup>16</sup> The Albanian geographical position is a factor, historically recognized by others, but occasionally properly emphasized by national policy makers.*

*Wars in Albanian territory among regional powers or against it have been frequently connected to its maritime position: to gain maritime accessibility or to use it. After collapse of Berlin Wall in late 80' and positive developments in the regional balance of powers, the role of Albanian factor in the region is considerably improved. This fact needs to be more emphasized, especially through use of its national maritime strength.*

*A new Albanian National Security Strategy (NSS) must take into account the most strengthen national factors; Albanian population and maritime position. A National Maritime Security Strategy (NMSS), as integrated part of NSS of the Republic of Albania, need to optimize the use of Albanian maritime factors. Re-dimensioning of the Albanian maritime factor, request also a new NSS with more ambitious objectives toward its more active role on regional security environment.*

### **Introduction**

The Sea has been and will be important for the economical development and prosperity of Albania and Albanians. Maritime space of Albania is about 60% of its land territory size<sup>17</sup>. Maritime and seabed resources, as well as capitals moving through the sea, represent a wealth of great national value.

Political changes occurred in Albania in the beginning of 90', and what follows in Balkan region, culminating with the independence of Kosovo, have dramatically changed the regional security. The actual Albanian NSS, approved in 2004<sup>18</sup>, has justified defining its objectives through facing the regional security environment, rather than engaging it.

Starting from 2004, there have been significant changes in Western Balkan; Montenegro got independence in 2006, Kosovo in February 2008, and Albania become a NATO member in 2009. In the new Western Balkan reality, need a new cooperative, ambitious and engagement Albanian NSS to the regional security. Population and maritime factors must shape Albanian national security objectives.

---

<sup>16</sup> Global Security Forum .

<sup>17</sup> Republic of Albania has a cost line of 420 km-Transformation Plan of Albanian Naval Forces 2006.

<sup>18</sup> The Albanian National Security Strategy. Law Nr.9322 date 25.11.2004.



## **The Need for a National Maritime Security Strategy**

The changes and what is expected to be changed in regional and national security environment must be reflected in new Albanian NSS. Final establishment of the Balkan borders and the new expected security environment driven by the common NATO and EU aspiration, is turning gradually Western Balkan into a security provider. The lock-landed Albanian neighbouring states, such as Serbia, Macedonia and Kosovo, in the new promising economic security environment, progressively will try to increase their accessibility to maritime trade, as long as it remains the less expensive one. The U.S. Maritime Administration estimates that global maritime trade, travel, and commerce will double in the next twenty years<sup>19</sup>.

Any strategy is based on the appropriate use of its own and adversary's strengths and vulnerabilities. Combination in use of your strengths and protecting your vulnerabilities, by not allowing you competitors to do the same, empower your own strengths. Regionalizing and nationalizing the Albanian maritime space will optimize the use of Albanian maritime factor in regional security environment contest.

The objectives of national security strategy are focused and defined to secure the national interests. Economic development and prosperity of the nation is the end-state of any security strategy. ***The nowadays Albanian geopolitical advantages must be converted into trade and economical advantages of tomorrow.*** Achievement of those objectives requires a more ambitious Albania engagement in regional security through an active cooperative security strategy and a protagonist role in regional trade.

The actual regional corridors through Balkan, east-west, and north-south and vice versa, in the new geopolitical environment need to be sponsored by Albanian side. The activation of the 8-th Corridor, as well as 10-th Corridor, will emphasize the maritime strength of Albania and its role on regional security. Economic and trade regional links reduce friction and produce regional security. The new role of Albania in regional trade, economic development and security needs a new dimension of its maritime domain; regional dimension.

The expecting economic development of Albania will requite exploitation for the new natural resources. Despite that Albania is a maritime nation, in the past the exploration of maritime natural resources has been limited, especially those in the seabed. Exploration of maritime natural resources requires high technological standards, in territorial sea as well as in continental shelf. The exploration of maritime natural recourses in the sea bed started after Second War World. For the first time, continental shelf was clamed on September 28, 1945 from the US President Truman<sup>20</sup>. That's why, the improvement of Albanian legislation and maritime policies has to foresee this new economic dimension of its maritime space.

A new Albanian National Maritime Security Strategy should set up a new and favourable environment for achieving national unity of efforts toward more ambitious, well defined and achievable national maritime objectives. Development of maritime policies needs strategic view and guideline, which will drive state and not stare actors toward the same objective: the optimization of national capacities usage.

---

<sup>19</sup> Baer, George W. p 18.

<sup>20</sup> Sokrat, Plaka Dr. p. 123.

The NATO membership and the aspiration for EU membership, as two very important European security structures, need Albania to develop a reliable National Maritime Security Strategy, as an integrated part of its National Security Strategy. The new NMSS has to show the good political willpower and appropriate national instruments for guarantying its national maritime security and cooperation with maritime neighbouring states into the Adriatic and Ionian Sea environment.

### **The Objectives of Albanian National Maritime Strategy**

A new National Maritime Security Strategy, as we did mention above, have to be driven by National Security Strategy of the Republic of Albania and also must be its integrated part. It must be articulated by taking into account national maritime strength in the new regional security environment. In our point of view, the future National Maritime Security Strategy has to be articulated for achieving the following national objectives:

#### ***Protecting the territorial maritime integrity of the Republic of Albania***

Protecting the territorial maritime integrity is a vital interest for any maritime nation, as well as for the Republic of Albania<sup>21</sup>. Albanian Naval Forces represent the most important instrument<sup>22</sup> for the protection of Albanian territorial maritime integrity jointly with other services of Armed Forces<sup>23</sup> and exercising national sovereignty jointly with other law enforcement agencies<sup>24</sup>.

Albanian Naval Forces, beside their traditional constitutional mission, are the primary instrument for exercising national maritime sovereignty through their secondary mission: Coast Guard. Maintaining and increasing the Coast Guard capacities, it is important on the actual and future of development of Albanian maritime affairs and incoming threats.

Protecting Albanian national interests in the new regional geopolitical equilibrium, providing security in the maritime area of interest and contribution in NATO and EU, it needs a new vision and profile for Albanian Naval Forces. Naval Forces must have adequate capacities to deter and protect from military nature threats, asymmetric threats, and guarantying its sea lines of communications, trade and maritime, as well as seabed exploration. The Albanian, Balkan, Adriatic and Ionian Seas, including Central Mediterranean Sea predictable maritime environments will require a mid-term development profile of Albanian Naval Forces with more selected naval war fighting capabilities to operate outside their traditional and national maritime area of operation.

#### ***Exercising the national maritime sovereignty and sovereign rights.***

The exercise of Albanian sovereignty, including maritime one, is an other vital interest of the Republic of Albania<sup>25</sup>, as well as a permanent challenge of its security<sup>26</sup>. Maritime threats in Albania are connected with the unlawful use of natural and historical resources, as well as used the sea as a platform for smuggling and trafficking. Terrorism, weapon of mass destruction

---

<sup>21</sup> The Albanian National Security Strategy. Law No.9322 date 25.11.2004.

<sup>22</sup> The Albanian Constitution. Law No.8417 date 21.10.1998.

<sup>23</sup> The Albanian National Security Strategy. Law No.9322 date 25.11.2004.

<sup>24</sup> Law No 8875 date 4.4.2002 “for the Albanian Coast Guard” amended by Law 9788 date 19.7.2007.

<sup>25</sup> The Albanian National Security Strategy. Law No.9322 date 25.11.2004.

<sup>26</sup> *ibid.*

proliferation and possibly, but less probable, piracy have to be assessed as possible future threats in Albanian maritime domain.

The future challenges of exercising national maritime sovereignty and sovereign rights will be linked with: increasing national law enforcement agencies capacities, strengthening the cooperation among law enforcement agencies, drafting a comprehensive maritime law body compatible with national interests and international law and drafting clear, harmonized and the most important well defined national maritime policies.

The exercise of national sovereignty is not the mission of a single law enforcement agency. The Albanian Maritime Code defined the authority of each agency<sup>27</sup>. Some of them have difficulties in fulfilling their mission, due to the lack of operational capacities. In the future, the short-term government policies have to be focused on better financing the most important maritime law enforcement agencies.

Albania is a small maritime nation with limited financial resources. One of the main approaches on guarantying the national maritime sovereignty and sovereign rights is strengthening cooperation among national law enforcement agencies and the neighbouring countries. Reduction of interagency friction and optimizing the usage of national capacities was the aim of establishing the Inter-Ministerial Maritime Operational Centre (IMOC) in January 2010.

The clash<sup>28</sup> between the Coast Guard Law<sup>29</sup> and Government Decision<sup>30</sup> on the IMOC has created a not favourable environment for the interagency cooperation. IMOC is organized based on Government Decision by conflicting with the Maritime Code and Coast Guard Law. Due to the excessive authority not authorized by Coast Guard Law, IMOC couldn't play its role as national inter-ministerial coordination centre, even IMOC was, and still is, a promising and original Albanian solution. A clear IMOC mission based on the Coast Guard Law and not conflicting Maritime Code Law will put it on the track and will make it more effective in law enforcement agency cooperation.

In the last ten years the number of international conventions ratified by Albania is increased, but still *Albania is signatory only of a limited number of maritime conventions*<sup>31</sup>, especially respecting the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Conventions<sup>32</sup>. The national law needs a radical improvement, especially on the law of the maritime borders<sup>33</sup> and achieving agreements with neighbours on maritime boundaries. Still Albania is in the black list of IMO<sup>34</sup>, due to the not proper application of some IMO convention, especially The Standards of Training,

---

<sup>27</sup> Ligji Nr. 9251 date 8.7.2004 "for the Albanian Maritime Code"

<sup>28</sup> By the Law of the Coast Guard Article 3/1 states that "for conducting Coast Guard operations is established IMOC" and Article 3/3 states that "the way how the Coast Guard cooperates with the other law enforcement agencies ..." (noted by authors).

<sup>29</sup> Law 8875 date 4.4.2002 "for the Albanian Coast Guard" amended by Law 9788 date 19.7.2007

<sup>30</sup> Government Decision No. 954 Date 30.9.2009 amended by Government Decision No. 1125 Date 13.11.2009.

<sup>31</sup> Gerveri, Rear Admiral Kristaq. Page 89.

<sup>32</sup> IMO - <http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/StatusOfConventions>

<sup>33</sup> The Law No. 8771 date 19.04.2001 "for the State Borders of the Republic of Albania" is abolished by the Law Nr. 9860 date 24.01.2008 "for the control and supervision of state borders". (noted by authors).

<sup>34</sup> Paris Memorandum of Understanding website-Black List 2006-2008

Certification & Watchkeeping (STCW) Convention<sup>35</sup> and the Paris Memorandum of Understanding<sup>36</sup>.

Gaps in interagency cooperation are also result of non-harmonized national maritime policies. A not clear articulation and well defined National Maritime Security Strategy has driven individual agencies' plans and policies toward facing competition among them rather than complementing each other toward the same national objectives. Overlapping on tasks interpretation and modernization programs occurred frequently among those agencies. Also, short term objectives shaped by the electoral government programs have shift the attention from interpreting long term national maritime objectives shaped by national security strategy.

### ***Application of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982)***

Albania is a maritime nation with regional interests. The history of Albania is closely linked with maritime environment. Threats coming from the sea have challenged frequently the Albanian vital interests. In certain historical timelines those threats have been crucial to its independence and territorial integrity of Albania.

In the same time, sea has been important for the economical development of the country and a safe security environment. The geopolitical position of Albania is purely related to its choke point position on one of the most important sea line of communication: Adriatic ad Ionian maritime highway. Local control and secure of this maritime highway is an obligation and interest of Albania as long as there are involved and clashed regional maritime and lock-land countries interests.

The uncertain legal regime in Adriatic and Ionian Sea, based on the UNCLOS 1982, is linked with excessive claims and interests of certain medium regional maritime powers by conflicting with other small regional maritime nations. The application of UNCLOS 1982 in the Albanian maritime area of interests and broader is fully in compliance with its national maritime security objectives.

The future economic development of Albania, as mention above, will require exploitation and exploration of natural resources in its sovereign rights maritime space. It is in the interest of Republic of Albania to put in its agenda the delimitation of its maritime boundaries. It will legitimize the national sea space where Albania will exercise its sovereignty and sovereign rights. Due to the responsibilities of Albania by ratifying the UNCLOS 1982 and Hamburg Convention 1979<sup>37</sup>, Albania must start as soon as possible negotiation with its maritime countries on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) Agreements.

The application of UNCLOS 1982 in the Adriatic and Ionian Sea is very complex and conflicting issue. It must be consider by the Albanian authorities as a long term process. The Albanian diplomacy need to draft a clear vision and achievable objectives through the proper usage of national instruments, by taking advantages from the coming opportunities and shaping “*temporary focused in objectives*” regional alliances.

---

<sup>35</sup> Ratified by Albanian Parliament with the Law No. 9852 date 26.12.2007.

<sup>36</sup> Ratified by Albanian Parliament with the Law No. 8569, date 20.1.2000.

<sup>37</sup> IMO Search and Rescue 1979 convention known as Hamburg Convention 1979, is ratified by Albania by Law Nr. 9055 date 24.04.2003.

### ***Promotion and support of the maritime economy***

Economical development of the country requires the promotion and support of the new economic dimension: maritime industry. The new maritime economical trends foresee the Albanian maritime area as one of the most important gateway toward east and vice versa, as well as its increasing exploration of the maritime natural resources. Policy formulation and legislation adaption is needed for the expecting maritime economic developments.

The maritime transport has a strategic importance for the Republic of Albania. Nowadays Albanian ports processing is not in the expected figures, while their total annual processing capacities goes up to 5-6 million tons per year<sup>38</sup>. The expecting flow of goods, through 8-th and 10-th Corridors will require the increasing ports processing capacities up to about 16 million tons per year. It will be a requirement for inhabitants of Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Macedonia and transiting parts of Bulgaria and Rumania<sup>39</sup>. The actual port processing in Albania can't allow fluent flow of the expecting regional trade. *AMBO*<sup>40</sup> *project need to put into Albanian agenda, as well as TAP*<sup>41</sup> *Project*<sup>42</sup>. From geo-political and geo-economic point of view, these complex infrastructure networks “*are of strategic importance for Italy*”<sup>43</sup> also, as well as for countries of the region where the corridors pass through.

The fluent flow of the expecting regional trade requires a new balance on funding roads, rails and port infrastructures networking. Albania needs to be focused on building port processing capacities in Bay of Vlora, as an unlimited capacity and all year weather bay, rather than Durres Port<sup>44</sup>, which has limited enlargement opportunities. Also, “*Transportation infrastructure throughout most of Southeasters Europe, including Albania, has been underfunded, neglected, and not harmonized with European Union standards*”<sup>45</sup>”.

### ***Respecting the fundamental freedom of the Law of the Sea***

Promotion and support of the maritime activities is closely connected with respecting of the fundamental freedoms of the of the seas. The new expecting dimension of national maritime affairs will require guarantying the respect of two maritime freedoms: navigation and economic freedom.

Freedom of navigation is one of the most important fundamental freedoms of the international law of the sea and the backbone for developing maritime activity. In the same time, it is one of the national sovereignty challenges on the actual EU integration phase of Albania. Controlling and managing the maritime borders, can't limit the freedom of navigation. Freedom of navigation is vital also for the maritime and coastal tourism. Temporary and local sea denial<sup>46</sup>, is

---

<sup>38</sup> File, Çapajev Dr. p 34.

<sup>39</sup> File, Çapajev Dr. p. 100.

<sup>40</sup> AMBO-Albanian Macedonian Bulgarian Oil Pipeline.

<sup>41</sup> TAP-Trans Atlantic Pipeline.

<sup>42</sup> Goga, Anastas and Metalla, Osman. p 139-140.

<sup>43</sup> Ministry of Foreing Affairs of the Republic of Italy.

<sup>44</sup> Durres Port Authority.

<sup>45</sup> US Commercial Service.

<sup>46</sup> Sea Denial-GlobalSecurity.org.

a theory, which denies your adversaries using the sea. It can't be apply for harming your own forces or activities. Moratorium of speed boats was a mistake, which didn't improve the maritime border control and "was not certainly the right way to address permanently those threats"<sup>47</sup>. It must be abolished in a very short period of time.

Economic freedom is essential for development of maritime industry, including the exploration of natural maritime and seabed resources, as well as maritime transportation. Maritime industry requires advanced technology and initial capital leverage. The new maritime economic freedom must consider Albanian sea as a free economic zone, by quitting from traditional methods and creating new favourable environment for welcoming foreign investments. The free maritime economic zone must include also the economic activity of the Albanian seagoing merchant and fishery fleet. Those two fleets are severely downsized and obsolete starting from the beginning of 90'<sup>48</sup>, and need to be rebuilt and renewed.

## Conclusions

Development of a new Albanian National Maritime Security Strategy is a matter of time. In my point of view, it is time to do that. The new strategy will merge the entire state effort to a better integration and harmonization of government and private sectors into common national maritime objectives through optimization of national limited capacities.

In the same time, the new Albanian National Maritime Security Strategy must be an unified and comprehensive document in support of achievable objectives of the new Albanian National Security Strategy, in the new regional security environment and broader. Despite how is will be elaborated, as an integrated part of the NSS, as its appendices or a separate document, we still believe Albania need a NMSS.

Sea will be important, as it has been before, for guarantying Albania and Albanian security and their welfare. Albania needs to shift attention to its maritime security, as our maritime neighbouring countries have done it years ago. This is a competition, or called also a game, that our neighbouring competitors have started. Now, it is the time for Albania to start this game, even it is late. Tomorrow will be too late and the game will be over.

## Bibliography:

- Baer, George W. *Notes toward a new maritime strategy*. "Naval War College Review. Newport. RI. USA Spring 2007-<http://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Naval-War-College-Review/2007---Spring.aspx>
- Durres Port Authority
- [http://winne.com/country/europe/albania/2009/cr/cp/durres\\_port/index.php](http://winne.com/country/europe/albania/2009/cr/cp/durres_port/index.php).
- File, Çapajev Dr. *Kontrrolli i hapësirës detare të Shqipërisë dhe ushtrimi i sovranitetit të Shtetit Shqiptar*. Shtëpia Botuese e Ushtrisë. Tiranë. 2009.
- Gerveni, Rear Admiral Kristaq. *The state action at sea-Albanian perspective*. Symposium: Albanian Maritime System and EU experience University "Ismail Qemali, Vlore. 14-15. Aulona Press. May 2010.
- Goga, Anastas and Metalla, Osman. *Implementimi i sistemeve te reja te akostimit dhe shkarkimit të anijeve të gazit te lëngshem dhe hidrokarbureve në det*. Symposium: Albanian Maritime System and EU experience University "Ismail Qemali, Vlore. 14-15. Aulona Press. May 2010.

---

<sup>47</sup> Gerveni, Rear Admiral Kristaq. p. 85.

<sup>48</sup> File, Çapajev Dr. p. 10.

- Global Security Forum-<http://www.globalsecurity.or> International Maritime Organisation (IMO)-  
<http://www.imo.org/>
- Manuali-Përmbledhje e ligjeve të detit-Qendra e Shtypit, Botimeve dhe Përkthimeve Ushtarake. Tirane 2004.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Italy-<http://www.esteri.it/>
- Qendra e Publikimeve Zyrtare-<http://www.qpz.gov.al>
- Sokrat, Plaka Dr. *E drejta e re detare ndërkombëtare dhe Shqipëria*. Shtëpia Botuese “Marin Barleti”, 2003. P. 123.
- Strategjia e Sigurisë Kombëtare të Republikës së Shqipërisë-Law Nr.9322 date 25.11.2004 ”On approval of Albanian National Security Strategy”, Paragraph 33. [Official Magazine: Year 2004, Nr 98, Page 6696]
- Transportation Infrastructure Development in Southeastern Europe-US Commercial Service-  
<http://www.buyusa.gov>
- U.S. Department of the Navy. *Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations*, NWP 9 (Rev. A)/FMFM 1-10 (1989).

## ***STANAG 6001 – The Progress and Way ahead in AAF***

Docent Jaup Zenuni,  
Ph.D. student in Applied Linguistics  
Faculty of Foreign Languages, Tirana

**Abstract.** *English is nowadays a "lingua franca" for all personnel of the Armed Forces of NATO member nations and those who aspire to become part of this important alliance. This is imposed by the dynamics of activity and communication needs within and outside the alliance. Education in English is considered and continues to be one of the priorities of education policy of the Armed Forces personnel in our country. For this purpose, AAF has defined the necessary standards and continues to work for their implementation. All curricula of English language education is built according to STANAG 6001. This has brought profound changes in the design of curricula, the teaching method, in the basic materials used in teaching, in knowledge assessment and tests conducted to measure the English level of AF personnel.*

*Key words: NATO, STANAG 6001, AAF, testing, curriculum, innovation, review.*

### **Introduction**

Albania is a member of the Council of the North Atlantic Cooperation since June 1992. It supported the Partnership for Peace Initiative in January 1994 and signed the Framework Document on 23 February 1994, becoming a PfP member. These important political steps were accompanied by profound changes in the strategic and doctrinal documents of the Armed Forces. In accordance with these documents priorities and standards were set. One of these priorities was education of personnel of AAF in English as the main language of communication in NATO. From the very beginning efforts to effectuate this priority focused on two main levels: on quantitative level, i.e. by increasing the number of military and civilians personnel who learned English in AAF; on qualitative level, i.e. by raising the quality of the acquisition and mastery of English language.

All English language education policy relies on the strategy and doctrine of the Armed Forces. It is based on STANAG 6001 which is the agreement reached among NATO countries to establish and implement the practice of teaching and testing in foreign language referring to common standards deriving from the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages. STANAG 6001<sup>49</sup> is a document drawn up with the good intention to measure and compare the language level in different NATO member countries and those who intend to join the Alliance. At its start this agreement states: "The purpose of this agreement is to provide NATO Forces a table describing the overall levels of language. Participating countries agree to use general language levels in order to:

- a. To meet language requirements for the supporting staff appointed to international positions;
- b. To compare national standards by means of a standardized table;

---

<sup>49</sup> NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG, Language Proficiency Levels (edition 2), 2003, [www.extra-muros.ch](http://www.extra-muros.ch)



c. To identify, report, communicate at international level the way how overall language level is measured (if necessary by making the conversion from national standards).<sup>50</sup>

Since 1994 when the document to join the Partnership for Peace was signed, the Albanian Armed Forces made concrete steps to achieve that objective by revising the entire curriculum of English education and in this context, introduced and carried out STANAG 6001 testing. Due to this priority, the Foreign Language Center (FLC) took over new responsibilities.

### **STANAG 6001 Testing in AAF: Progress and innovation**

STANAG 6001 Testing in NATO countries originates in 1976 when for the first time language levels that were to be achieved by all those who would be subject to STANAG 6001 test were drafted and adopted. Requirements of these levels were revised and enriched in 2003 and in 2009. For this reason, depending on the stage of development, the increasing demands and dynamics of NATO activity, nowadays STANAG recognizes the descriptor of 1976, 2003 and finally the descriptor of 2009.

FLC Testing Section based its work on the STANAG descriptor of 2003. It was this document that was used as a reference point for the design of STANAG 6001 Test Specifications, Rules of Test Administration<sup>51</sup> and design of STANAG 6001 Test, for the four language skills. On the other hand, the whole process of drafting such documents had as its focal point the policy of the Ministry of Defense and General Staff for foreign language education. Thus, the English STANAG 6001 Test was conceived and designed as a test to measure language proficiency. Therefore the content of this test is not based on the content of a course or textbook set.

The introduction of STANAG 6001 test was harmonized with curriculum changes. Since 2005, American textbooks used in all English courses FLC (American Language Course) are supplemented with other materials such as textbooks published in the NATO countries ("Campaign", "At Ease", "Face the Issues" and "Raise the Issues"), books published by the staff of the FLC's ("Steps in writing" or "Useful Phrasal Verbs"); materials prepared by the teachers for each level and for every language skill, according to STANAG 6001 descriptors. All these materials used by every level and course, are constantly enriched and updated by teachers and are successfully used to develop speaking, writing and listening skills. These teaching materials bear the unquestionable contribution of the U.S. Office of Cooperation (ODC) and the British Council.

Curricular changes were supported by an intensive training program for teachers, the core of which was the understanding and practical implementation of the requirements of this intended curriculum, which aligned the activity of FLC with the level of the allied NATO countries. All teachers were trained and qualified in certain courses on teaching or other specific courses abroad like USA, Canada, Germany, Slovenia, Croatia and elsewhere. Many training activities such as conferences, seminars and regional workshops were organized by PEP and PFP. In view of the capacity building for teachers FLC created a pretty good tradition by organizing training

---

<sup>50</sup> NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG, Language Proficiency Levels (edition 2), 2003, p.1. [www.extra-muros.ch](http://www.extra-muros.ch)

<sup>51</sup> Ministria e Mbrojtjes (2005), "Rregullore e administrimit dhe testimit në gjuhën angleze, STANAG 6001".

activities at workplace, where language instructors from different units were also invited to participate. Unfortunately, with PEP and PpP leaving the country, this tradition has faded.

The introduction of STANAG 6001 test had significant impact on the attitudes of military and civilian personnel towards English language. It was associated with an increased interest and desire to acquire the four language skills. Increasingly the communicative skills gained prominence, especially those related to the military field. Hence, the emphasis was on the acquisition of military terminology and operational language especially in courses 3/3/3/3 3/2/3/2. If prior to STANAG 6001 test application, English language teaching focused on reading, grammar and to some extent in listening, the introduction of this test changed the relationship between language skills by integrating them better and by bringing about a balanced alignment between them.

An innovation was also the allocation of time for supplementary materials. With new programs a redistribution of time allocated to courses was practiced, leaving two / three classes to deal with the textbook and two / three classes for supplementary materials aiming at development of speaking, writing and listening.

The new curriculum, above all, brought innovations in content and teaching methods. The class became more attractive in content and organization. Elements like discussions, debates, group work, role play, pair work, independent work, briefings and presentations on military topics, projects, getting to know the experience of the personnel participating in missions abroad, etc., were introduced in English classes. In listening skill exercises are designed on audios downloaded from NATO site, BBC, CNN, VOA and Deutsche Welle which in most cases are of military flavor. In writing class work and independent work focus mainly on techniques of informal and formal correspondence according to STANAG 6001, starting with the letters of various types and of two registers (informal and formal), e-mails, summaries, memos, descriptions, narratives, reports, essays and articles.


The fact that STANAG 6001 test, as a proficiency test is designed and administered by the staff of the FLC is another innovation. From this viewpoint, this center is the only and the first in Albania that designs tests of this level. It is worth mentioning that the drafting of a proficiency test (that test the four language skills) is a genuine research and rigorous work that can be estimated only by the experts of the field. A test designed and administered with scientific rigor that embodies the requirements of STANAG 6001 descriptors for each linguistic skills for each level produces positive washback<sup>52</sup>. In contrast, a test designed without expertise, without having in mind the description of STANAG 6001 and people who would undergo it, will produce negative washback, which in turn, has negative impact on teaching, learning and attitudes of teachers and course participants.

As above stated, STANAG 6001 is a proficiency test which measures the overall linguistic level of the candidate, no matter how and where he learned English. This, in other words, means that it is not an achievement, placement or diagnostic test. In all NATO countries it has this function and is mainly used to test the language proficiency of military and civilian personnel who are potential candidates for various positions in NATO staffs, for training courses abroad or for peacekeeping missions. Suffice to say that Slovenia, under comparatively equal conditions to those of our country in terms of the number of military and civilian personnel in the Armed

---

<sup>52</sup> *Washback* is the concept used in Applied Linguistics expressing the impact of the test on teaching and learning a foreign language.

Forces, holds three open seasons of STANAG 6001 test a year and tests 200-250 candidates<sup>53</sup>. Bulgaria, another country of the region, but much greater than our country, in 2003 tested 1722 people with STANAG 6001, in 2004 tested 1210 people whereas in 2005 and the number of the tested candidates was 1057.<sup>54</sup> In our country, for various reasons, especially in the years 2006-2011, STANAG 6001 test was not used appropriately. It was used as a massive test to get results that will be used by promotion committees, opening testing seasons by special orders which in many cases did not take into account the capacity and human resources of the FLC. In this way, up to 810 people a year, according to STANAG 6001 were tested. The following chart gives, in details, the number of test takers for each academic year. It should be emphasized that for the following academic year until March, the number of the tested candidates is 153.



**Chart 1:** Number of personnel tested with STANAG 6001 for the period 2005-2011

Such a massive use of this test has implications on several aspects: first, it creates problems in administration, secondly, leads to 'rapid aging' of variants of the tests in use, thirdly, the overloads the staff of FLC, that of test section in particular, who in addition to full teaching load in class, conduct testing and translation as an extra work. Finally, it creates the preconditions for less qualitative work in class.

Another aspect related to the use of STANAG 6001 test is its application as an achievement test. From the viewpoint of testing theory this is not fair because at the end of the course each student should be tested for the knowledge acquired during the course. In his book "Testing for foreign language teachers" Hughes (1989, p. 11-23) makes the classification of foreign language tests and the purposes they are used for. In order to illustrate the argument for the use of STANAG 6001 tests as achievement tests let's refer to the following data: 205 candidates were tested in 2010, 230 candidates in 2011 and 90 candidates in 2012 until April.

Referring to improper use of tests Shohamy (2006: 106) says "... *foreign language tests are considered powerful because they are used by authorities to enforce what should be taught how to learn, who should be given the opportunity to learn and what would be the criteria of*

<sup>53</sup> Djurić, M. (2008), "Dealing with situations of positive and negative washback", SDUTJ, p.20.

<sup>54</sup> Sotirova, O & LTC Stamatov, S. (2006), "Standardizing language training programs in the military educational institutions", BILC Conference, Budapest, ppt. presentation.

*accuracy assessment.*” Improper use or overuse of STANAG 6001 test, first of all stems from the lack of cooperation between stakeholders and experts of the field , secondly, from the routine necessity to have some statistics required to be reported somewhere and thirdly, from traditional way of understanding the vertical relations in chains of command.

### **Testing STANAG 6001: new approaches**

In the era of globalization, the society is making a very fast progress. In February 2009, BILC approved the revised version of STANAG 6001 descriptors.<sup>55</sup> This document requires from all NATO member states to reflect the necessary changes in policies on foreign language education, in curriculum, test specification and, the assessment criteria. One of the features of this descriptor is that it introduces the pluses in defining the language level of the candidates tested by STANAG 6001. Above all this change should be reflected in the reviewed education policy. Then the changes should be reflected in the specifications of STANAG 6001test, the Regulation of the Administration of STANAG 6001English test, STANAG test content and curriculum. These changes were to be made since 2009, but we are still in time to catch the time.

Another issue which needs to be seen in light of new dynamics is the validity of STANAG test results. So far these results are valid only for one year. In all NATO countries, the validity of STANAG test results is two to three years. It is the right time to adapt these standards of test validity in our country. This will release time and human resources for the test section staff to deal with the design of new test variants and increase the quality of their development. This also requires the review of language policy and the proper documents reflecting the validity of the test issued by Defense Academy.

FLC is internationally appreciated for its level of expertise in English and other languages teaching and testing. Currently all the staff is of Master Degree (Professional Master or Master of Sciences) and five teachers are attending doctoral studies for "PhD" in linguistics, English and American literature and in the field of security and defense. It should also be noted that all teachers are trained overseas. For all these reasons, this center should be accredited and the assessment made by it should be valid not only for the military personnel and within the country. One element that facilitates this is the inclusion of the FLC among the centers registered in BILC<sup>56</sup>.

Through bilateral agreements Testing Section in FLC should have the opportunity to pilot new variants of STANAG tests in regional countries such Kosovo, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia and Bulgaria. Piloting is a very important test for any test variant before its use. It creates opportunities to see testers' reaction and get professional expertise from colleagues. On this basis, the ultimate test variant is modified and improved. This tradition existed in 2005-2006, when PEP and PfP programs were assisting FLC. If at that time the role of coordinator was performed by PEP manager, now this role could be played by relevant authorities in Ministry of Defense or General Staff. In addition, FLC has all the necessary possibilities to maintain and deepen the cooperation with BILC. It is necessary that members of the Testing Section staff

---

<sup>55</sup> NATO Standardization Agency, Military Committee Joint Standardization Board, STANAG 6001 NTG (Edition 3)-Language Proficiency Levels, 20 February 2009.

<sup>56</sup> Jan Smid, Defense Language Institute, Deputy Director, Methodology and Testing Department (2010)

regularly attend events such as conferences, seminars and workshops organized by BILC in order to update their knowledge and share experience.

One of the features of massive tests like STANAG 6001 test, is that after the test the opinion of test takers are collected. This necessarily should become a normal practice in the activity of the Test Section in FLC. It would be a contribution to the overall analysis of the test but also for the analysis of each task or exercise of the test. In this way we can achieve what Shohamy calls "democratization of testing" and will create the opportunity for greater transparency with those who are tested and with other interested stakeholders.

The practice of using 6001 test as an achievement test should be abandoned as goes against the testing theory. It should be replaced by achievement tests which test the knowledge the students acquire during the courses. These tests can be designed by working groups set up specifically for this purpose in the FLC with the assistance and expertise of the Test Section. In this way, a better view of the work performed in each group and by every teacher might be created. This would help in generating more accurate conclusions about the effectiveness of curricula to reflect necessary changes.

## Conclusions

STANAG 6001 is not a static document. It follows the dynamics of social development. Given the features and conditions of our country, we have the opportunity to reflect new requirements by making appropriate revisions in educational policy in order to better conform to the requirements of this Agreement; to reflect the changes required in the documentation governing the whole process of STANAG 6001 testing starting with the test specifications, test administration rules, certification rules and the period of validity of test score. This requires a better cooperation among stakeholders in this process, reflecting the changes required in the curriculum and building a more dynamic qualification process.

In a nutshell, we need to catch the time and keep its pace.

## Bibliography:

- Djuric, M. (2008), "Dealing with situations of positive and negative washback" SDUTJ.
- Hughes, A. (1989), *Testing for Language Teachers*, Cambridge University Press.
- Ministry of Defense (2005), "Regulation of the management and testing in English, STANAG 6001".
- NATO Standardization Agreement (STANAG, Language Proficiency Levels (edition 2), 2003, *www.extra-muros.ch*
- NATO Standardization Agency, Joint Military Committee Standardization Board, NTG STANAG 6001 (Edition 3)-Language Proficiency Levels, 20 February 2009.
- Sotirova, O & LTC Stamatov, S. (2006), "Standardizing language training programs in the Military Educational Institutions", BILC Conference, Budapest, ppt. Presentation.
- Shohamy, E. (2006), "Language policy: Hidden agendas and new approaches", Routledge.
- General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania (MP-3-4) (2009), "Education and Training in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania," item 2.6.

## *A historical overview of Military Education Until 1944*

Colonel, PhD. Edmond Braneshi,  
Head of the Military Leadership Section, Defence Academy "Spiro Moisiu"

**Abstract.** *The history of the Albanian Military Education has pursued a path full of sacrifice and hardships, and is an IMPORTANT part of Our Nation's history. From an institutional point of view, the Declaration of Independence in 1912, simply prelude the Albanian Military Education. The year 1919 marks the opening of the first school to train Military Officers and gendarmes. Further, in 1928, the Albanian government opened the first Royal Military School. Military schools became a permanent part of the Organizational structure of the Armed Forces. They continued to exist and function based on State Laws and regulations. The curricula of schools were Oriented Toward Military western Countries. The hardship of Antifascist National Liberation War enriched further the Albanian tradition of Military Education. It was November 1944, when the First Officer Course initiated, on the verge of full liberation of the country, in the liberated town of Berat. This would serve as a starting point to opening other Military schools or academies in the futures. It shows that the Military Education in Albania is not quite random, rather than original path based on long years of historical experience and tradition*

### **Introduction**

Permanent threats of invasion by foreign aggressors in centuries, the need of survivability and existence as a nation from assimilation and foreign occupation of its own Territories, lead Albanian people, indeed dictated it to inventory and develop some rich combative tradition. Obviously, knowing these values have led foreign researchers to compel, calling the Albanians as the very true warriors in their genes. They described Albanians as "*Balkan warrior caste with guns ready in their hands,*"<sup>57</sup> recognising their warrior nature, "*as a common sense of character and constant attribute of this nation.*"<sup>58</sup>

Equipments and weapons of war and those elements found in tombs detected in the Illyrian Territories represent very significant evidence to show that at that time our people have conducted the Military Education, specifically training on weapons and physical fitness. The Infantry constituted the main weapon at that time, relying mainly on combat tactics. The confidence in the victory, firm personality, physical strength and individual combat capability have served as a key to success and victory. The development of physical force, action, jumping, salting, wrestling, swimming, arrow the target precisely and get the Skills for night engagements in combat and fast switching lines were the ultimate goal of intensive infantry training of Illyrians.<sup>59</sup> The preparation of cavalry,<sup>60</sup> and the Marine Fleet had an important attention, also.<sup>61</sup>

In the Slavery Society, because of interest within tribes, the close family tights recognized the need for organized education of their children, which led to the rise of institutions for education and gaining specific skills. Even they had an Academia in Apollonia where high society of

---

<sup>57</sup> Eqerem Çabej, "Shqiptarët midis Perëndimit dhe Lindjes", Tiranë, 1994, page 27.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, page 17.

<sup>59</sup> Sybi Maska, "Në gjurmët e historisë së edukimit ushtarak shqiptar", Tiranë, 1987, page 44.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid, page 45.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, page 48.

Roman Empire used to send their children during 2nd-3<sup>rd</sup> century, a distinguished general education institution, really advanced for that time, indeed. Illyrians followed their education abroad as well, however the basis for the Military Education of Youth Generations remained traditional approaches, through which was achieved the preparation and promotion of the princes and military leaders of the country.<sup>62</sup>

The middle Ages with its numerous mobs of people displaced, brought to Albanian Lands too much congestion, frequent invasions and consequently the space compactness thoroughly to Albanians. Nevertheless, within this period the well-known principalities of Albans were created and strengthened, despite of the backwardness and destruction by numerous wars, brought to several developments in the traditions of Military Education, aiming to enhance it.

The body laws (Statutes) shaped the Arbër's municipalities. Among them, we can mention civetas, skutarjensis, and drivasti civitas, etc. Arbër's clan of Balsha, Muzakaj, Dukagjinasit, Thopias, etc., had their flags, stems and currencies as well. They held often in their castles the official military ceremonies. The quality of their wars shows some development of Military Education. The foundation of this education and training was the withstanding efforts in preserving freedom, survivability and independence among Arbërs. Ottoman invasions found Arbër's Principalities in the verge of this development; therefore, the battles against Ottomans have point out their conscious character, so they knew who they are.

Scanderbeg's epoch marked the height of this process, when the Military Education gained solid features with clear elements of education.<sup>63</sup> The Skanderbeg's army held and practiced various drills, many military games, horseracing and some military interventions, frequently, etc. Also forming their Albanian Diaspora in Venice, the exiles established a school for their children's education, so called "Albanian School", indicating that the Albanians were concerned for the education of their children.<sup>64</sup>

Later in XVII-XIX centuries, during the period of main pasha- states, such as Shkodër (1757-1831) and Ioannina (1786-1822) we face elements of educational institutions, primarily the Military Education. More clear visibility of those elements appeared in the Pashallëk of Ioannina, ruled by Ali Pasha Tepelena. He was the first to design and dare to set up the Institution of schooling. He encouraged the State Projects for Education, opening courses for engineering and gunnery, etc. He issued orders to establish the artillery branch, opening for the first time the artillery school in Bonila,<sup>65</sup> town of Ioannina, providing to its support a special financial fund and material provisions in support of their training curricula, attracting the local lads, who were daily visitors. This school, as indicated, was the first within suburb area of Turkish Empire, aimed at preparing the artillery specialists, being the main branch among other arms of the time. To enhancing the efficiency of the school and bring about the modern concepts

---

<sup>62</sup> Flamur Skraparliu, Disertacion: "Arsimimi ushtarak dhe përgatitja taktike e oficerit shqiptar gjatë viteve 1912-1944", Tiranë 2000, page 5.

<sup>63</sup> Pajtim Ribaj, "Retrospektivë e shkurtër dhe disa përfundime nga historia e shkollës ushtarake shqiptare", Magazine "Defence" No 10, 2001, page 86.

<sup>64</sup> Sh. Osmani, Gazeta "Ushtria dhe koha", date 23 october 1996.

<sup>65</sup> Sabri Godo, "Ali Pashë Tepelena", printed in "A. Z. Çajupi", Tiranë 1993, page 114.

of that time, Ali Pasha engaged the well-known French specialists.<sup>66</sup> Meanwhile, he planned to open a school for Infantry Officers,<sup>67</sup> within the Pashallëk territory as well.

### **Military Education- an embedded companion to the Albanian state**

The vast majority of Albanians military commissioned officers and non commissioned ones (NCOs) prior to 1912, the year when Albania declared its independence from Ottoman Empire, were educated, qualified and entitled exactly to the schools of this Empire. Among them, the history has distinguished Albanians military officers and patriots as well, such as Mehmet Pasha Dërralla, the first minister of War of newly created Albanian State, Ali Shefqet Shkupi (a close friend and classmate of Mustafa Kemal, Ataturk) and, many others, who kept many other important positions in the military ranking. Right after the first years of Declared Independence was no way of speaking or opening schools or short term military training courses, in such difficult economic and political conditions all around the country.

The time extension starting from 1914, while Prince Wide (March-September) governed Albania, until the year 1919, there were a few military-style events concerning the foreign invading forces of Albania during World War I, however not relating at all with military professional education. Such commands were Austro - Hungarian, Italian and French. The fighting forces of WWI had deployed their occupation powers to Albania during WWI, and divided the country into military operational areas in between. Meanwhile, the Austro - Hungarian Regional Command in Albania selected and sent nearly 40 Albanian service members in 1916,<sup>68</sup> to their Military Schools in Austria. However, the majority of them could not return to Albania before the WWI was over, to entering into the service of the Albanian Army. In addition, during the year 1917, Austrians organized in the city of Shkoder a short-term course, training there some Albanian aspirants.

Meantime in 1919, the Provisional Government of Durres after its commencement, opened in Tirana a special school with a 6-month academic curriculum, in order to fulfil the needs of the organizing and managing the Albanian Gendarmerie, to train officers, aspirants and gendarmes based on a single term courses.<sup>69</sup> Different intellectual circles severely criticized this school, despite its achievements. This, due to the violation of eligibility criteria and selecting process and the oath given in front of foreign officials (Italians), who had the final word on selecting and enrolling the candidates. They rejected the fact our gendarmerie to use the Italian uniform, as well as an Italian officer to head that school.<sup>70</sup> Certainly, the Albania of 1919 had too much vulnerability to foreign interference, right at the end of WWI. In addition, it needed cooperation to establish new state institutions from the scratch on the post war period. It is well- known that Albania became a total burned out land of battlefields among major powers of WWI. The gravity of this situation became more apparent under the circumstances while our border line neighbours with their chauvinistic ambitions did not perceived well such institutional military professional

---

<sup>66</sup> A. Boppe, "Napoleoni dhe Ali Pasha", Tiranë 1999, page 18.

<sup>67</sup> Sabri Godo, "Ali Pashë Tepelena", printed in "A. Z. Çajupi", Tiranë 1993, page 116.

<sup>68</sup> "Shqipërija më 1937", Second volume (Committee publication of the 25th anniversary celebrations of self-government from 1912 to 1937), Tirana 1938, page 89.

<sup>69</sup> AQFA, Fondi 149, File no. 1, Year 1921.

<sup>70</sup> Newspaper "Populli", No. 33, date August 29, 1919, Shkodër.



education. They could not tolerate such event, where the dominant spiritual motivation of this education was independence and National Values.

On January 1920, the National Assembly for Salvation gathered in town of Lushnja, one turning point event in our National History, so called the Congress of Lushnja. This Congress put forward the foundation for a true consolidated state of modern Albania, based on rules of law and order. The government emerged from Congress of Lushnja considered the defence of the country from foreign aggression, and maintaining rule of order in domestic affairs. Despite difficult economic situation of the country, the Parliament shared the view of the necessity of a National army as a force to ensure "The Vitality of the state" in enhancing the "National Honour".

Over the period of years 1920-1925, Albania provided the military personnel mostly from formerly educated officers in Turkey, Italy and elsewhere. Meantime, starting with the year 1920, the Aspirant School was functioning in Tirana. Its mission to prepare young aspirants (lieutenants) for the Army was based on 6 months courses. Such a course launched in October 1920, ended on 13 March 1921.<sup>71</sup> The school conducted six-month theoretical and practical curricula, including that of platoon's level. The candidates admitted here came from various provinces and professions, such as Army NCOs, students, individual masters, merchants, police officers, etc. After the accomplishment of this course, each participant had the obligation to pass a regular state exam. A special commission, composed of four well-qualified military officers, headed by a major as the chairperson and four members, the Capitan rang, conducted the state testing. This school made its evaluation based on digit marks, rather than based on grade definition such as "good" or "very well,"<sup>72</sup> etc.

The following political events of so called "Revolution of June", over the years 1924-1925 and later, reflected in the organization of the Armed Forces, involving military, police and gendarmerie. The government of Ahmet Zogu signed on November 27, 1926 the Albanian-Italian Pact of "friendship and security", which gave Italy the right to intervene in Albania, if affected on "legal and political status quo, or to the state territory of Albania." On November 22, 1927, the Italian and Albanian governments signed the Second Pact of Tirana, called differently "Irrevocable Defense Alliance," by means of which Italy established its full military control over Albania. Other agreements and technical arrangements followed this Pact. Right after, dozens of military mission took place in Albania, starting with nearly 280 Italian service members at the Albanian Army. An Italian advisor was attached to the office of King Ahmet Zogu, who had the full power over military issues. Even the King himself could not take any decision on military affairs without approval, primarily by this Italian advisor.<sup>73</sup>

Within the efforts made to restructure and transform the Albanian Armed Forces, proper attention took again the development of professional military education. The concept of substituting the previous militia with a regular army led the restoration of the military

---

<sup>71</sup> Proletar Hasani, "Drejt Perëndimit, historia e arsimimit të ushtarakëve shqiptar në perëndim në vitet 1913-1944, printed in Grand Prind, Tiranë 2011, page 37.

<sup>72</sup> AQSH, Fondi Komanda Ushtarake, File No. 4, Year 1921, page 70.

<sup>73</sup> "Historia e popullit shqiptar", Third Volume, EH "Toena", Tiranë 2007, page 269, ISBN 978-99943-1-269-6.

organization. Previously, the Austrian organizer of the Albanian Army, Colonel G. Myrdac, applied the militia concept in early 1920. Currently, the foundation changed, admitting that preparation and recruits' training should go along with military tasks under the relevant structure in the shortest possible time. Consequently, this approach leads to the need for well educated officers and higher performance to train the trainers for their units.

Multiple demands of this system in managing 'train the trainers' process, was thought to be conducted during an academic year by a variety of courses. The education of this young generation officers in the specific schools, made it more likely of their theoretical and practical preparation. With the adoption of a new structure and Table of Equipment (TOE), the Army made necessary efforts that all aspirants in the active duty to take the exams for their level of knowledge and skills. They should match their ability of taking charge the combat training for their military units. Furthermore, thinking to open immediately the course for aspirant officers and NCOs, the Army selected the participants within its personnel structure, among various level of commanding officer and NCOs.

The purpose of this course was to prepare the platoon leaders to develop training within the framework of so called "training tubes."<sup>74</sup> The selected candidate should fulfill the age criteria of 18-24 years, as well as physical health conditions, clearance of criminal records, educational level (at least have two classes of graduated high school) and have completed at least 6 months of active conscript service in the army barracks. The Army released from the active military service those aspirants who did not pass the exams at the end of the course. Meanwhile the NCOs aspiring candidates for officers, who failed to pass the exams, were allowed in case by case basis to going back to their original military unit, serving again as NCO, otherwise released from active duty. The exam questions split thorough wide academic disciplines, including subjects of history, geography, exact sciences such as the mathematics and elementary geometry. Such a course opened on March 1, 1925 in Tirana.<sup>75</sup> In addition, in November of that year took place the first full option course for preparing the aspirants within a time scope of six months. The first course had about 30 people. Later, another courses followed for Army NCOs and Gendarmerie, in Shkodra garrison. The Army gave to each participant a monthly wage, constituting the money for tuition fee as well; consequently the participants had the legal obligation of serving in active duty three years after, based on a signed contract.

The increased size of military structures, demanded the urgent measures to meet the needs for military personnel strength, thus expanding the training capacities for aspirants within the net of military schools. So, the first course, one academic year, commissioned 64 infantry aspirants and six aspirants for gunnery, which ended in January 1927.<sup>76</sup> Their training syllabus included a wide spectrum of military subjects, such as fortification, field tactics, military geography, unit regulations and code of military troops, history, topography, logic of speaking and writing skills, unit and resource management and other subjects. Compared to the curricula of previous

---

<sup>74</sup> "Training troops" old military designation of subunits of the Albanian Army.

<sup>75</sup> Proletar Hasani, Engjëllushe Sula, Asllan Zemani, "Historia e ushtrisë shqiptare" First Part (years 1912-1944), MEH (Military Editing House), Tiranë 2000, page 208.

<sup>76</sup> AQSH, Fondi Komanda Ushtarake, File No. 2, Year 1927, page 1.

courses, the current one had a higher level and more specific in aims and molded values of each aspirant. One should add to enrolling personnel trained within national military institutions, those prepared in the institutions of high professional military education of some Western countries, such as in Italy, Austria, France, and Greece. In the latter, studied a group of navy Sailors.<sup>77</sup>

It is worth mentioning that the presence of the Italian organizers, advising the commanding hierarchy of these schools influenced in enhancing the profile of our military education. In addition, the increased in number of Artillery Troops, which moved from lower formations of battery size to the larger ones, such as artillery groups, determined the establishment of additional school in the artillery branch with 20 aspirants, in Tirana.<sup>78</sup> Because the curricula of artillery is more scientific orientated, the students attending the course were selected from seniors of gymnasiums or technical schools around the country. At the same educational level were 70 aspirant candidates aspiring to graduate in the school, which have to prepare the commanding officers for machine gunners units and special weapons. This school celebrated the opening ceremony early in December, in the city of Durrës.<sup>79</sup> In a span time of 2-, 3 years the results achieved in the professional military education in Albania were out-standing. To improve the quality of this school, the high command of the Army gave orders to transform its curricula, with some concerted efforts to establishing a proper ratio between theory and practice, and the duration of that course.

On November 1, 1928 was inaugurated the Royal Military School in Tirana and on October 15 of that year the Artillery School.<sup>80</sup> Nevertheless, the Albanian military education during this period, although increased both in numbers and in its academic content, did not practiced courses longer than one year. Despite of many shortcomings, this professional military education helped to some extent, on fulfilling the personnel strength of the Albanian Army with commissioned and non commissioned officers (NCOs), who conducted the organised activities and daily routine of their military units. In 1929, officer corps was accounted for nearly 4% of all Albanian military manpower, however later, during the years 1929-1939, this figure changed in proportion to the growing demands of the Army units' authorised strength. Of course, the financial treatment of military personnel was within the financial possibilities of the country economy and military etiquette.

As for the officer corps the intent was to entwist those factors, which enhance the military carrier, such as age, level of intelligence and professional culture, military ethics, etc. In achieving these goals, a selection was conducted, which supported the recruitment of officers among the young's, not connected previously with military service, however had accomplished the general high education. The organisers used other sources as well, such as recruiting officers and NCOs from reserve rosters, who graduated in proper schools. Some former officers from the

---

<sup>77</sup> Proletar Hasani, Engjëllushe Sula, Asllan Zemani, "Historia e ushtrisë shqiptare" Part one (years 1912-1944), SHBU, Tiranë 2000, page 209.

<sup>78</sup> AQSH, Fondi Komanda Ushtarake, File No. 2, 1927, page 4, (Published in no. 368/11, date 5 mars 1927).

<sup>79</sup> AQSH, Fondi Kryeministria, File No. 2, Xhaketa 659, page 99.

<sup>80</sup> Ligje, dekretligje e rregullore të vjetit 1928, përmbledhje, Tiranë 1939, No. 198, date November 3, 1928.

period of the Republic, who were disposed from the Army for political reasons, re-entered in active duty service, also. The entrance of Italian officers in the Albanian military service almost in all sectors and its formations was another source of recruitment.<sup>81</sup> All these measures were associated with the conduct of courses based on branches of weapons and combat service supports, so the officers were able to receiving the appropriate level of preparation, due to the general conviction that they could have a good physical, intellectual and ethical condition.

The foundation for preparation of lower ranking officers remained military schools, which continued working in our country. So remained the Royal Military School, which continued to develop regular educational programs until 1933, when it was closed for insufficient budgeting.<sup>82</sup> Another school, which was active during '30s years was the Officer Reserve School (School of Completion), located in Tirana. The frequenting students were them from high school graduates or various university bachelor students, public administration personnel, etc. Also, since 1929, was functional the Advanced Officer Training School (The Perfection Officers School), located also in Tirana. The enrolled cadre comprised various military ranking officers who came to meet the increased standards of their professional knowledge, gaining the right for next military rank, if graduated successfully.<sup>83</sup>

The Royal Military School was sending students in Italy during 1932, based on bilateral cooperation programs, supporting them financially.<sup>84</sup> In general, the primary source of education and training in this period were military colleges of Italy, worth to be mention: Military College of Rome, Naples Military College, Academy of Ordnance (Artillery) and Engineer in Turin, Academy of Infantry and Cavalry in Modena, the Naval Academy in Livorno, etc. In the above mention, academies studied dozens of Albanian officers who served afterwards in the structures of the Albanian Army.

Another level qualification after the academy graduation was one pursued by a limited number of senior Albanian service members, also overseas. Such was the War College in Turin, San-Sir College of France, etc. In order to put the process of overseas qualifications on juridical tracks, some legal criteria were approved, defining more proper and transparent set of procedures on the eligibility of each candidate. Starting the year 1932, Army published "The Regulation on rules for sending officers overseas."<sup>85</sup> Furthermore, in August of 1935, King Zogu received General Alberto Pariani.<sup>86</sup> While discussing on military training issues, Pariani promised to train into Italy all young Albanians who would choose a military career.

---

<sup>81</sup> Flamur Skraparliu, Disertacion: "Arsimimi ushtarak dhe përgatitja taktike e oficerit shqiptar gjatë viteve 1912-1944", Tiranë 2000, page 29.

<sup>82</sup> Proletar Hasani, Engjëllushe Sula, Asllan Zemani, "Historia e ushtrisë shqiptare", Part one (1912-1944), SHBU, Tiranë 2000, page 263.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, page 263.

<sup>84</sup> "Shqipërija më 1937", Volume two (Commission publication of 25 th anniversary celebrations of self governance 1912-1937), Tirana 1938, page 135.

<sup>85</sup> Proletar Hasani, Engjëllushe Sula, Asllan Zemani, "Historia e ushtrisë shqiptare" Part one (1912-1944), SHBU, Tiranë 2000, page 264.

<sup>86</sup> AQSH, Fondi i Legatës Italiane, File no. 3229, date August 29, 1931.

Part of Joint Armed Forces of Albanian Kingdom was The Gendarmerie, also. Historically, Armed Forces of Albania has fulfilled their missions in the defence of the state borders from external aggressions and border security management. The Gendarmerie did not make any exception, however the main mission of gendarmerie was domestic security as executive agency on rule of law. This was the case until the late '30. It is well-known fact that cadre education standards within Gendarmerie were improved year after year, starting from 1920 and onwards until 1938. This is obvious, if we consider the net of regular gendarmerie schools, established around the country in some cities, such as (Durrës, Tirana, Vlorë, and Burrell) and especially the contemporary curricula that they were delivering.

### **The previous experience-a basis for consolidation of partisan formations**

Antifascist National Liberation War was an important period in the history of Albania. In these years were "poured in" the secular experience, when the new ways began to developing the art of war fighting, such as the creation, organization and preparation of the National-Liberation Movement and structuring of its Army (LANÇE) for national liberation war. The creation of this army under the severe circumstances of Nazi-fascist occupation and ruined economic and military conditions was a multi-complex task and a strategic priority of the national survivability, in other words to be part of Nazi-fascist triangle or dignified and contributor member of anti-Nazi Alliance. LANÇE highlighted the values of educated cadres, who distinguished themselves for patriotism and military professionalism. In solving its strategic tasks such as structuring, managing and conducting the operational engagement, LANÇE needed above all many highly qualified individuals, with potential skills in military affairs, social interaction and traditional Albanian culture.

Many high ranking commanding officers of LANÇE Army (UNÇSH), were among them coming from career cadre of former Albanian Army, educated or qualified in the Albanian military schools, military academies and in other countries, such as in Italy, (Rome, Milan, Padova, Torino, Naples, etc.), Austria and elsewhere over the period of 1920-1930. Some of them helped in organizing and running the first partisan formations, as battalion or militia unit commanders, despite of some other individuals engaged in commanding posts of some military formations outside the National Liberation Front.<sup>87</sup>

The creation of the General Staff of UNÇSH, (Albanian National Liberation Army- ANLA) herald a higher degree of war and growing of its formations. Now the Albanian theatre of war began to operate larger formations, as a partisan group, assault brigades, the First Operative Zone, divisions, corps-army, etc. Undoubtedly, there were many well-known commanding and staffs officers of these formations coming from previous army. Their genuine patriotism, maturity and strong personality, gave them a great applause for their role.<sup>88</sup> Just to recall, these military personnel were accounted for 25% of heads of brigades, 75% of the directors of the First Operative Zone, 20% of heads of divisions, 50% of the top leaders of corp.-army, etc., not taking

---

<sup>87</sup> Proletar Hasani, "Histori e pashkruar", FLLAD, Tiranë 1999, page 158.

<sup>88</sup> Ibid, page 159.

into consideration a substantial numbers of such officers serving to the staffs of these formations.<sup>89</sup>

First simple form of getting combat skills for the new comers, in the war conditions, was through sharing experience, by interacting with ranking officers who came from previous cadre of career. They gained new knowledge on the military formations, the art of war, the manoeuvre and security measures while marching, the forms of engagement, frontal tactics and skirmishes, how to organize and conduct the gunfire system, reconnaissance on terrain and the enemy formations, battle command and control and other standard management procedures, necessary for a successful conduct of war. Due to the values created by the war experience and this kind of "education" and training on war-fighting zone, many of these popular commanders commissioned to receive a valid "Diploma", at the end of the war.

Nevertheless, the military training of commanding officers of ANLA become more formal and well framed within the combat units close to the last months of war, almost on the eve of liberation of the country. Around this time, some short-term courses were organized on the monthly basis. They were regular courses, taking place on the centre installations and designed for specific levels of executives, apprised and selected for their future service in ANLA (UNÇSH). Therefore, even the General Staff of the Army developed such courses within the deployed areas of military unit, at the level of assault brigades, divisions and corps as well. The curricula content dealt with the common foundation and specific military training. Respectively, the unit level managing the course conducted some theoretical and practical workshops on military and political issues, designed for both, military and political leaders as well. Just to mention, fifth Assault Brigade conducted one for a week, etc.

Certain interests and values on military training and education constitute the circulars, generalisations from previous experience, after action reports, operative communications, periodic or the guidelines send to its subordinate units by General Staff of ANLA, etc. They were valuable, especially on issues of tactics and conducting the battle, the command and control of military operations, on the perfection of coordination and co-operation, the compilation of military directive orders, etc. It may be worth to mention the circular of the General Staff (GS) regarding the experience in fighting the enemy to face the German operation on June 1944.<sup>90</sup> More, in July 1944, GS gave instructions on drafting the full orders of operation or short version, called directive orders (short executive military orders, mission oriented for assault brigades based on their area of interest and contingencies).<sup>91</sup>

The personnel's level of education and training were tested through their involvement in the process of "train the trainers" of their combat formations and during their engagements. As mentioned above, military training conducted not only at the termination of hostilities, but it also organized in time of war (in the intervals or breaks between fighting in free operational zones, etc.). Combat training was considered primary tasks since the beginning of military unit

---

<sup>89</sup> Ibid, page 159.

<sup>90</sup> Dokumenta të shtabit të Përgjithshëm, 1<sup>st</sup> Volume, Tiranë 1976, page 475-484.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid, page 453-465.

formation. The training exercises dealt with marksmanship, mainly automatic weapons, not excluded other types of them. Besides other factors, they should be able to fight and use directly in the ongoing battles “the weapons seized from the enemy.”<sup>92</sup> In addition to weapons training they make tactical drills, especially focusing on the recognition of elements of guerrilla warfare tactics. The directive was: "Our fighters must learn how to get a good fighting post and to do it right when to attack and retreat".<sup>93</sup> Simultaneously, endless tasks were undertaken to prepare for night fighting, unit protection and security measures, reconnaissance and surveillance, etc. These practical drills had their values, among other things, were subject to the preparation of cadres and leaders, as well as increase the operability of the unit formations and individual fighters for war. Here were the true laboratory to preparing new leaders and enhancing combat capabilities of their fighters. This was managed from the high leadership and their staffs, etc.<sup>94</sup>

Referring to documents of the General Staff, the subjects developed in the battlefield had significance and their features were necessary, as affecting military training of commanding officers. Training was conducted into two groups. In the first group fall: the drilling exercise and alignments, tactical exercise, weapons' description and utilisation, marksmanship, combat service support and provisions, unit protection and guard's service. In the second group went subjects: guerrilla tactic, signals training, field fortifications, combat support weapons, basics of character and personality, ethical behaviour.<sup>95</sup> The company level conducted combat training, indicating the increased demand and improvement of unit experience, on the other side shows the commanders' contribution to their subunits, influencing in enhancing the qualification of their own. The second phase of the Anti-Fascist War was accompanied by the increasing perfection of the organizational structures of NLA (UNÇL). In this process took their shape some of the necessary combat weapons and services. Having them as part of TOE (table of equipments), demanded intensive special training and acquires the recognition of technical values, especially their tactical utilisation in the battlefield operating system.

In this context, it became necessary the preliminary training and qualification of respective cadre, who managed those weapons and branches. This was achieved following short courses one week long, which were organized by the military units or their superior staffs, both divisions, corps- armada or from the General Staff of NLA. Such courses were them preparing engineers (explosive ordnance), the signals and others, conducted by brigades' staffs or centralised as Army, however under the guidance of General Staff of ANL. A great importance in successful development of quality training and combat exercises were the mission directives and circulars prepared and issued by General Staff. As such, were those associated with the preparation of gunners in the level of assault brigade,<sup>96</sup> the training and duties of reconnaissance of the companies,<sup>97</sup> the engineer teams of explosive ordnance,<sup>98</sup> the medical and sanitary personnel.<sup>99</sup>

---

<sup>92</sup> UNÇSH, Brochure 1943, page 8.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid.

<sup>94</sup> Dokumenta të Shtabit të Përgjithshëm, 1<sup>st</sup> volume, Tiranë 1976, page 247.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid, page 52-53.

<sup>96</sup> Ibid, page 31

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, page 292-294

<sup>98</sup> Ibid, page 313-314

It is understandable that the recognition and enforcement of such guidelines was qualitatively possible by subordinate formations such as them of assault brigades of NLA (National Liberation Army). Each brigade conducted its training as a mandatory task and performed its planning in advance.

The war expansion, and increasing partisan formations led up to same major tasks waiting for solution in a more organized way in front of them. On eve of the national liberation from the NAZI, more perfection of skills was needed among the military cadre coming out of war. Therefore, on November 8, 1944 the first course of "Officer Perfection,"<sup>100</sup> commenced in the liberated city of Berat.

The participants of this course were the deputy commanders of battalions and companies of Divisions I and III as well as from the Brigades XVI, II, IX, XX, XI and VIII. Opening these courses marked the resumption of organised training for military cadre. In the first course were enrolled 220 participants. The training curricula may be called diversified for that period, constituting the following subjects: political workshops, disciplinary code, tactics, topography, structuring units (TOE), individual training exercise, fortification, force protection and guarding service, firing range exercise and shooting, logistics, etc.

This period, launched a useful basis for streamlining of the Albanian military school in the following post liberation years, despite of its hardness, shortcomings, its benefits, and the durability of lessons learned.

**To conclude:**

Obviously, the military education and its school is an embedded fellow of the Albanian state, concluded based on records and documents. Showing and generalising that is not only an honour for the Albanian school and its Armed Forces, but also a permanent obligation for the relevant institutions of Albania. Albanian military education appears to be institutionalized nearly 93-years ago. Therefore, there is a tradition that we should take into account, consistently.

The military schools of the period up to 1939 have apparent educational value, which we should generalize based on all archival documents, publications and former time press. Besides that, there is solid evidence that the trend of the school managers and the curricula designers worked based on the Western military school, because they took their experience from these countries. Schools in general had common approaches, namely providing the basics of military science and art. Such, were the "Royal Military" school, the "Students of Reserve Officers ", and others focused on speciality and weapons. Much like were the artillery and the gendarmerie school in Durrës and Burrell. They were mainly school-based vocational education, tasked to conduct special military training and skills. The number of daily-enrolled residents in them was limited, in accordance to the needs of an Army, relatively small and the authorised personnel strength.

---

<sup>99</sup> Ibid, page 294

<sup>100</sup> AQFA, Fondi 474, File no. 6, Year 1984, page 6.



The military organization, training on combat skills and knowledge on military science and art, led to satisfactory levels of military strength, mobility, combat power, and ability to perform military duties aiming to victory. During wartime against Nazi-fascists, everyone tested not only the patriotism, but also the level of education and training of personnel and military leadership. Above all, the Army enhanced the education and training for the vast majority of units and subunits and their military leaders.

In spite of the ruling political elite, which ran the country after 1944, each occurrence would qualify as innovation in military education. Inauguration of the Lower Course for Officers in November 1944 was the resumption of organized education of military commanders and staff officers. From that time up to now, Albanian military education has gone through several phases, which are "readable", due to the goals, consistency, duration, content of academic curricula and relevant features.

### **Bibliography:**

#### **Archival sources**

AQFA, Fondi 149, File no. 1, Year 1921.  
AQSH, Fondi Komanda Ushtarake, File No. 4, Year 1921.  
AQSH, Fondi Komanda Ushtarake, File No. 2, Xhaketa 3, Year 1927.  
AQSH, Fondi Komanda Ushtarake, File No. 2, Year 1927.  
AQSH, Fondi Kryeministria, File No. 2, Year 1928.  
AQSH, Fondi i Legatës Italiane, Document no. 3229, date August 29, 1931.  
AQFA, Fondi 474, File no. 6, Year 1984.

#### **Published Documents**

“Shqipëria më 1937”, volumer two, edition of the Commission of the 25th anniversary celebrations of self-governing 1912-1937, Tirana, 1938.  
Ligje, dekretligje e rregullore të vjetit 1928, summary, Tiranë, 1939.  
UNÇSH, Brochurë, year 1943.  
“Dokumenta të Shtabit të Përgjithshëm”, 1st volume, Tiranë, 1976.  
Dissertation “Arsimi ushtarak dhe përgatitja taktike e oficerit shqiptar gjatë viteve 1912-1944”, by Flamur Skraparliu, Tiranë 2000.

#### **Books**

A. Boppe, “Napoleoni dhe Ali Pasha”, Tiranë 1999.  
Eqrem Çabej, “Shqiptarët midis Perëndimit dhe Lindjes”, Tiranë 1994.  
Sabri Godo, “Ali Pashë Tepelena”, printed in “A. Z. Çajupi”, Tiranë 1993.  
Proletar Hasani, “Histori e pashkruar”, FLLAD, Tiranë 1999.  
P. Hasani, E. Sula, A. Zemani, “Historia e Ushtrisë Shqiptare”, part one (vitet 1912-1944), Tiranë, 2000.  
Proletar Hasani, “Drejt Perëndimit, historia e arsimit të ushtarakëve shqiptar në perëndim në vitet 1913-1944, printed in “Grand Prind”, Tiranë 2011.

Sybi Maska, "Në gjurmët e historisë së edukimit ushtarak shqiptar", Tiranë, 1987.

"Historia e popullit shqiptar", Third Volume (Period of Independence), Publishin House "Toena", Tiranë 2007, ISBN 978-99943-1-269-6.

### **Newspapers and Magazines**

Newspaper "Populli", no. 33, date, August 29, 1919, Shkodër.

Newspaper "Ushtria dhe koha", date October 23, 1996.

Magazine "Mbrojtja", no. 10, year 2001.

## ***83 Years of Military Hospital in Albania***


Colonel Phd Luan Nikollari,  
LTC Dr. Edlira Kukeli,  
Military Institute at Central University Military Hospital (CUMH)

**Abstract.** *The Central University Military Hospital (CUMH) was founded 83 years ago, on September 26, 1929. It is one of the most important medical institutions in Albania for tradition, experience created during many years of operation, and contributing notably to the development of Albanian military and civilian medicine.*

### **Introduction**

The CUMH is the reference institution of military medicine in the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF). In the memory of many military generations the military hospital has particular importance. After structural changes in 1990, adapting the developments in the Albanian army with the assistance of NATO, CUMH was composed to fulfil the mission in support of AAF but taking on other missions: politrauma management at national level and assistance of the civilian population in case of disaster and major misfortune. The Hospital is located in the North-West of Tirana, it occupies an area 77.405 sqm and plenty of green. The History of the Military Hospital originates at the time of the Albanian Kingdom of King Ahmet Zog. It was built in September 26, 1929 at the cost of 548.894,88 gold francs. The first director of the hospital was LTC Dr. Jani Basho (1892–1957), who graduated with “excellence” and the title “Doctor Unicus Medicus” from the Austrian University Vienna in the branch obstetric-surgery.

After returning home, he was appointed chief of the health department in the National Defence Command, director of the Military Hospital (1929-1935) and personal doctor of King Zog. Dr. Jani Basho is a great name of military and civilian Albanian medicine. His name is associated with the construction of military and civil hospital projects that he brought from Vienna in 1927 which have been designed by Viennese architect Köhler. It was a two storey building, in the location where today is and operates the civil surgery hospital, in harmony with and next to the civilian hospital today, University Hospital Centre “Mother Theresa”. Military Hospital was a very distinguished conspicuous building, built according to the architecture of that time, and the same as described in the album “10 Years Albanian Kingdom”, Military Hospital of the Capital where hundreds of soldiers were healed, the valuable sons of this



Fatherland and the operations' room. It has a long corridor that connects well-lighted comfortable the rooms.

### **CUMH today**

General Military Hospital, even after liberation, continued its intensive activity in the same premises until 1957. In 1957, the Military Hospital was transferred and placed there where currently is, at Laprake, in a building built in the 1930s. At the onset, the destination of this building has been that of the children orphanage, after the war, the Command of the 1<sup>st</sup> Army Corps, later the Military School and today, the Military Hospital. Hospital capacity after the transfer to Laprakë was 400 beds, put in the first floor, trauma pavilion with 50 beds, second floor surgery with the 45 beds and the central block operator with two operation rooms. Military Hospital, today Central University Military Hospital (CUMH), is one of the most important medical institutions in the country for the tradition, the experience created in years, contribution in the development of the Albanian medicine. Medical personnel that is prepared and specialized in this institution, has left a tradition in the development and modernization of Albanian medicine.



CUMH remains the only reference of the military medicine in the Armed Forces (AF). After 1990, the changes in its structure and adaptation to the changes and developments in the Albanian Army and with the NATO assistance, it has such a structure that not only fulfils the mission in support of the AF, but by taking over another mission such as the one of treating poly-traumas nationwide.


In this way, the name of military hospital is exalted and is also known for the public, with a new dimension in accordance with the mission of the Armed Forces, in order to help the civilian population in case of disaster and calamity.

The contribution of the military hospital is indelible with respect to the medical assistance in the events of 1997 and the events of Kosovo in 1999. Nowadays, when the “epidemic of automobile traumas” brings into question the risks and people's lives every day; it still is a military hospital that manages this new disaster. As a military medical centre but also as an important national medicine institution, CUMH remains SUQU at the attention and care of the AF leaders, as well as the attention of the Health ministry and the government for empowerment and modernization.

Since the focus of public observation is sensitive regarding the medical care, the responsibility of all leaders and the entire directing staff and its medical and non medical staff, is that based on maximum efforts to provide solutions to all urgent cases, cases that in a day are on average of 50-60 cases. Poly-trauma is a very important facing moment with the health system in Albania, and in this regard, the Military Hospital has displayed and demonstrated the values, discipline and devotion.

According to the standards of military medicine, CUMH is the highest institution of the medical support at the tertiary level (role 3) and fulfils the mission in:

- AF Health support, Ministry of Interior included,
- Guard of the Republic and National Intelligence Service.
- Military and their family members according to status
- Poly-trauma at the national level.
- Foreign military on missions in Albania
- Preventive Medicine in AF.
- Health insurance in catastrophes and disasters.



CUMH has a capacity of about 230 beds with a total of 400 personnel. In the structural viewpoint, CUMH operates in three main blocks:


- National Trauma Centre (NTC)
- Military Hospital (MH)
- Institute of Military Medicine Research (IMMR)

Statistical data of the CUMH activity are quite significant and can not be compared to the medical institutions in the country. They provide not only the impression but also the full volume and capacity with which the institution operates. Geographical position, with its location at the intersection of national main roads coming from North and South "favours" the arrival of emergency flux, mainly of the automobile traumas. On average each year in CUMH we had over 35.000 medical emergencies and up 9000 cases were hospitalized.

### National Trauma Centre (NTC)


NTC plays the main role in the management of urgency and poly-trauma at the national level.

Surgery services, orthopaedic and intensive care units complete the full profile of CUMH in mission and role as the second tertiary hospital in Albania. Its personnel trains and prepares the medical teams for domestic emergencies as well as emergencies on missions abroad according to goals. Scientific and pedagogical activity with students and post-graduates completes the image of the advanced medical institution.



## Military Hospital

It plays a significant role in the field of treatment of internal diseases for military, former-military and their families, as well as in the areas of pedagogical and scientific activity with students and postgraduate ambulatory service in Polyclinic. MH has also realized ambulatory visits, medical examinations and lab tests and diagnostic operations. The area of ambulatory service has an important activity for health, physical control of the military, those recruited for the first time in AAF.




MH cares also for candidates for military students abroad and in the country, military unit and contingents before deployment missions abroad, ambulatory medical committees and Military Medical Committee (MMC)

## Institute of the Military Medicine (IMM)

The MMI follows the CUMH mission as a unique and specialized institution in the preventive of medicine in the Armed Forces for:

- Identifying and monitoring the risk factors for the Military Community,
- Prevention of diseases and epidemics, water and food security and duties of the State Sanitary Inspectorate.
- Preparation of programs and realization of information-education-counselling of the military community about health problems,
- Stimulation and support the guidelines and regulations aimed at protecting the health,
- Research in etiology, diagnosis and prognosis of the military community health problems, in cooperation with the Public Health counterpart structures in the country,



- The final goal, developing scientific strategies of control and prevention of diseases and health events in the Armed Forces.

In the strengthening and modernization process of CUMH – very significant progress is made through the investments given by the funds of the Ministry of Defence as in the case of poly-trauma emergency and block operator, reconstructions of morgue, MMI, laboratories, canalization and lighting system, and internal infrastructure.

It is also worth mentioning the great contribution of NATO countries and armies, which together with donations of the Ministry of Defence have completely transformed the military hospital. Expressing thanks and gratitude for the contribution, we would like to mention:

**Norway** Government and the NORWAC foundation for developing the Master Plan and investments conducted in almost all premises of the military hospital. Master plan drafted by them was the basis on which the donations were absorbed and reconstruction was made to transform the CUMH. **US** donations of CT-Scanner and multi-channel, ultrasound ECHO. **The Netherlands**, with much assistance, training, reconstruction and completion of the Physiotherapy, the best in the country. **Greece**, with the reconstruction and equipment of the Ambulatory Service with new and modern equipment, and training of the medium and high level medical personnel. **Germany**, with assistance in radiological equipment, surgical equipment and training of many doctors and nurses especially in the field of surgery and imagery. **Italy**, by means of the Delegation of the Italian Experts (DIE) with aid in the medical equipment and logistics, Baro-camera Project for the oxygen therapy, staff training, internal infrastructure, etc. **Turkey**, with equipment, ambulance, education of the staff high and university level at Gata Military Medical Academy in Ankara. **France**, with the training of the medical staff in surgery, anaesthesia-intensive care, aviation, tropical medicine etc. as well as in French language courses.

### Summary

“The reduced number of soldiers will not result in reduced health challenges. Instead, contemporary conflicts increase the demands for extensive knowledge within military medicine”

During these decades of the birth and progress of this vital institution, many generations of doctors and support staff have done everything to increase, improve standards, composition, dimensions and level of service, qualifications of its personnel and therefore and the honouring of its name and image in the eyes of his people and patients. Tradition will be preserved; good name will be passed over and exalted. By decree of the President of the Albanian Republic No. 6267, date.24.09.2009, CUMH was awarded the Order "Mother Teresa".

### Bibliography:

- National Library Fund, Album 1938 "10 years Albanian Kingdom"
- Master Plan of Central Military Hospital Tirana, Albania. Prepared by NORWAC Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Approved by the Ministry of Defence, January 8<sup>th</sup> 2002, 25 out of 50.
- Dr.Veli Toto “History of medical military services”, pag.89
- Dr. Jovan Basho, (Monograph for Dr.J.Basho) “Sa kam shpirt kam shpresë” pag.81-83
- Decision of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania No.465 on 02-6-2010 “Regulation of organization and functioning of the Central University Military Hospital”
- Decision of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania No.357, on 18-07-2002 granting of status "University Hospital" for CUMH.

## **SHORT GUIDANCE**

### **FOR ‘MILITARY REVIEW’ RESEARCH PAPERS**

#### **Dear contributors to the Military Review!**

“Military Review” is a research review focused on security and defense aspects. It is the magazine of the AAF military elite and prominent civilian analysts, through their research papers. The papers are not based only on information, but primarily, they provide recommendations and solutions to the most important security and defense issues, at the strategic and operational level. That means that priority number one of the Military Magazine is the applied value of the research papers.

With this purpose, we invite talented students of high military studies of Albanian Defense Academy, instructors, lecturers, researchers, analysts, commanders, chiefs and trainers of all institutions and units of the Albanian Armed Forces, and beyond, independent analysts, civilian or military security and defense, to engage and organize their community, creating highly valuable and respected research works.

In order to facilitate the efforts of the researchers, the Editorial Board of the Military Review provides the following guidance and technical data on the structure of the articles for the author (authors) of the Military Review, which should be respected by all contributors.

#### **Structure of the Article**

**Title.** Title of the article

**The author, co-author:** Name of the article’s author or co-author

**Abstract:** The abstract is a short commentary of an article. It precedes the full article. It is a brief summary of about half a page or some 400-600 words of the main findings of the article (such as, fundamental issues in the article, intentions of the author’s view, conclusions or recommendations, etc.).

**Length:** The main part of the article (including introduction and conclusions) written in Albanian/English should be 6-8 computer pages with a maximum of 15.000-25.000 characters, including “footnotes” and additional information.

**Format:** Page must be A4: Type of script: “Times New Roman” size of font 11, 5. Indent (new paragraph) is determined by a blank line. Presentation of the text is to be simple and to a minimum of styles and formatting options. Paragraphs should not be numbered; text should be a structure of 3 levels maximum. Highlighted bold text or colored letters should be avoided. Writing steep and quotes should be used only for quotations and literature sources used.

Graphs, tables and other images should be in-group formatted by avoiding their disintegration. They should be clear and closer to the text explaining them. All images should be reflected in the way that readability is not affected by reducing the size and black and white printers. If an image is taken from another source, it is essential that the respective source is quoted.

Articles should be sent in printing format and electronically to the editorial board of Military Review. For those items that do not meet the above requirements and language format, the



editorial staff decides to return to the authors for improvement, or to exclude them from the submission process.

**Documentation:** All contributors of the Military Review should respect all rights reserved policy and provide references and “footnote” throughout the article and finally to identify all the literature used for the article. “Footnotes” should respect the national and international rules correctly to include: Surname, name (referring to copyright), title of reference material, the name of the entity editor, publication place, publication year, number of pages where it relates ISBN number, website where the item is published. (E.g. SMITH, James Carl, Nowak, George. *Security in the 21st Century: History unknown. 2<sup>nd</sup> edition. New York, London: Oxford University Press, 2006. 235 p. ISBN 0071448209, [http://www.iir.cz / display.asp? LNG = uk & ida = .](http://www.iir.cz/display.asp?LNG=uk&ida=))*

**Biography:** Along with the article, the author should also send an electronic photo, and a short CV of about 100 words including: name, surname, military and research degree, job position, education, research efforts, phone number and email address.

**Style:** Writing must present a simple structure, using titles and subtitles. It is important that author use at the end of the article conclusions and recommendations on the key issues.

The article should not contain classified material and must apply the rules of classified information. Also, the article should not contain political positions or views on the issues concerned. It must respect the research orientation of this review.

For further information, please contact:

Publications Branch, Center for Defense Analyses (CDA), TRADOC Command

Mail: Komanda e Doktrinës dhe Stërviçjes, QAM, Dega e Botimeve  
Kutia Postare 24 23, Rruga e Dibrës, Tiranë, Shqipëri

Nr. Tel: 00355(4)23 63 465 ext. 1076, 1037

Nr. Fax: 00355(4)23 69 179

Email: [revistaushtarake@aaf.mil.al](mailto:revistaushtarake@aaf.mil.al) or [qam@aaf.mil.al](mailto:qam@aaf.mil.al)

**Editorial Board of the Military Review**