Dr Sarah Beck

Poor teamwork is often implicated in serious healthcare delivery failings, leading to calls for effective team improvement interventions. Taking a complex, adaptive systems perspective, we adapted an oncology team quality improvement program to make it appropriate for other areas of clinical care. Study phases included: (1) meetings with National Health Service, policy and service user representatives (n = 19), a rapid review of existing maternity teamwork interventions, and mapping of the proposed program content to an evidence-based model of team effectiveness; (2) feasibility and acceptability testing of the team questionnaire component, and content analysis of free-text responses with four maternity teams within two NHS Trusts (n = 26). Meetings with representatives highlighted the importance of non-punitive, continuous team-led assessment, and the ability to compare performance to similar teams while enabling adaptability to different team types. Program content mapped well to known components of team effectiveness. Internal consistency of the questionnaire was acceptable (Cronbach alpha = 0.79–0.92). Most team members (76.9%) reported benefits in identifying priorities for improvement. Preliminary proof of concept was supported but larger-scale evaluation including testing in other clinical areas is warranted.

Composite tool use (using more than one tool simultaneously to achieve an end) has played a significant role in the development of human technology. Typically, it depends on a number of specific and often complex spatial relations and there are thus very few reported cases in non-human animals (e.g., specific nut-cracking techniques in chimpanzees and capuchin monkeys). The innovative strategies underlying the innovation and spread of tool manufacture and associative tool use (using > 1 tools) across tool using animals is an important milestone towards a better understanding of the evolution of human technology. We tested Goffin's cockatoos on a composite tool problem, the 'Golf Club Task', that requires the use of two objects in combination (one used to control the free movement of a second) to get a reward. We demonstrate that these parrots can innovate composite tool use by actively controlling the position of the end effector and movement of both objects involved in a goal directed manner. The consistent use of different techniques by different subjects highlights the innovative nature of the individual solutions. To test whether the solution could be socially transmitted, we conducted a second study, which provided only tentative evidence for emulative learning. To our knowledge, this indicates that the cognitive preconditions for composite tool use have also evolved outside the primate lineage.

Evidence from developmental psychology on children's imagination is currently too limited to support Dubourg and Baumard's proposal and, in several respects, it is inconsistent with their proposal. Although children have impressive imaginative powers, we highlight the complexity of the developmental trajectory as well as the close connections between children's imagination and reality.

Developmentalists have investigated relief as a counterfactually mediated emotion, but not relief experienced when negative events end-so-called temporal relief. This study represents the first body of work to investigate the development of children's understanding of temporal relief and compare it with their under-standing of counterfactual relief. Across four experiments (407 children aged 4-11 years and 60 adults; 52% female), we examined children's ability to attribute counterfactual and temporal relief to others. In Experiment 1, 7-to 10-year-olds typically judged that two characters would feel equally happy despite avoiding or enduring an event that was unpleasant for one character. Using forced-choice procedures, Experiments 2 to 4 showed that a fledg-ling ability to attribute relief to others emerges at 5 to 6 years of age and that the tendency to make these attributions increases with age. The experiments in this study provide the first positive evidence in the literature as to when children can begin to attri-bute both counterfactual and temporal instances of relief to others. Overall, there was little evidence for separate developmental tra-jectories for understanding counterfactual and temporal relief, although in Experiment 4 there was an indication that, under scaffolded contexts, some children find it easier to attribute coun-terfactual relief rather than temporal relief to others.(c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/).

Recent claims contrast relief experienced because a period of unpleasant uncertainty has ended and an outcome has materialized (temporal relief)-regardless of whether it is one's preferred outcome-with relief experienced because a particular outcome has occurred, when the alternative was unpalatable (counterfactual relief). Two studies (N = 993), one run the day after the United Kingdom left the European Union and one the day after Joe Biden's inauguration, confirmed these claims. "Leavers" and Biden voters experienced high levels of relief, and less regret and disappointment than "Remainers" and Trump voters. "Remainers" and Trump voters showed an effect of precursor, experiencing little relief about the outcome that had occurred but stronger relief that a decision had been implemented. Only Trump voters who believed the election was over showed this precursor effect. Results suggest at least two different triggering conditions for relief and indicate a role for anticipated relief in voting behavior.

Developmental psychologists debate when children acquire the ability to think counterfactually about what might have been. Most researchers have focused on the reasoning structure of counterfactual thoughts, but the subject matter about which children are asked to think counterfactually has been largely neglected. I review whether children's counterfactual thinking differs across subject matter, specifically when they are asked to think about emotional, mechanistic, and temporal aspects of the world, concluding that the last is particularly important.

The use of tool sets constitutes one of the most elaborate examples of animal technology, and reports of it in nature are limited to chimpanzees and Goffin’s cockatoos. Although tool set use in Goffin’s was only recently discovered, we know that chimpanzees flexibly transport tool sets, depending on their need. Flexible tool set transport can be considered full evidence for identification of a genuine tool set, as the selection of the second tool is not just a response to the outcomes of the use of the first tool but implies recognizing the need for both tools before using any of them (thus, categorizing both tools together as a tool set). In three controlled experiments, we tested captive Goffin’s in tasks inspired by the termite fishing of Goualougo Triangle’s chimpanzees. Thereby, we show that some Goffin’s can innovate the use and flexibly use and transport a new tool set for immediate future use; therefore, their sequential tool use is more than the sum of its parts. [Display omitted] •Captive Goffin’s cockatoos are able to innovate the flexible use of a tool set•Goffin’s can switch flexibly between transporting a tool set or individual tools•Results suggest the ability to recognize the need for a tool set•Results suggest a convergence of associative tool use between birds and primates In this study, Osuna-Mascaró et al. test Goffin’s cockatoos in tasks inspired by the termite fishing of wild chimpanzees. Goffin’s are able to flexibly use and transport a tool set for immediate future use, suggesting the ability to recognize the need for both tools as a set for task success.

Tool behavior might be based on two strategies associated with specific cognitive mechanisms: cued-learning and technical-reasoning strategies. We aimed to explore whether these strategies coexist in young children and whether they are manifest differently through development. We presented 216 3- to 9-year-olds with a vertical maze task consisting in moving a ball from the top to the bottom of a maze. Two tool-use/mechanical actions were possible: rotating action and sliding action. Three conditions were tested, each focused on a different strategy. In the Opaque–Cue condition (cued-learning strategy), children could not see the mechanical action of each tool. Nevertheless, a cue was provided according to the tool needed to solve the problem. In the Transparent–No Cue condition (technical-reasoning strategy), no cue was presented. However, children could see the mechanical actions associated with each tool. In the Transparent–Cue condition (cued-learning and/or technical-reasoning strategies) children saw both the mechanical actions and the cues. Results indicated that the Opaque–Cue and Transparent–Cue conditions were easier than the Transparent–No-Cue condition in all children. These findings stress that children can use either cued learning or technical reasoning to use tools, according to the available information. The behavioral pattern observed in the Transparent–Cue condition suggests that children might be inclined to use technical reasoning even when the task can be solved through cued learning.

In four experiments, we explored the inferences people make when they learn that counterfactual thinking has occurred. Experiment 1 ( N = 40) showed that knowing that a protagonist had engaged in counterfactual thinking (compared to no counterfactual thinking) resulted in participants inferring that the past event was closer in time to the protagonist, but there was no difference in inferring how close the past event was between knowing that a protagonist made many or a single counterfactual statement(s). Experiment 2 ( N = 80) confirmed that participants were not affected by the number of counterfactual statements they read when inferring temporal closeness. Experiment 3 ( N = 49) demonstrated that participants who learned that a protagonist had engaged in counterfactual thinking were more likely to infer that the protagonist experienced the controllable event. Experiment 4 ( N = 120) indicated that participants who learned that a protagonist had engaged in counterfactual thinking were more likely to infer that the protagonist experienced the exceptional event. We concluded that the existence (but not the number) of counterfactual thoughts can lead people to infer that events were close, exceptional, and controllable, which suggests that the relations between closeness/controllability/exceptionality and counterfactual thinking are bidirectional. These results showed that as well as making inferences based on facts about the real world, people also make inferences about the real world based on hypothetical worlds.

Associative Tool Use (ATU) describes the use of two or more tools in combination, with the literature further differentiating between Tool set use, Tool composite use, Sequential tool use and Secondary tool use. Research investigating the cognitive processes underlying ATU has shown that some primate and bird species spontaneously invent Tool set and Sequential tool use. Yet studies with humans are sparse. Whether children are also able to spontaneously invent ATU behaviours and at what age this ability emerges is poorly understood. We addressed this gap in the literature with two experiments involving preschoolers (E1, N = 66, 3 years 6 months to 4 years 9 months; E2, N = 119, 3 years 0 months to 6 years 10 months) who were administered novel tasks measuring Tool set, Metatool and Sequential tool use. Participants needed to solve the tasks individually, without the opportunity for social learning (except for enhancement effects). Children from 3 years of age spontaneously invented all of the types of investigated ATU behaviours. Success rates were low, suggesting that individual invention of ATU in novel tasks is still challenging for preschoolers. We discuss how future studies can use and expand our tasks to deepen our understanding of tool use and problem-solving in humans and non-human animals.

In this study, we focus on Rubinstein-Taybi syndrome (RTS) to explore the associations between executive function deficits and repetitive behaviors. Thirty individuals with RTS completed direct assessments of inhibition, working memory and set-shifting. Informants completed repetitive behavior and executive function questionnaires. Repetitive questions were associated with poorer inhibition and working memory. Stereotypy was associated with poorer inhibition. Adherence to routines was associated with poorer set-shifting, but only on the parental report measure. No other associations were evident. There is evidence of an association between specific repetitive behaviors and executive functioning in RTS, suggesting executive dysfunction may underpin behavioral difference in RTS. The findings point towards specific associations that are of interest for further research across populations in which repetitive behaviors are present.

Regret is a common emotion that has important links with decision-making in adults. Recent research suggests that the ability to experience regret emerges relatively late in development. By around 6 years, most children will experience regret, but the likelihood of experiencing this emotion increases across childhood and into adolescence. The developmental emergence of regret seems to affect children's decision-making: Children who experience regret about a choice are more likely to make a better choice next time, and regret also seems to help children learn to delay gratification and behave more prosocially.