Dr Laura Chappell

Dataset 1: EU Democracy Support Actions  This dataset comprises democracy support actions conducted by the European Union towards the eastern neighbourhood countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) from 2010 to 2022. It includes projects that began earlier but continued or concluded after 2010. Data for 414 projects were collected from official documents, archives, and websites. The projects are categorized by individual countries and joint initiatives, offering detailed explanations of each project’s approach, objectives, domestic challenges, and opportunities. Dataset 2: EU Member States' Democracy Support Actions The dataset comprises democracy support actions conducted by seven EU member states towards the eastern neighbourhood countries from 2010 to 2022. It includes projects sourced from the OECD ODA databases (https://stats.oecd.org/qwids/) and covers the three largest projects by funding volume from the Government and Civil Society and Education sectors provided by seven EU member states: Germany, Sweden, Romania, Poland and the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) to six EU eastern neighbourhood countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.

Are EU institutions able to perform their preferred role within defence capability development? Highlighting increased demands for a stronger EU role in security, we explore how EU institutions have promoted their role within CSDP. Using role theory, we investigate the European Commission, the EDA, the EEAS and the European Parliament’s ability to promote pooled and shared defence resources in European capability development. We argue that this depends on the combination of the alignment of their original role treaty/design-based mandate with the role they perceive having; the role expectations of the big three Member States (Germany, France, UK); and the changing international environment, which may alter both role perceptions and role expectations. We find that the Commission and the EEAS have managed on occasion to promote pooled and shared defence resources overcoming Member State objections, showing autonomy in creating increased defence capability independently of MS leading to more integration within CSDP.

How useful is the concept of strategic culture for understanding when, where and how the European Union uses force? This paper will assess the extent to which agreement among the European Union Member States to conduct Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) operations is founded on a top-down approach based on a common strategic culture or alternatively on a bottom-up approach. In the latter case, a decision to deploy troops is based on specific Member States’ interests and capabilities. Four military operations will be analysed: Operation EUFOR Althea, EUFOR RD Congo, EUFOR TChad/RCA and Operation Atalanta. Emphasis is placed on whether there has been any form of decision-making based on shared beliefs, attitudes and norms regarding the use of force. The aim is to highlight whether there has been increasing convergence behind the reasoning for the deployment of European Union operations which indicates the extent to which the organisation possesses a European strategic culture.

Despite equality being considered one of the key normative foundations of the EU, gender has not yet been mainstreamed within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This article investigates the impact of institutional structures on the inclusion of a gender dimension in this policy area. The article adopts Woodward’s (2003) model of feminist triangles to unpack the role of actors and processes; specifically, highlighting key innovations and missed opportunities to integrate gender into CSDP. Focusing in particular on femocrats, the article argues that for gender mainstreaming to take place, the office of the Gender Advisor needs to bridge the division between the military and civilian dimension of CSDP. It concludes that CSDP remains largely gender blind in spite of the EU’s adoption of an action plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

This article will analyse the challenges facing CSDP through an evaluation of the impact that differing member state strategic cultures have on the EU Battlegroup Concept,, highlighted through the examples of Germany and Poland. The concept was initiated to give the EU an increased rapid reaction capacity. However, as emphasised through the cases of Germany and Poland, divergences in EU member states’ strategic cultures remain, including when, where and how force is used. When this is combined with the cost of plugging military capabilities’ gaps, the political willingness to deploy a Battlegroup can be affected. Whilst the article highlights that the role that member states want to play within CSDP as well as international expectations can override constraining factors, the Battlegroups rely on a rotation system. As some member states are more willing to deploy the Battlegroups than others, the concept risks becoming a declaratory policy thus undermining CSDP.

This chapter analyzes the key drives underpinning continuity and change in Polish foreign and security policy from 1990 to 2019. This period has marked a significant shift in Poland’s position on the European continent. From a country under Russian tutelage during the Cold War, Poland has ‘returned to Europe’, joining the EU (2004) and NATO (1999). As this chapter will highlight, while the core of Poland’s foreign and security policy has remained focused on Poland’s territorial integrity as sacrosanct, how this has been operationalized by Poland’s policy-making elites has fluctuated. This not only relates to shifts in government, but also to external drivers, not least the behavior of Poland’s neighbor Russia. In particular, Poland’s pro-active approach to participating in international military operations, whether in the context of NATO, CSDP or US coalitions of the willing, marking it as a ‘go to player’ in European defense (Whitney, Re-energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy. European Council on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 24), has been replaced by a territorial defense focus. This has been accompanied by a fortified Atlanticism and a skeptical Europeanism. Overall, however, this chapter will demonstrate that Polish foreign and security policy has shown remarkable continuity and that changes can primarily be found in how policies are designed, actioned or prioritized.

This volume explores the complex European security architecture and introduces students to the empirical, theoretical, and conceptual approaches to studying the subject. Written by experts in each subfield, it addresses key topics within the wider strategic context of international security.

The EU has been a key actor in shaping European gender regimes in post-war Europe. There is a substantial amount of work on the role of the EU as a gender actor, particularly in employment and social policy. The adoption of and consistent referral to equality as a fundamental value of the EU raises important questions about the way the EU promotes ‘soft’ values in an international setting, through its security and defence policy, particularly as the EU is trying to promote itself as a normative actor. Hence, this article sets out to analyse where gender equality, as a policy frame, is located within the European External Action Service (EEAS). Through an investigation into whether the core normative principles of gender equality and mainstreaming have permeated this policy domain, we then focus on how the EEAS reflects the EU’s gender regime, which is informed by Walby’s framework, and how this shapes mainstream security and defence policies. We find that the neo-liberal foundations of the EU permeate the way the EEAS incorporates the principle of equality, leading to a shallow understanding that focuses on adding women into existing structures.

In Germany, Poland and the Common Security and Defence Policy Laura Chappell offers a comprehensive comparative analysis of an old and a new EU Member State's perceptions of and contributions to EU security and defence at the beginning of the 21st Century. Utilising a distinct theoretical framework intertwining strategic culture and role theory, this book focuses on change and continuity in Poland and Germany's defence policies. It does this by connecting the political and the military through two case studies on the EU Battlegroup Concept and the European Security Strategy. By analysing these along with each country's general approach to security and defence it is possible to assess in which areas convergence has occurred, where divergences remain and the impact of this on the Common Security and Defence Policy including whether a European strategic culture is developing. This has important implications for the effectiveness and efficiency of the EU as an international security actor