Professor Esteban Jaimovich

We build an occupational-choice general-equilibrium model with for-profit firms, non-profit organizations and endogenous private warm-glow donations. Lack of monitoring on the use of funds implies that an increase of funds of the non-profit sector (because of a higher incomein the for-profit sector, a stronger preference for giving, or an inflow of foreign aid) worsens the motivational composition and performance of the non-profit sector. We also analyze the conditions under which donors (through linking donations to the motivational composition of the non-profit sector), non-profits themselves (through peer monitoring), or the government (using a tax-financed public funding of non-profits) can eliminate the low-effectiveness equilibrium. We present supporting case-study evidence from humanitarian emergencies and developing-country NGO sector and humanitarian emergencies.

We propose a model where the size of the public sector and aggregate output are interrelated through the occupational choice of agents who differ in their skill level and degree of public-mindedness. When the public sector attracts bureaucrats with low degree of public service motivation, they will use their position to rent seek by employing an excessive number of unskilled workers. This leads to an equilibrium with relatively high unskilled wages, which lowers profits and deters entrepreneurship. Conversely, an equilibrium with a lean public sector and greater private economic activity arises when public service motivated agents populate the state bureaucracy. These agents exert high effort and employ a limited number of unskilled workers. Our model also shows that a bloated public sector with high wages may be supported by the unskilled agents.

We provide evidence showing that the degree of diversification of import sources of finely disaggregated commodities rises monotonically along the growth path. This result is robust to different measures of import diversification and the inclusion of a large set of additional control variables. In addition, we show the process of rising import diversification takes place as countries gradually increase their spending shares in imports originating from relatively distant exporters. Highlights ► We measure diversification of import sources using the Gini and Herfindahl index. ► Diversification of import sources rises monotonically along the growth path. ► Import diversification takes place as countries gradually shift spending towards more distant exporters.

The North-South trade literature has traditionally explored conditions under which international trade might further magnify income disparities between the advanced North and the backward South. We show that even when no single country is initially more advanced than any other one and productivity changes are uniform and identical in all countries, trade may still be a source of income divergence when nonhomothetic preferences and quality ladders are jointly taken into account. Income divergence will be experienced when comparative advantages induce patterns of specialization that, although initially optimal for all countries, do not offer the same scope for quality upgrading of final products. © 2012 by the European Economic Association.

We propose a demand-driven growth theory where process innovations and product innovations fulfil sequential roles along the growth path. Process innovations must initially set the economy on a positive growth path. However, process innovations alone cannot fuel growth forever, as their benefits display an inherent tendency to wane. Product innovations are therefore also needed for the economy to keep growing in the long run. When the economy fails to switch from a growth regime steered by process innovation to one driven by product innovation, R&D effort and growth will eventually come to a halt. However, when the switch to a product innovation growth regime does take place, a virtuous circle gets ignited. This happens because product innovation effort not only keeps growth alive when incentives to undertake process innovation diminish, but it also regenerates profit prospects from further process innovation effort.

This paper presents a theory in which talented entrepreneurs are identified as the key agents driving the process of development and modernisation. Entrepreneurial skills are private information, which prevents full risk sharing. Development into a modern industrial economy might fail to take place, since potentially talented entrepreneurs may refrain from taking on the entrepreneurial risks as a way to avoid income shocks. An interesting feature of the model is the fact that the informational asymmetries are endogenous to the process of development, as they are related to the heterogeneity in entrepreneurial skills required in the manufacturing activities. © The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics 2010.

I present a theory of development in which heterogeneously talented entrepreneurs require credit to start new projects and open new sectors. During development the variety of sectors expands, which allows better sorting of entrepreneurial talent. The paper shows that, in addition to increasing the average productivity of matches between agents and sectors, this process also mitigates informational frictions in the financial markets. Furthermore, the impact of sectoral variety on the operation of financial markets gives rise to an interesting feedback between financial development and R&D effort, which may lead to different types of dynamics. A successful economy exhibits a progressive increase in the variety of sectors, which in turn enhances the operation of financial markets. However, a poverty trap may also arise. This situation is characterised by a rudimentary productive structure with poor matching of skills to activities and severely inefficient credit to talented entrepreneurs. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.

© 2015 Elsevier B.V. We propose a Ricardian trade model with horizontal and vertical differentiation, where willingness to pay for quality rises with income, and productivity differentials across countries are stronger for high-quality varieties of goods. Our theory predicts that the scope for trade widens and international specialisation intensifies as incomes grow and wealthier consumers raise the quality of their consumption baskets. This implies that comparative advantages strengthen gradually over the path of development as a by-product of the process of quality upgrading. The evolution of comparative advantages leads to specific trade patterns that change over the growth path, by linking richer importers to more specialised exporters. We provide empirical support for this prediction, showing that the share of imports originating from exporters exhibiting a comparative advantage in a specific product correlates positively with the importer's GDP per head.

This paper explores patterns of quality differentiation and specialization relying on model-level panel data of retail sales and prices of refrigerators across 23 countries in the European Union. Unlike customs data aggregated at the product category, typically used in the trade literature, model-level data allow us to test for the presence of nonhomotheticities by comparing market shares of identical models across different markets. We measure quality at the model level, account for varying willingness-to-pay for quality at different incomes, and link quality measures to objective model attributes. Using originally assembled data on the country of manufacture of each model, we study patterns of quality specialization by brands with plants in multiple countries. We find that firms locate the production of their higher-quality models in richer countries and argue that the home-market effect linked to nonhomothetic preferences is a key driver of such patterns of quality specialization.

We study the implications of transparency policies on decentralized public good provision by the non-profit sector. We present a model where imperfect monitoring of the use of funds interacts with the competitive structure of the non-profit sector under alternative informational regimes. Increasing transparency regarding the use of funds may have ambiguous effects on total public good provision and on donors' welfare. On the one hand, transparency encourages all non-profit firms to engage more actively in curbing fund diversion. On the other hand, it tilts the playing field against non-profits facing higher monitoring costs, pressing them to give up on their missions. This effect on the extensive margin implies that transparency policies lead to a reduction in the diversity of social missions addressed by the non-pro…t sector. We show that the negative impact of transparency on social missions variety and on donors' welfare is highest for intermediate levels of asymmetry in monitoring costs.

We study the implications of transparency policies on decentralised public good provision by the non-profit sector. We present a model where imperfect monitoring of the use of funds interacts with the competitive structure of the non-profit sector under alternative informational regimes. Increasing transparency regarding the use of funds may have ambiguous effects on total public good provision and on donors’ welfare. On the one hand, transparency encourages all non-profit firms to engage more actively in curbing fund diversion. On the other hand, it tilts the playing field against non-profits facing higher monitoring costs, pressing them to give up on their missions. This effect on the extensive margin implies that transparency policies lead to a reduction in the diversity of social missions addressed by the non-profit sector. We show that the negative impact of transparency on social mission variety and on donors’ welfare is highest for intermediate levels of asymmetry in monitoring costs.

We propose a model where the internal transport network facilitates the sourcing of intermediate goods from geographically diffuse locations. A denser internal transport network promotes thus the growth of industries that rely on a large variety of inputs. The model shows that heterogeneities in internal transport infrastructures can become a key factor in shaping comparative advantage and specialization. Evidence based on industry-level trade data grants support to the main prediction of the model: countries with denser road networks export relatively more in industries that exhibit broader input bases. We show that this correlation is robust to several possible confounding effects proposed by the literature, such as the impact of institutions on specialization in complex goods. Furthermore, we show that a similar correlation arises as well when the density of the local transport network is measured by the density of their internal waterways, and also when road density is instrumented with measures of terrain roughness.

We provide evidence showing that the degree of diversication of import sources of nely disaggregated commodities rises monotonically along the growth path. This result is robust to different measures of import diversication and the inclusion of a large set of additional control variables. In addition, we show the process of rising import diversication takes place as countries gradually increase their spending shares in imports originating from relatively distant exporters.